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Abstract 
This dissertation is a collection of three essays that investigates various issues related to 
market microstructure and risk management. Chapter 1 examines the determinants of 
traders' decisions to revise orders, and the profitability of traders' order revision 
strategies using a unique dataset which provides complete information on trades, orders, 
trader identification codes, and trader categories. The analysis provides three important 
results. One, informed traders and traders who function as voluntary market makers 
revise orders most intensely. Two, along with changes in market prices and other 
market conditions, changes in traders' inventories, including inventories of correlated 
stocks, influence order revision strategies. Three, informed traders reduce the execution 
costs of their order portfolios through active order revisions; the benefit is especially 
pronounced on earnings announcement days, when the value of private information is 
high. That traders employ revisions to mitigate their order submission, inventory, and 
adverse selection risks indicates that order revisions are a valuable feature of the rapidly 
proliferating electronic limit order markets. Chapter 2 examines the impact of the option 
to fail and the resultant naked short-selling on market quality. For a sample of 1,492 
NYSE securities, the study finds that naked short-selling has the same beneficial impact 
on liquidity and pricing efficiency as covered short-selling. The study does not find any 
evidence that naked short-sellers engineered price declines or distortions, or triggered 
the demise of financial firms during the 2008 financial crisis. Hence, the study 
questions the removal of the option to fail, a potentially valuable tool for limiting 
settlement-related distortions and stock-borrowing costs of all short-sellers. Chapter 3 
examines how the gold and stock markets react to corporate hedging announcements by 
xii 
gold mining firms. The gold market reaction is consistent with the market believing that 
firms have credible private information about future gold prices, which is puzzling in 
light of extant evidence that firms cannot successfully time the market when they hedge. 
After controlling for the gold market announcement effect, the study finds a strong 
negative (positive) reaction in the stock prices of the firm making the announcement 
and other gold mining firms to a hedging increase (decrease), suggesting that (a) the 
announcement also conveys information about a change in the expected cost of 
financial distress of both the firm and its industry; and (b) any shareholder benefit of a 
hedging increase is more than offset by the negative news conveyed to shareholders 
about the change in the firm‘s prospects, and vice versa. These findings provide new 
insights into the endogeneity associated with hedging policy changes and its 
confounding effect on measuring the relation between hedging and the value of the 
firm. 
1 
 
Chapter 1: The Who, Why, and How Well of Order Revisions: An Analysis 
of Limit Order Trading 
 
1. Introduction 
The largest exchanges around the world operate as electronic limit order book 
markets or at least allow for  public limit orders.
1
 A unique feature of electronic limit 
order book (LOB) markets is that liquidity is provided by a pool of voluntary market 
participants who strategically place limit orders, not by designated market makers. 
Consequently, examinations of limit order trading strategies employed by such 
voluntary liquidity providers are integral to our understanding of the evolution of prices 
and liquidity in LOB markets. This paper focuses on a prominent class of limit order 
strategies: order revisions. These are dynamic strategies that involve decisions about 
when and how to modify or cancel prevailing limit orders.
2
 Few limit order strategies 
are as ubiquitous as order revisions. Almost half of all limit orders submitted on the 
NYSE, the London Securities and Derivatives Exchange, and the Australian Securities 
Exchange are revised.
3
 Further, due to innovations in information technology, the 
incidence of order revisions has been increasing in recent years at an alarming rate. 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) document that, in 2004, the rate of 'fleeting orders' — order 
                                                 
1
 See Jain (2005) and Swann and Westerholm (2006) 
2
I collectively refer to order cancellations and modifications, wherein the limit price and/or quantity 
specifications of the order are changed, as order revisions. Order cancellation is effectively a revision of 
the quoted volume to zero. 
3
 Coppejans and Domowitz (2002) , Yeo (2005), and Fong and Liu (2010). 
2 
cancellations within two seconds of submission —  on INET was 36% of submitted 
limit orders, twice its value in 1999.
 4
 Similarly, Hendershott et al. (2011) find that 
when the NYSE automated the dissemination of the inside quote in 2003, the orders-to-
trades ratio, which proxies for the intensity of order cancellations,  increased manifold.  
The increasing incidence of order revisions, especially cancellations, has 
recently attracted regulatory scrutiny. Market regulators such as the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in the 
US, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK, and the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI) have filed charges against numerous market participants for 
having employed manipulative order cancellation strategies.
5
 Even the recently passed 
Dodd-Frank act specifically discusses manipulative order cancellations, and has added 
the same to the list of unlawful "Disruptive Practices".
6
 Order cancellations are also 
suspected of having played a significant role during the infamous 'Flash Crash' of May 
6, 2010 — when the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost and gained 9% within minutes.  
Consequently, regulators are considering various actions to discourage order revisions. 
The SEC is debating the introduction of an order cancellation fee, and the European 
Commission (EC) has proposed imposing a minimum resting period before an order can 
be revised and/or limiting traders' order cancellations rates to a pre-specified level.
 7
  
                                                 
4
 INET is an electronic communications network (ECN) LOB market. See Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) for 
further details. 
5
 For example, see CFTC press release PR6007-11; SEC press release 2001-129; SEBI press release 254. 
6
‗‗Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act‘‘: 
www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf 
7
 "SEC chief looks to fix market structure", Reuters (March 1, 2011).   Document titled "Consultation 
Document" dated December 8, 2010:http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/mifid_en.htm 
3 
Despite the prevalence of order revision strategies in LOB markets around the 
world and the recent regulatory concern, few studies have empirically analyzed limit 
order revisions.  Liu (2009), Hasbrouck and Saar (2009), and Fong and Liu (2010) 
provide valuable characterizations of order revisions. However, probably due to data 
limitations, our understanding of the rationale for, and the profitability of, order 
revisions remains incomplete. This paper employs a unique database drawn from one of 
the largest electronic LOB markets, the National Stock Exchange, India (NSE). The 
database provides complete information on trades, orders, trader identification codes, 
and trader classifications for a sample of 50 stocks, which constitute the Standard & 
Poor's CNX Nifty index, between April 1 and June 30, 2006.
 8
 The richness of the 
database enables the paper to answer three important and hitherto unaddressed 
questions. First, what type of traders revise orders? Second, how do trader inventories 
and market characteristics affect trader's decision to revise an order? And, third, do 
traders profit from the active management of their order portfolios through order 
revisions? Apart from adding to our understanding of order revisions, answers to the 
aforementioned questions also provide vital insight into the determinants of limit order 
trading and the role of informed traders in the rapidly evolving LOB markets. 
The empirical analysis provides a number of new results. Traders who are 
members of the exchange (the voluntary dealers at the NSE), traders who curtail the 
size of their over-night inventories to a small fraction of their daily trading volume, and 
traders who regularly post a network of buy and sell orders around the mid-quote revise 
a significantly greater proportion of their orders than others. In sum, the de facto market 
                                                 
8
 The index represents almost 60% of the exchange's market capitalization, and covers 21 sectors of the 
economy. 
4 
makers or middlemen in the market prominently employ order revisions. That the de 
facto market makers greatly utilize order revisions supports the general implication of 
inventory management models that dealers with finite capital actively adjust their 
quotes to manage inventories.
 9
 Further, traders belonging to financial institutions, 
frequent traders, and traders who generally place large orders revise a significantly 
greater proportion of their orders than other traders. This result underlines the role of 
informed traders
10
 in limit order trading; while it contradicts the traditional assumption 
that informed traders participate only through market orders, it adds to the emergent 
view
11
 that informed traders strategically provide liquidity in LOB markets. 
Results from the proportional hazards duration models show that traders closely 
monitor their outstanding limit orders and strategically respond to changes in their 
inventories and in market conditions through order revisions.
 12
 Specifically, consistent 
with the inventory control models, traders are more likely to cancel or negatively 
modify — move the limit price away from the prevailing mid-quote — a buy (sell) 
order when their inventory in the stock increases (decreases) after submitting the order. 
Similarly, traders are less likely to positively modify a buy (sell) order when their 
inventory in the stock increases (decreases) post its submission. The results are also 
                                                 
9
 See, for example, Amihud and Mendelson (1980), O'Hara and Oldfield (1986), Madhavan and Smidt 
(1993). 
10
 Kumar et al. (2009), who employ the same dataset as the current paper, find that orders placed by 
institutional traders, especially by financial institutional traders, are significantly more informed than 
those placed by individual traders. Numerous other studies have also found  similar evidence in different 
settings. See, for example, Bartov et al. (2000) and  Campbell et al. (2007),  Chakravarty (2001),  Anand 
et al. (2005),  Boehmer and Kelly (2008), and  Boehmer et al. (2008). 
11
 See, for example, Bloomfield et al. (2005) and Anand et al. (2005). 
12
 Similar to Hasbrouck and Saar (2009), I use hazard models to accommodate time varying covariates. 
While in their models only the best quotes are time varying,  here I also introduce time varying inventory 
variables. 
5 
consistent with the dynamic limit order models proposed by Harris (1998), Foucault et 
al. (2005), Goettler et al. (2005 and 2009), and Rosu (2011). These models imply that 
because inventory imbalances increase waiting costs (costs of delayed execution), 
traders, especially the de facto market makers, will place aggressive orders so as to 
correct their inventory imbalances. Furthermore, changes to trader inventories in 
correlated stocks also have a similar effect on order cancellations. For example, traders 
are more likely to cancel a buy order in stock s when their inventories in stocks that 
belong to the same industry (2 digit SIC) as stock s increase after submitting the buy 
order. This result supports the Ho and Stoll (1983) inventory management model, which 
implies that traders actively adjust their quotes in a stock to manage their 'equivalent' 
inventories — inventory in the stock corrected for inventory positions in all other stocks 
with correlated returns — and not just their ordinary inventory in the stock. The 
equivalent inventory effect is not statistically significant for order modifications. 
Trader category matters. Hazards duration models also show that even after 
controlling for trader inventories, order characteristics ,and market conditions, an order 
is more likely to be revised if it is submitted by an institutional trader. This evidence 
adds further credence to the hypothesis that informed traders revise a greater proportion 
of their limit orders than the uninformed. Also, consistent with extant literature, 
aggressively priced orders (Hasbrouck and Saar ,2009 and Fong and Liu, 2010) and 
large orders (Liu, 2009) are more likely to be revised. I also find evidence in favor of 
the 'chasing' hypothesis posited by Hasbrouck and Saar (2009); order cancellations and 
positive order modifications are more likely when prices move away from an order, 
while negative modifications are less likely.  
6 
Finally, panel regression analysis of execution costs of traders' order portfolios 
show that institutional traders, especially those belonging to financial institutions, 
significantly benefit from order revisions. Specifically, controlling for market 
conditions, stock characteristics, and trader's skill (through trader fixed effects), I find a 
negative relation between the number of times an order in an institutional trader's 
portfolio is revised and the portfolio's execution cost — measured by a modified13 
version of the Perold (1988) implementation shortfall method.  Results also show that 
institutional traders reduce the adverse selection costs of executed trades and the 
opportunity costs associated with unexecuted orders through order revisions. These 
results indicate that institutional traders use order revisions to 'time' the limit order 
book; when the mid-quote is, say, below the fundamental value, they positively modify 
buy orders — 'walk up' the book — to ensure executions, and/or they negatively modify 
or cancel sell orders — 'walk down' the book — to avoid executions. In 
contradistinction, these results do not hold for individual traders. Bloomfield et al. 
(2005) argue that informed traders have a competitive advantage in limit order trading 
because they can manage adverse selection risk better than other traders. The panel 
regression results show that order revisions are one of the strategies through which 
                                                 
13Since order revisions are prominently employed by intermediaries, who are not 
precommitted to orders, as suggested by Harris and Hasbrouck (1996), the modified 
measure accounts not only for the cost of order execution (Price Impact) and the 
opportunity cost of unexecuted orders (Opportunity Cost), but also for the adverse 
selection spread, measured by the movement in market prices subsequent to the 
execution of orders (Ex post performance).  
7 
informed traders actualize this competitive advantage. Further, financial institutional 
traders use order revisions to mitigate the incremental execution costs on earnings 
announcements days, when information uncertainty and the value of private information 
are high. Bloomfield et al. (2005) show that, in an experimental set-up, informed traders 
use market orders when the value of information is high. Results here show that 
informed traders use order revisions to mitigate the incremental costs of liquidity 
provision when the value of information is high.  
This paper directly contributes to the small but growing literature on order 
revision strategies. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to show that 
informed traders and de facto market makers use order revisions the most, that changes 
in traders' ordinary and equivalent inventories influence their order revision strategies, 
and that informed traders use order revisions to reduce the execution costs of their order 
portfolios.  These findings also contribute to our understanding of at least three more 
important aspects of limit order trading.  
First, extant empirical studies on limit order trading have neglected the effect of 
inventory management on traders' limit order strategies.  Current empirical papers have 
focused mostly on the influence of spreads (e.g., Harris,1998; Biais et al.,1995), depth 
(e.g., Beber and Caglio, 2002; Ranaldo, 2004), volatility (e.g., Ahn et al., 2001; Handa 
et al., 2003), and pre-trade transparency (e.g., Aitken et al., 2001; De Winne and 
D'Hondt, 2007;Bessembinder et al., 2009) on limit order strategies. Bloomfield et al 
(2005) find that large liquidity traders, when placed with a deadline, place market 
orders instead of limit orders. However, there results are based on an experimental 
setup, not an actual LOB market. This is the first paper to provide direct empirical 
8 
evidence of the inventory effect in limit order books. Similarly, the result that limit 
order strategies in a stock are also dependent on traders' inventories in related stocks 
(equivalent inventory) is also a novel finding; this is the first study to find evidence 
consistent with the Ho and Stoll (1983) model of equivalent inventory management. 
The inventory effect documented here should be especially instructive because of the 
increasing role of high frequency traders (HFTs) in LOB markets. HFTs, who account 
for more than 50% of trading volume in the US and European markets, are generally the 
implicit market makers in modern LOB markets.
14
 More importantly, their trading 
strategies invariably involve high trading volumes and low (intraday and overnight) 
inventories.
15
 Similar to the exchange members at the NSE, HFTs' order submissions 
will be significantly influenced by their inventory imbalances. Also, since monitoring 
costs are negligible for HFTs, they trade simultaneously in multiple securities and 
markets.  Hence, the equivalent inventory effects documented in this study should be 
particularly profound for such traders and for the LOB markets they trade in.  
 Second, few papers have examined the profitability of limit order strategies. 
Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) find that conditional on execution, limit orders are more 
profitable than market orders; Griffiths et al. (2000) examine the relation between order 
aggressiveness and  performance; Bessembinder et al. (2009) find a negative relation 
between the use of hidden quantity and execution costs. These papers analyze the 
performance of individual orders, not of a traders' portfolio of orders. Given the 
frequent order cancellations and resubmissions in LOB markets around the world, the 
                                                 
14
 See, for example, Jovanovic and Menkveld (2010), Hendershott and Riordan (2009), and Brogaard 
(2011). 
15
 Kirilenko et al. (2010). 
9 
net execution cost of a trader's portfolio of orders should be the more pertinent measure 
of performance.  To that end, Handa and Schwartz (1996) analyze the profitability of 
placing a network of buy and sell orders. However, there examination is based on 
executions of hypothetical limit orders given actual price time series, not actual 
transactions. This paper adds to the literature on the profitability of limit order strategies 
by examining the relation between execution costs of a trader's portfolio of orders and 
an important aspect of limit order trading — order revisions. 
Third, this study also adds to the literature on the role of informed traders in 
limit order books. The traditional models (e.g., Rock,1996; Glosten,1994; and 
Seppi,1997) that assumed that limit orders were submitted only by uninformed traders 
have been recently questioned. Kaniel and Liu (2006) posit that informed traders will 
prefer to submit limit orders more than market orders, especially when their information 
is persistent. Goetler et al. (2009) theorize that in a dynamic limit order market with 
asymmetric information, informed traders submit a large proportion of limit orders even 
when their information is short lived. Bloomfield et al. (2005) use an experimental 
electronic market to show that pre-identified informed traders use more limit orders 
than uninformed. Anand et al. (2005), similar to the current study, indentify institutional 
traders as informed traders. Consistent with Bloomfield et al. (2005), they find that 
informed traders shift from market to limit orders over the course of the trading day. 
However, extant  empirical evidence is based either on an experimental market 
(Bloomfield et al., 2005) or on the two decade old TORQ dataset
16
 (Anand et al., 2005). 
This paper adds to the literature by providing evidence of informed limit order trading 
                                                 
16
 Audit trial data on NYSE stocks between November 1990 and January 1991. 
10 
in a (relatively) modern pure LOB market. More importantly, unlike extant studies, this 
paper documents that informed traders significantly benefit from active limit order 
trading.  
The findings in this paper have implications for market regulators as well. 
Importance of order revisions stems from the result that informed traders and voluntary 
market makers prominently employ them. These two, often overlapping, classes of 
traders dictate the evolution of prices and liquidity in LOB markets. Consequently, if 
the option to revise orders were to become costlier due a regulatory directive, pricing 
efficiency and liquidity could be adversely affected. Specifically, the de facto 
intermediaries use order revisions to mitigate their information and inventory risks. In 
the absence of order revisions, they will maintain larger limit order spreads as a 
compensation for the increased risks, resulting in higher transaction costs for liquidity 
demanders. Further, as argued by Handa and Schwartz (1996), "the viability of LOB 
markets depends on limit order trading being profitable for a sufficient number of 
public participants." The results here show that the order revisions enhance limit order 
profitability for informed  traders. If order revisions were to become costlier, due to 
reduced profitability, informed traders may opt for alternative means of trading, such as 
trading in 'dark pools' or in upstairs markets (Bessembinder et al., 2009). Such a 
development could potentially impede price discovery in LOB markets.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the extant literature on 
limit order revisions, and presents the testable hypotheses. Section III describes the data 
and the institutional features of the NSE. Section IV examines the relation between 
trader categories, styles, and order revisions.  Results from duration analysis of order 
11 
cancellations and modifications are presented in Section V. In Section VI, I examine the 
relation between order revisions and performance of trader's order portfolios. Section 
VII presents concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1. Literature on Limit Order Revisions 
Literature on limit order revisions is still in its infancy, and has recently 
witnessed a spurt in interest. Liu (2009) theorizes and empirically tests the relation 
between limit order revisions, the management of 'free trading option' and non-
execution risks, and monitoring costs. Empirical examination of 23 stocks from the 
Australian Stock Exchange finds evidence in favor of his theory that order revision 
activity is higher when order submissions risks are higher, when spreads are narrower, 
and when the concerned firm is larger.  Fong and Liu (2010) also find evidence in line 
with that of the Liu (2009). More specifically, they document that order revision 
activity increases with free trading option and non-execution risks, size of the order, and 
decreases with costs of monitoring. They also find evidence that order revisions are 
succeeded by favorable mid-quote returns. Further evidence linking order cancellations 
and monitoring costs in found in Boehmer, Saar and Yu (2005). They document an 
increase in the intensity of limit order cancellations and a decrease in time-to-
cancellations after the introduction of NYSE's OpenBook, which increased pre-trade 
transparency. Evidence on the relation between order revisions and free-option risk is 
also documented by Biais et al. (1995). They find that after large sales (buys), which 
convey negative (positive) information, rate of cancellations increases on the buy (sell) 
12 
side of the book. They also find positive serial correlation in order cancellations in a 
sample of stocks trading on the Paris Bourse; Ellul et al. (2007) find a similar 
autocorrelation on the NYSE. An explanation for this autocorrelation is provided by 
Yeo (2005), who documents that majority of cancellations originate from split orders. 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) study the phenomena of fleeting orders — orders 
that are cancelled within two seconds of submission — in a sample of 100 NASDAQ 
stocks traded on the INET platform. They find evidence indicating that fleeting orders 
are submitted by impatient traders chasing market prices and searching for latent/hidden 
liquidity. Further, they document that rapid order cancellations are a consequence of 
automation and fragmentation in markets. Theoretical explanations for fleeting orders 
have been put forth by Large (2004) and Rosu (2011). Large (2004) proposes a model 
wherein resolution of order flow uncertainty leads to fleeting orders. Rosu (2011) 
presents a dynamic model of limit order trading where agents are allowed to modify and 
cancel orders. This theory posits that when limit order books are full, traders cancel 
preexisting limit orders and place market order to expedite execution.  
2.2. Contributions and Testable Hypotheses 
While the aforementioned studies have examined some important determinants 
of order revisions, our understanding of this recent phenomena is far from complete. 
This paper is distinguished from the extant literature for at least three reasons. One, I 
examine the characteristics of traders that employ order revision strategies. Two, I relate 
order revision decisions to inventory management of traders. Finally, I also analyze the 
relation between order revisions and performance of traders' portfolio of orders. The 
next section develops the hypotheses relating to the unique contributions of the paper. 
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2.2.1. Inventory management and order revisions 
 The literature on dealer markets has extensively examined  the role of 
inventory management in establishing a dealer's  trading behavior and market liquidity. 
Starting from Garman(1976), inventory management models (e.g., Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1980; Ho and Stoll, 1981 and 1983; O'Hara and Oldfield, 1986; Madhavan 
and Smidt ,1993) theorize that since a dealer has access only to finite or limited capital, 
he must actively adjust his prices or quotes to manage inventory.  As noted by 
Madhavan (2000), a general implication of these models is that when a dealer's 
inventory is above (below) its optimal level, the dealer is more (less) likely to sell rather 
than buy the security.  Empirical studies find evidence mostly in favor of these 
inventory management models. Ho and Macris (1984) show that specialists quotes in 
the AMEX options market are significantly affected by their inventories; the specialist 
decreases his bid and ask quotes when his inventory is positive. Hasbrouck (1988) and  
Madhavan and Smidt (1991) document weak intraday effects of specialists inventory 
management in equity markets, and Madhavan and Smidt (1993) find  that the specialist 
inventory adjustments are slow and have a half-life of 7.3 days. On the other hand, 
Lyons (1995) using intraday data on dealer positions finds a strong evidence in favor of 
the inventory-control effect on prices. Similarly, Manaster and Mann (1996) use data on 
locals' intraday inventory positions in the commodity markets and find strong support in 
favor of the inventory models: locals with long (short) positions are the most active 
sellers (buyers). Comerton-Forde et al (2010) document a positive relation between 
NYSE specialists' overnight inventories  and market spreads. 
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More recently, models of dynamic limit order trading have formalized the effect 
of inventory imbalances on limit order submission strategies. Harris (1998), Foucault et 
al. (2005), and Rosu (2009) propose models wherein an inventory imbalance increases 
the waiting costs — costs of  delayed or non-execution of orders — for a trader. Hence, 
the impatient trader finds it optimal to place orders aggressively so as to rebalance his 
portfolio, particularly when faced with a deadline. In Goettler et al. (2005 and 2009), 
traders with liquidity or inventory rebalancing motives have a predisposition (private 
value) to placing orders on one side of the book over the other. A trader with a positive 
inventory imbalance is more likely to be aggressive on the sell side rather than on the 
buy side. Although empirical studies are yet to examine inventory effects in LOMs, 
Bloomfield et al (2005) find evidence supporting the same in an experimental set-up. 
They find that large liquidity traders (traders constrained to meet a target by a deadline) 
place limit orders to begin with, but as the deadline approaches place market orders to 
ensure execution of their outstanding orders.   
The implications of the inventory control models for order revisions are 
immediate. A liquidity provider should revise his preexisting limit orders in response to 
changes in his inventory; for example, he should respond to an increase in his inventory 
by cancelling or by negatively (positively) modifying his preexisting buy (sell) order.
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Accordingly, I state my first set of hypotheses. 
 
H1a: A trader's propensity to cancel a buy (sell) order increases (decreases) after 
his inventory in the same stock increases. 
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 A positive modification is one where an order's price is revised aggressively. 
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H1b: A trader's propensity to negatively modify a buy (sell) order increases 
(decreases) after his inventory in the same stock increases. 
H1c: A trader's propensity to positively modify a buy (sell) order decreases 
(increases) after his inventory in the same stock increases. 
 
Of particular importance to the current study is the model proposed by Ho and 
Stoll (1983). They solve the dealer's pricing problem by relaxing the assumption of 
dealer monopoly and  accommodating multiple dealers, which is a primary attribute of 
limit order markets.  They show that a dealer's reserve price depends, among other 
things, on his equivalent inventory in the stock.  In other words, a dealer revises his 
quotes in stock 's' based not just on his inventories in 's' (ordinary inventory), but also 
based on his inventories in other stocks whose returns are correlated with those of stock 
's'(equivalent inventory). However, Naik and Yadav (2003) find that trading behavior of 
dealer firms in the London Stock Exchange is governed by ordinary inventories rather 
than their equivalent inventories. They argue that due to limitations on real time 
communication between traders and complications in performance evaluation, dealer 
firms adopt a decentralized framework  of market-making, wherein every individual 
trader manages his inventory in isolation without regard to firm-level equivalent 
inventories. Notwithstanding the Naik and Yadav (2003) study, the dealer-level pricing 
problem vis-à-vis equivalent inventories as theorized by Ho and Stoll (1983) remains 
untested. Unlike their study, the current one employs trader-level data that enables a 
direct examination of the theory. 
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To the extent that stocks in the same industry (2 digit SIC) are highly correlated, 
an implication of the Ho and Stoll proposition is that a liquidity provider's order 
revision behavior should also be guided  by his inventory in stocks from the same 
industry as the concerned stock. For example, a liquidity provider will respond to an 
increase in his inventory in stocks from the same industry as the concerned stock by 
cancelling or negatively (positively) modifying his preexisting buy (sell) order in stock 
s. Accordingly, I state my next set of hypotheses. 
 
H2a: A trader's propensity to cancel a buy (sell) order increases (decreases) after 
his inventory in stocks from the same industry as the concerned stock increases. 
H2b: A trader's propensity to negatively modify a buy (sell) order increases 
(decreases) after his inventory in stocks from the same industry as the concerned stock 
increases. 
H2c: A trader's propensity to positively modify a buy (sell) order decreases 
(increases) after his inventory in stocks from the same industry as the concerned stock 
increases. 
 
We can also test the relation between order revisions and inventory management 
by examining the nature of traders who employ order revisions on a regular basis. 
Intermediaries are most concerned about inventory management. If order revisions are 
driven by inventory management (amongst other factors), we should find traders 
performing an intermediary function employing order revisions more than other type of 
traders.  
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H3a: Intermediaries revise a greater proportion of orders than other traders. 
 
2.2.2. Order Revisions and Performance 
 Limit orders are ex ante commitments to trade a fixed quantity of shares 
at a specific price. Hence, Copeland and Galai (1983) treat them as free options written 
by limit order traders to other market participants. The limit order trader faces the risk 
of being 'picked off' when the market prices move adversely after he places the limit 
order. To ensure that limit orders do not go 'stale', traders monitor market events after 
placing the order. In the model proposed by Foucault et al. (2003), NASDAQ dealers 
choose to monitor market events after placing their quotes in order to minimize the risk 
of being picked off by professional day traders. Liu (2009) extends the Foucault et al. 
(2003) model to incorporate non-execution risk, and also allows traders to revise posted 
limit orders. In his model, limit order traders weigh the benefits of monitoring against 
the costs of non-execution and free-option risk while placing orders. Even in Goetler et 
al. (2009), traders revise unexecuted limit orders so as to reflect changes in market 
conditions. In their model, traders choose to revise orders when the benefit from 
adjusting the order's specifications to reflect changes in market factors is greater than 
the cost incurred from losing the order's time priority due to the revision. The emergent 
intuition from these models is that order revisions are a consequence of traders 
monitoring and strategically responding to changing market conditions. Further, the 
objective of a revision is to ensure that the revised order reflects the trader's new 
expectation of market conditions and other factors that affect the order's payoff. 
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Consequently, revised orders should contain more information and perform better than 
other orders. Accordingly, I state the following hypothesis: 
 
H4a: Performance of an order is positively related to the number of times it is 
revised. 
 
Extant literature has consistently found that institutional traders are more 
informed than individual traders. For example, Bartov et al. (2000) and  Campbell et al. 
(2007) find that institutions take positions to arbitrage mispricing around earnings 
announcements; Chakravarty (2001) and Anand et al. (2005) find that institutional 
orders have a significantly greater price impact than orders placed by individuals; 
Boehmer and Kelly (2008) show that prices of stocks with greater institutional 
ownership are more efficiently prices and Boehmer et al. (2008) document that 
institutional short sales are more informed than short sales initiated by other traders. 
Kumar et al. (2009), who employ the same dataset as the current paper, conduct an 
examination of the informativeness of orders placed by different traders on the NSE. 
They find that the information level of institutional traders, especially financial 
institutional traders, is significantly greater than the information level of  individual 
traders. Accordingly, if limit order revisions are indeed employed more by informed 
traders, we should expect institutional traders to revise orders more frequently than 
others.  
 
H5a: Institutional traders employ order revisions more frequently than others. 
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Unlike other traders, informed traders can recognize mispricing in securities. 
There trading strategies are also a consequence of market prices straying away from 
fundamental values. Indeed, Bloomfield et al. (2005) show that informed traders 
strategically place aggressive orders to arbitrage mispricing in market prices. Since 
order revisions enable traders to dynamically respond to evolving market conditions, 
informed traders will employ them also to actualize their informational superiority. In 
contrast, other traders will be able to use order revisions only to manage information 
and inventory risks. Therefore, the relation between order revisions and order 
performance should be more positive for informed (institutional) traders than for other 
market participants. 
 
H6a: Order performance is more positively related to the number of revisions 
for institutional traders than it is for other market participants. 
 
3. Data 
NSE was created in 1994 as part of major economic reforms in India. It operates 
as pure electronic limit order book market, and uses an automated screen based trading 
system called National Exchange for Automated Trading (NEAT), which enables 
traders from across India to trade anonymously with one another on a real-time basis 
using satellite communication technology. NSE was the first exchange in the world to 
use satellite communication technology for trading. In terms of total number of trades, 
NSE is the second largest pure electronic LOB market in the world, just behind 
20 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), and it is the fourth largest among all markets 
irrespective of market structure, behind NYSE, NASDAQ and SSE.
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 NSE 's order 
books accommodate all the standard types of orders that exist internationally in order-
driven markets, including limit orders, market orders, hidden orders, stop-loss orders, 
etc. Limit orders can be continuously cancelled or modified without any incremental 
fees. NSE operates a continuous trading session from 9:55 am until 3:30 pm local time. 
The tick size is INR 0.05 (less than USD 0.01). Outstanding orders are not carried over 
to the next day. There is no batch call auction at the beginning of the trading day. The 
opening price is also determined by pure order matching.  
The sample consist of all the 50 stocks in Standard & Poor's CNX Nifty index, 
which represents about 60% of the market capitalization on the NSE and covers 21 
sectors of the economy. The sample period is from April 1 through June 30, 2006, 
covering 56 trading days. Table 2 presents summary statistics on the trading 
characteristics of the sample stocks over the sample period. There are, on average, 
19,121 trades per day, or 57 trades per stock per minute. There are, on average, 24,907 
order submissions per stock per day, or about 75 order submissions per stock per 
minute.
19
 More importantly, on an average, 24% of all incoming limit orders and 45% 
of incoming limit order volume is cancelled. The same for modifications are 16% and 
26%, respectively. Larger orders are more likely to be cancelled or modified. In sum, 
about 36% of all incoming limit orders and 61% of all limit order volume is revised.  
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 These statistics are as reported in Kumar et al. (2009) 
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The dataset provides complete information of trades and orders that enables the 
reconstruction of the order book to obtain best quotes and depth information. Further, 
the data also provides identification codes and classifications of traders for all the orders 
and trades in the dataset. I aggregate the 14 trader classifications flagged in the dataset 
into 4 broad categories: Individuals, Financial Institutions, Dealers, and Other 
Institutions. Table 3 presents summary statistics and descriptions of the four trader 
categories. While Individuals outnumber other trader categories, institutional traders, 
especially Dealers, are more active in terms of order submissions. Although the NSE is 
a pure electronic limit order book market with no designated intermediaries, Dealers, 
who are registered members of the NSE, trade on behalf of their clients and also trade 
for their proprietary accounts. These traders generally function as  voluntary 
intermediaries at the exchange
20
. The table also presents order revision activity by 
different trader groups. Clearly, traders revise a substantial proportion of their limit 
order volume. Dealers cancel the greatest proportion of their limit order volume; they 
cancel about 68%  of their limit order volume. Financial institutional traders modify the 
greatest proportion of limit order volume; they modify about 34% of their limit order 
volume. Interestingly, individual traders appear to be more revising a greater proportion 
of limit order volume than financial institutional traders. This apparent anomaly is 
driven by the fact the individuals are an extremely heterogeneous group of traders. That 
a small portion of individual traders are influencing  the revision numbers reported here 
is further substantiated in the next section where I examine order revision activity of an 
average trader in each category.  
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4. Trader categories, styles, and order revisions  
In this section, I examine the relation between different attributes of traders — 
such as their category, reliance on inventory management, and trading frequency — and 
their use of order revisions. I next define the variables that are employed in the analysis. 
The intensity of order cancellations and modifications for trader i is measured 
using the entire sample of 50 stocks (s) and 56 days of trading (t): 
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Note that unlike the Cancellation Ratio, the Modification Ratio can be greater 
than 1 because each order can be modified multiple times. Revision Ratio is defined as 
the sum of the two ratios.  
iii RatioonModification RatioCancellatiRatioRevision       
The Revision Ratio measures the number of times trader i revises (either cancels 
or modifies) orders for every limit order he places. I also define the following indicator 
variables based on trader categories as given in the dataset. 
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Table 4, Panel A presents results from the analysis of trader categories, Revision 
Ratio, Cancellation Ratio, and Modification Ratio. Exchange members (Dealers) and 
financial institutions (Fin) use revisions the most. The median revision ratios show that 
they approximately revise (modify and/or cancel) once for every two limit orders they 
place. Exchange members (Dealers) use cancellations more than any other class of 
traders; about 50 exchange members (p90), cancel every second limit order they place.  
However, financial institutions (Fin) modify orders most frequently; about 580 financial 
traders (p90), modify every orders more than once. To the extent that dealers and 
financial institutions are mostly likely to function as intermediaries in an electronic limit 
order market, these results are in line with H3a. Individuals (Individual) use order 
revisions least frequently. The difference between the average revision, cancellation, 
and modification ratios of institutional and individual trades is positive and statistically 
significant (at 1% level). These results are consistent with H5a; institutional traders, 
who are more likely to be the informed traders in the market, revise orders with greater 
intensity than individual traders.  
I next examine the relation between trader characteristics — Closing Ratio, 
Network Trading Ratio, Trader Size, and Trader Frequency — and order revision 
ratios. Following Kirilenko et al. (2010), Closing Ratio is calculated as the ratio of a 
trader's daily closing position and his daily total trading volume. The ratio is calculated 
for each trader i, initially for each of the m days that he traded in stock s and then 
averaged over the n stocks he traded during the sample period.  
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A low Closing Ratio implies that the trader liquidates most of his intraday 
position before the close of trading. Hence, Closing Ratio proxies for the frequency of 
inventory management related trades, and thereby the half-life of the trader's 
inventories. Further, traders who function as intermediaries generally carry only a small 
component of their daily trading volume as overnight inventory. Consequently, Closing 
Ratio also identifies de facto or voluntary intermediaries in the market. Lower the value 
of Closing Ratio for a trader, more the trader behaves as an intermediary. Similarly, I 
also estimate Network Trading Ratio to identify the implicit or de facto market makers. 
Market makers typically post multiple two-sided quotes (network of quotes) and in 
doing so create their own limit order spread. Handa and Schwartz (1996) refer to such 
limit order trading as 'network trading'. The Network Trading Ratio captures the 
intensity of network trading for each trader in the dataset. Snapshots of the order book 
are created for all the stocks at one-minute intervals. In each such interval, a trader is 
said to be Network Trading if he has multiple orders on both sides of the book.  
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Network Trading Ratio is calculated for each trader i, initially for each of the m 
snapshots of stock s that his orders are present in and then averaged over the n stocks he 
traded during the sample period.  
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Trader Size and Trader Frequency variables are defined as follows:  
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Table 4, Panel B presents results from the regression analysis of trading styles 
and order revision ratios. As shown in Table 4, Panel B, large and active traders revise a 
greater proportion of orders. More importantly, I find a negative coefficient on Closing 
Ratio in both the Cancellation Ratio  and Modification Ratio regressions. The 
coefficient is also statistically significant (at 1% level). This implies that traders who 
actively manage their inventory revise a greater proportion of orders. Further, 
Networking Trading Ratio is also positively related to the intensity of order 
cancellations, modifications, and revisions. Again, the coefficients are statistically 
significant (at 1% level). These results indicate that traders who function as market 
makers employ order reversion strategies more regularly than others; evidence is 
consistent with H3a.  
In sum, large and frequent traders, exchange members/dealers, traders belonging 
to financial institutions, traders who most frequently manage their inventories, and 
network traders employ order revisions the most. These findings are consistent with the 
previously stated hypotheses that informed traders and intermediaries revise orders 
more regularly than others. 
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5. Duration Analysis of Order Revisions 
In this section I employ hazard analysis techniques to examine the determinants 
of a trader's decision to revise an order. 
Order revisions are dynamic strategies executed by traders at high frequencies 
after order submission. In order to examine the determinants of such a phenomena we 
need to relate traders' decisions to developments in market conditions and other factors 
of interest through the life of the order. In fact, the inventory hypotheses built in the 
previous section require an analysis of changes in a trader's inventory after order 
submission. For example, if a trader decided to cancel a limit order 1 minute after 
submission, how did changes in his inventory in the said 1 minute affect his decision to 
cancel the order? The question of interest here is not how a trader's inventory affects his 
order placement, but how a change in his inventory since order submission affects his 
decision to revise the previously submitted order. Hence, a standard duration analysis
21
, 
wherein the conditioning variables are all established prior to the submission of the 
order, is not best suited for the purposes of this study. Instead, following Hasbrouck and 
Saar (2009), I employ a (Cox's) proportional hazards duration model with time-varying 
covariates
22
 to analyze traders' strategic responses to the evolving market conditions and 
other time variant factors post order submission. 
I first discuss the explanatory variables, and then present the parameter estimates 
from hazard analysis of cancellations, positive modifications, and negative 
modifications. In accordance with Hasbrouck and Saar (2009), I include Lagged 
                                                 
21
For examples of such applications please see Lo, Mackinlay and Zhang (2002) and Boehmer, Saar and 
Yu (2005). 
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 See Allison (1995) for an excellent and detailed discussion of proportional hazard duration models. 
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Volume, Lagged Volatility, and Spreads to account for the general market conditions 
prevailing prior to the submission of the order.   
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Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) also find a positive relation between price 
aggressiveness and intensity of cancellation, which supports their (search) hypothesis 
that traders cancel orders after failing to find latent liquidity within the spread. Although 
the NSE does not permit complete hidden orders, which limits the extent of liquidity 
searching, price aggressiveness remains an important factor. Liu (2009) theorizes that 
traders revise orders to manage the "free-option" risk. Since this risk is positively 
related to price aggressiveness, I include the Hasbrouck and Saar measure of the order's 
price aggressiveness (
Relativep ) in the analysis. The definitions of buy and sell orders are 
analogously defined, and the definition for a buy order is as follows: 
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Further, Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) find a positive (negative) relation between 
the intensity of order cancellation and post-submission changes in quotes on the same 
(opposite) side as the submitted order. They interpret the positive relation as evidence of 
traders "chasing" market prices by cancelling stale orders and resubmitting more 
aggressive ones; the negative relation as evidence of traders cancelling orders and 
submitting market orders to exploit cheaper opposite quotes. Accordingly, I include two 
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time-variant variables 
opposite
t
same
t qq   and . The definitions of buy and sell orders are 
analogously defined, and the definitions for a buy order is as follows: 
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Fong and Liu (2010) document that large orders are more likely to be revised 
due to fixed costs of monitoring. Hence, I include Order Size as a covariate. 
 )PriceLimit Volume(Order  Log  so,,  o,ssoSizeOrder  
Next, I define the time varying inventory related variables that are central to the 
hypotheses developed earlier. The following definitions are for buy orders; variables for 
the sell orders are defined analogously. 
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Further, I also employ trader classification dummy variables that were defined 
earlier. Finally, following Lo et al. (2002), I also include the logarithm of average stock 
prices as a covariate to capture the differences across stocks. 
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5.1. Order Cancellations 
The data creation and the following analysis are similar to that of Hasbrouck and 
Saar (2009).Using all the orders in 50 stocks for duration analysis is computationally 
costly and unwarranted. Hence, I randomly sample 10,000 limit orders from each of the 
50 stocks. Since there are only 50 stocks in the cross section, following Lo et al (2002), 
I pool all the orders for the analysis. In order to address dependence among  orders from 
the same stock, I cluster standard errors by stock. The data is organized in a "counting 
process" format
23
; at each 5 second interval from the time of order submission, it is 
recorded whether the interested event — order cancellation — occurred, and the 
corresponding values of all covariates are also recorded. As seen in Figure 1, more than 
50% of  order cancellations and more than 60% of order modifications happen within 2 
minutes of order submission. Hence, I track all orders only through the first 2 minutes. 
Execution is viewed as a competing process.
24
 All the stock specific variables are 
standardized.  
5.1.1. Results 
Results of the proportional hazard duration model are presented in Table 5. The 
estimates are generally consistent with the extant literature. The positive sign on the 
estimated coefficients on Lagged Volume and Lagged Volatility indicate that traders 
cancel orders to eliminate the 'free-option risk' in volatile periods. This finding is 
consistent with the model developed by Liu (2009). The coefficient on the Spreads 
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 See Hosmer et. al. (2008) and http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/sas/faq/survival_repeated_events.htm for a 
detailed explanation. 
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Chakrabarty et al. (2006) also analyze order executions and cancellations as competing events. 
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variable is always positive, but never statistically significant. The pricing aggressive 
variable (
Relativep ) is always positive and statistically significant. This result is consistent 
with the 'search' hypothesis of Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) and the free-option risk 
hypothesis of Liu (2009) and Fong and Liu (2009). However, the NSE does not permit 
completely hidden orders, which reduces the potency of the 'search' hypothesis in this 
market. Hence, I infer that traders are more likely to cancel aggressive orders to manage 
their free-option risk. The statistically significant coefficients on the time varying same-
side quote change variable (
same
tq ) are consistent with the 'chasing' hypothesis posited 
by Hasbrouck and Saar (2009). Traders appear to be cancelling orders to post more 
aggressive ones when the markets prices move away from the posted limit prices. 
However, unlike Hasbrouck and Saar (2009), I do not find evidence in favor of the 
'cost-of-immediacy' hypothesis — when ask (bid) quotes increase, traders cancel 
preexisting buy(sell) orders and submit market orders to execute against favorable ask 
(bid) quotes — that predicts a negative coefficient on the 
opposite
tq  variable. 
The coefficient relating to the indicator variable Dealer is positive and 
statistically significant (at 1% level) in all the specifications. Clearly, dealers have a 
greater propensity to cancel orders than the rest of the market. The hazard or intensity of 
cancellation for dealers is about 185% of the hazard for other traders. Since dealers are 
most likely to make markets, these results add further credence to the inventory 
hypotheses. The hazard for individuals is only about 47% of the hazard for other 
traders. To place the results in a better perspective, I restate the relevant results in terms 
of probabilities. Probability estimates are obtained through the survivor function that is 
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non-parametrically estimated from the fitted hazard model
25
. When the order is 
submitted by a dealer (Dealer = 1 and Individual = 0), and all the other variables in 
specification 3 are held at the respective sample means, the probability of order 
cancellation(within 2 minutes of submission) is 33.74%; the same when the order is 
placed by an individual trader is 9.96%. The category of the trader has a non-trivial 
impact on the probability of order cancellation. This finding is consistent with the 
inventory hypotheses (H3a): de facto  intermediaries such as the trading 
members/dealers, who manage inventory on a regular basis, utilize order cancellations 
more frequently than other traders. These results are also consistent with the descriptive 
analysis and the results from the OLS regressions, which showed that dealers use order 
cancellations the most and individuals the least. Further, the result that individual 
traders employ order cancellations with a lower intensity than institutional traders 
supports the hypothesis that informed traders employ more order revisions. 
More important to this study are the coefficients on the inventory variables. The 
coefficient relating to the change in a trader's same-stock inventory (ΔInventory_Stockt) 
is always positive and statistically significant (at 1% level). These results imply that, 
after controlling for the category of the trader, price aggressiveness, order size, market 
volatility and volume and changes in quotes, an increase in a trader's inventory 
increases (decreases) his propensity to cancel preexisting buy (sell) orders; this 
evidence strongly supports H1a. The same-stock inventory effect is also economically 
significant. The estimated percentage change in hazard for each unit increase in 
covariate x1 is given by )1(
1 xe . Therefore, a unit increase in ΔInventory_Stockt, 
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 See Allison (1995) for an excellent and detailed discussion of proportional hazard duration models. 
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increases the intensity of cancellation by 1.3%. Or, the intensity of cancellation for a 
preexisting buy (sell) order in stock 's' increases (decreases) by 1.3% after the 
corresponding trader, in the previous 5 seconds, has bought 2.72 more units of 's' than 
he has sold. As before, I restate the results in terms of probabilities: when a trader 
increases his inventory in the stock by 1000 units (approximately 1 standard deviation 
in trade size), and all other variables are held at their respective sample means, the 
probability of a buy (sell) order cancellation increases (decreases) by 1.7 percentage 
points or 8.2%.  
The coefficient on ΔInventory_Relatedt (change in a trader's inventory in related 
or correlated stocks) is also significantly positive (at 1% level). This implies that traders' 
order cancellation decisions are not driven only by their inventory of the corresponding 
stock, but also by their inventory in stocks of the same industry as the said stock. 
Traders appear to be managing their equivalent inventory; this evidence is consistent 
with  H2a. Although the coefficient on ΔInventory_Relatedt is smaller than it is for 
ΔInventory_Stockt, the related-stock inventory effect is not trivial. A unit increase in 
ΔInventory_Relatedt, increases the intensity of order cancellation by 0.80%. Or, the 
intensity of cancellation for a preexisting buy (sell) order in stock 's' increases 
(decreases) by 0.80% after the corresponding trader, in the previous 5 seconds, has 
bought 2.72 more units of stocks in the same industry (2 digit SIC) as 's' than he has 
sold. Or, a 1 standard deviation increase in a trader's inventory in related stocks, 
increases (decreases) the probability of cancellation for a buy (sell) order by 1.00 
percentage point or 4.8%. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on ΔInventory_Industryt is 
also positive and statistically significant (at 1% level). 
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To further examine the validity of  the inventory results, I introduce  
ΔInventory_Unrelatedt — trader's inventory in unrelated stocks or stocks that don't 
belong to the same industry as the concerned stock — in place of ΔInventory_Relatedt. 
The results are shown in the fifth column of Table 5. In accordance with the equivalent 
inventory hypothesis (H2a), the coefficient, although positive, is statistically 
insignificant from zero. Lower the (absolute)correlation between two stocks, lower the 
impact inventory in one has on order cancellation decisions in the other.  
5.2. Order Modifications 
The empirical design is identical to the one employed for analyzing order 
cancellations, except for the following differences. One, the events of interest are 
positive and negative modifications, not order cancellations. Two, while analyzing 
modifications I consider order cancellations and executions as competing events. 
Finally, since modifications are repetitive events, I cluster standard error by order to 
mitigate the effects of dependency amongst repeated events.
26
 
5.2.1. Results 
The results of the analysis are presented in Tables 6 and Tables 7I. Wider 
Spreads increase the intensity of positive modifications; the effect on negative 
modifications, although negative, is statistically insignificant. This implies that, ceteris 
paribus, traders positively modify their orders when the returns for providing liquidity 
are higher. The coefficients on Lagged Volatility is again consistent with the free-option 
risk hypothesis of Liu (2009). It appears that active markets (Lagged Volume) 
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See Hosmer, Stanleu and May (2008) and 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/sas/faq/survival_repeated_events.htm for a detailed explanation. 
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discourage negative revisions and encourage positive revisions. The coefficient on price 
aggressiveness ( 
Relativep )  is positive for both positive and negative modifications in all 
specifications; similar to order cancellations, traders  employ order modifications to 
manage their 'free-option' risk. Intensity of order modifications is again positively 
related to Order Size; evidence supports the monitoring hypothesis of Liu (2009).  
The coefficients on quote changes (
same
tq  and 
opposite
tq ) provide strong support 
to the 'search' hypothesis of Hasbrouck and Saar (2009). Further the best quotes get 
from the limit order price, higher (lower) the intensity of positive (negative) order 
modifications. A one standard deviation increase in the 
same
tq increases (decreases) the 
intensity of positive (negative) modifications by 5.5% (8.0%). Similarly, a one standard 
deviation increase in 
opposite
tq  increases (decreases) the intensity of positive (negative) 
modifications by 10.4% (8.5%).   
Similar to the order cancellation results, the coefficient relating to the indicator 
variable Dealer is positive and significant , while the coefficient relating to the variable 
Individual is negative and significant for both positive and negative modifications. That 
individuals modify orders with a lower intensity than institutional traders is consistent 
with the hypothesis that informed traders revise a greater proportion of their limit orders 
than the uninformed. That dealers most actively modify orders is consistent with the 
hypotheses that de facto intermediaries,  who are most concerned about inventory  
levels, employ order revisions the most. 
Results also show that an increase in same-stock inventory (ΔInventory_Stockt), 
increases the hazard of negative modifications and decreases the hazard of a positive 
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modification. These results support inventory  hypotheses H1b and H1c. When a trader 
increases his inventory in stock 's' by 2.72 units, his propensity to positively 
(negatively) modify a buy order reduces by 6.1% (2.5%). In terms of probabilities: 1 
standard deviation increase in a trader's inventory in the stock, while all other variables 
are held at their respective sample means, increases the probability of a buy order 
positive (negative) modification by 4.41 (0.41)percentage points. Once again, after 
controlling for all the other factors, changes in inventory have a substantial impact on 
traders' order revision strategies. These results strongly support the inventory 
hypotheses. 
The coefficient on ΔInventory_Relatedt is statistically insignificant in both 
positive and negative modifications regressions. This evidence does not support 
hypotheses H2b and H2c. However, change in the total industry inventory 
(ΔInventory_Industryt) still affects order modification decisions. A 2.72 units increase 
in same-industry inventory, increases (decreases) the intensity of negative (positive) 
modifications by 4% (1.9%). The results indicate that traders employ order 
modifications to manage their ordinary inventory, not their equivalent inventory. 
5.2.2. Summary 
I find that limit order revisions (cancellations and modifications) are a function 
of various market and trader related factors. The results are consistent with extant 
literature that has documented that traders revise their orders to manage their free-
option  and non-execution risk. More important to this study is the finding that even 
after controlling for price aggressiveness, order size, market volatility and volume, and 
changes in best quotes, order revision decisions in a stock are governed by changes in 
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traders' inventory in the same stock and ,to a lesser extent,  in correlated stocks. Also, 
the category of the trader surfaces as an important determinant of the probability of 
order revisions: institutional traders employ order revisions strategies more regularly 
than individual traders do.  
 
6. Order Revisions and Performance 
Having shown that traders use order revisions to dynamically respond to 
changes in market prices/conditions and their own inventories, and that, even after 
controlling for all relevant factors, certain type of trades have a greater propensity to 
revise orders, I now try to answer the natural follow-up question: what is the net effect 
of such rampant and frenetic order management on the performance of traders' order 
portfolios? 
Typically, the implementation shortfall measure (Perold,1988), which 
incorporates the cost of order execution (Price Impact) and the opportunity cost of 
unexecuted orders (Opportunity Cost) is used to evaluate the performance of orders.
27
 
However, as noted by  Harris and Hasbrouck (1996), this method is better suited to 
analyze the performance of precommitted orders as it imputes a (substantial) penalty for 
non-execution. Evidence in the previous section implies that traders behaving as market 
intermediaries or middlemen use order revisions the most. Such traders are not 
precommitted to orders, but execute them opportunistically. Therefore, their 
performance evaluation should also incorporate the movement in market prices 
subsequent to the execution of their orders to account for the adverse selection 
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 See, for example, Griffith et al. (2000) and Bessembinder et al. (2008). 
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component of the trade. Accordingly, I also employ the 'ex post' measure proposed by 
Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) to examine the relation between order revisions and 
performance. The ex post performance measure is as follows: 







 

unexecuted isorder  the if       0
 at time executed order  sell afor     
 at time executed order buy  afor      
 min60
min60
topriceoffer pricefill
to pricefillpricebid
 postEx t
t
o
 
 Further, to facilitate a trader-level aggregation of performance measures, 
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The price impact and opportunity cost variables are defined as in Bessembinder 
et al (2009): 
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Price Impact and Opportunity Cost variables are also standardized by the price 
of the stock an instant before order submission (
t
Price
). 
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Finally Total Cost of implementation for an order o is obtained as the weighted 
sum of Ex Post performance,  Price Impact, and Opportunity Cost. 
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Variable Total RevisionsO, which measures the total number times order o has 
been revised, is used to measure revision activity. Other order related and stock related 
control variables, following Bessembinder et al. (2009), are defined as follows: 
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We have seen in the previous section that traders' order revision strategies are 
driven, amongst other variables, by changes in their total inventory in the stock; traders 
use order revisions to manage their portfolio of orders in a stock. Consequently, a 
trader's performance  for the analysis of order revisions  should focus on his entire 
portfolio of orders in a stock rather than on the performance of individual orders. 
Further, unexecuted limit orders at the NSE are terminated  at the end of the trading 
day. Hence, the analysis is conducted at a daily frequency. In lieu of these issues, the 
previously defined variables of interest are aggregated to the trader level in each stock 
and on each day of the sample. The aggregation is done on a value weighted basis, 
where value is calculated as the product of the order's quoted quantity and limit price. 
Next, I illustrate the aggregation procedure for the variable Total RevisionsO. 
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P
tsiRevisionsTotal ,,  is the portfolio (P) value weighted average of the number of 
times trader i  revised each order he placed  in stock s on day t. Similarly, other 
variables are also aggregated. Such an aggregation results in a panel dataset of variables 
for approximately 1.2 million traders and 50 stocks over 56 days. Consequently, I 
employ panel (OLS) regressions with trader and stock fixed effects. Trader fixed effects 
are included to ensure that the regression coefficients depicting the relation between 
order revisions and order performance are not corrupted by the generic relation between 
a trader's skill level and the performance of his orders. To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first study on limit order strategies to control for trader fixed effects. 
Similarly, stock fixed effects control for latent stock specific factors. Further, the 
standard errors of the regression coefficients are clustered by time (day) to control for 
the contemporaneous cross-correlation in residuals.
28
 
6.1. Results 
Table 8 presents results obtained from panel regressions of ex post performance 
ratio, price impact ratio, opportunity cost ratio, and total cost ratio on revision intensity, 
other order characteristics, and market conditions. Panels A, B, C and D report results 
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40 
relating to financial institutions, other institutions, dealers, and individuals, respectively. 
In all panels, columns 1a-3a include all trader portfolios; columns 1b and 2b consider 
only trader portfolios with either partial or complete execution; coefficients in column 
3b are obtained by including only trader portfolios with zero or partial executions.  
Ex post performance of trader portfolios is positively related to the number of 
order revisions. As seen in column 1a in all panels, Total Revisions is positively and 
significantly related to ex post performance.
29
 When I discard trader portfolios with no 
executions, the story changes. The relation between ex post performance and order 
revisions is positive and significant (at 10% levels) only for institutions, and is strongest 
for financial institutions; it is not statistically significant for individual traders.  To the 
extent that institutional traders are more informed than other market participants, we 
can infer that order revisions are beneficial to ex post performance only when traders 
are informed. This evidence is in line with hypothesis H6a: order revisions are one of 
the strategies through which informed traders capitalize their informational advantage.  
Interestingly, price aggressiveness ( 
Relativep ) is negatively related with ex post 
performance. This result is in accordance with the theory and evidence provided by 
Kaniel and Liu (2006) that limit orders perform better than market and marketable limit 
orders. 
Price impact ratio of a trader's portfolio of orders is positively related to the 
average number times an order in the same portfolio is revised. The result is statistically 
significant (at 10%) for all classes of traders, except for dealers (dealer). The relation is 
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 Results are robust to the duration over which ex post performance is measured. Analyses of ex post 
performance measured over 5 minute, 15 minute, and 30 minute durations provide qualitatively similar 
results. 
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even stronger for trader portfolios with at least partial execution (column 2b). This 
finding is consistent with positively revised orders walking up the limit order book and 
incurring higher price impact costs. However, for institutional traders, this increase in 
price impact cost is compensated by superior ex post performance; they incur higher 
price impact costs to ensure execution of informed orders. Consistent with 
Bessembinder et al (2009), trader portfolios with a greater proportion of hidden orders 
(Hidden) incur lower price impact costs. Price impact costs are positively related to the  
average price aggressiveness ( 
Relativep ) and size of portfolios ( QuantityLog ) . Further, 
price impact costs increase with market volatility ( VolatilityPast ) and decrease with 
market activity ( Frequency TradingPast ). 
Order revision activity is negatively and significantly (at 10%) related to 
opportunity costs in all panels. This relation is not merely because positively revised 
orders are less likely to remain unexecuted. Even when I consider trader portfolios with 
only partial or zero executions (column 3b),  the relation between order revisions and 
opportunity cost ratio is negative and significant (at 5%). This result is consistent with 
negatively revised orders  facing less adverse movements till close of day; even 
negatively revised orders appear to be informed. Opportunity costs are also significantly 
higher in volatile markets. Amongst other findings, the hidden order results are 
especially noteworthy. Portfolios with a greater proportion of hidden orders incur higher 
opportunity costs. This result implies that hidden orders are informed traders, and hence 
incur higher opportunity costs when they go unexecuted. On the contrary, 
Bessembinder et al. (2009) find that hidden orders are negatively related to opportunity 
costs, and hence infer that they are posted by uninformed traders. However, the current 
42 
finding supports the theory posited by Moinas (2006). She argues that informed 
liquidity providers use hidden orders to "camouflage" their orders as uninformed orders 
to increase the probability of execution. Further, Kumar et al. (2009) find that an 
overwhelming proportion of hidden orders at the NSE are posted by institutional 
(informed) traders wanting to mask the information content of their orders. 
The net effect of order revisions is presented in columns 4 and 5. The results in 
column 4 greatly depend on the category of the trader. While financial and other 
institutional traders (Fin and Others) significantly (at 10%) benefit from order revisions, 
the relation, although negative, is not significantly different from zero for dealers 
(Dealer) and individual (Indi) traders. Also, the coefficient on Total Revisions in Panel 
A (financial institutions) is significantly greater (at 5% level) than same coefficient in 
the remaining three panels.  To the extent that financial institutions are more informed 
than other market participants, we can infer that the more informed a trader, the greater 
is the benefit of order revisions. This result supports hypothesis H6a. For traders 
belonging to financial and other institutions, the relation between order revisions and 
performance is also economically significant. When the average number of total 
revisions (Total Revisions) of a financial trader's portfolio increases by one unit 
(approximately 1 standard deviation), the portfolio's total execution cost (Total Cost 
Ratio) reduces by 8.23% of its mean value; the same for a trader belonging to other 
institutions is 8.49%.  
Furthermore, financial institutions benefit more from order revisions on days 
with earnings announcements. As shown in column 5 of Panel A, the interaction 
between Total Revisions and Earnings Day is negative and statistically significant (at 
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10% level).The interaction is statistically insignificant for the other class of traders. 
Understandably, total cost ratio is significantly (at 10% level) higher on day with 
earnings announcements. But financial institutional traders employ order revisions to 
mitigate the increased execution costs around earnings announcements. This result 
indicates that informed traders (financial institutions) benefit more from order revisions, 
especially when the value of information is high. The evidence obtained here strongly 
supports hypothesis H6a. Total cost ratio is generally higher for portfolios that are more 
aggressively priced, larger in size and number, and for those that include a greater 
proportion of hidden orders. The results on hidden orders appear to be mainly driven by 
opportunity costs. Also, total cost ratio increases with market volatility and decreases 
with market activity. 
 
7. Conclusion 
While numerous studies have analyzed order submission strategies, few have 
focused on order revisions, which are post-submission strategies involving decisions on 
when and how to cancel or modify preexisting limit orders. We know relatively little 
about the type of traders who revise orders, the factors that govern their order revision 
strategies, and the profitability of actively managing order portfolios through order 
revisions. This is especially surprising given the predominance of order revisions in 
limit order book markets around the world. The current study fills this void in literature.  
Analysis of order revision activity in the sample of 50 stocks, which constitute 
60% of NSE's market capitalization, between April 1 and June 30, 2006,  shows that 
about  36% of all incoming limit orders or 61% of all limit order volume is revised. 
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More importantly,  analysis of different trader categories and trading styles shows that 
large and frequent traders, financial institutional traders, exchange members (voluntary 
dealers at the NSE),traders who most frequently manage their inventories, and traders 
who regularly post a network of two-sided quotes employ order revisions the most. In 
general, results indicate that informed traders and traders who function as voluntary 
market makers employ order revisions most prominently.  
I employ a (Cox's) proportional hazards duration model with time-varying 
covariates to analyze traders' strategic responses to changing in market conditions, 
inventories, and other time variant factors after the orders are submitted. Results show 
that traders revise orders not only in response to changes in  market prices, but to 
manage their inventories as well.  I find that,  after controlling for price aggressiveness 
of the order, order size, market volatility and volume, and changes in best quotes, a 
trader's decision to revise a preexisting order is substantially driven by changes in his 
inventory in the stock and ,to a lesser extent,  in correlated stocks. Further, consistent 
with the hypothesis that informed traders dominate revision activity, I find that an order 
is more likely to be revised if it is submitted by an institutional trader rather than by an 
individual trader. 
I also investigate the relation between order revisions and performance of 
traders' order portfolios. Results from panel regressions indicate that institutional 
traders, especially financial institutional traders, significantly reduce the execution costs 
of their order portfolios through order revisions. Institutional traders reduce the adverse 
selection costs of executed trades (i.e. obtain favorable price changes for executed 
orders) and the opportunity costs associated with unexecuted orders(i.e. obtain 
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favorable price changes for unexecuted and/or cancelled orders)  through order 
revisions; they seem to be using order revisions to 'time' the limit order book. In 
contrast, these results do not hold for individual traders. Results also show that financial 
institutional traders benefit the most from order revisions on earnings announcement 
days, when the value of private information is high.  
These findings are of interest to market regulators as well. The proliferation of 
automated trading has heightened regulatory concern that traders manipulate order flow 
and market prices through nefarious order cancellations.  Consequently, market 
regulators in Europe and the US are debating  regulatory measures to curtail order 
revisions, especially order cancellations.  The results presented in this paper should be 
especially instructive in this regulatory context. That traders, especially informed 
traders and implicit market makers,  revise orders to manage information and inventory 
risks implies that order revisions are a valuable feature of modern limit order trading. A 
regulatory intervention that constrains order revisions could have an adverse effect on 
market liquidity and pricing efficiency. 
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Chapter 2: Naked Short-Selling, Fails-to-Deliver and Market Quality: The 
Emperor‘s New Clothes? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Naked shorting harms the market and market participants… -- Harvey Pitt, former 
Chairman of the Security and Exchange Commission (Welborn, 2008). 
 
A lot of those companies are gone. A lot of them died. This was a fatal attack. Now, 
some of them were weak when they were attacked. Some of them would have failed 
anyway. Others wouldn‟t have. Again, it‟s not up to the naked short sellers to decide. 
It‟s up to the investors that play by the rules. -- Robert Shapiro, former Under Secretary 
of Commerce in a 2007 Bloomberg Television special report. 
 
Generally, short selling is ―covered", i.e., adequate borrowing arrangements are 
made to ensure availability of the security for delivery at settlement. On the other hand, 
as per the Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖) ("Key Points about Regulation 
SHO", 2005/2008), in ―a naked short sale, the seller does not borrow or arrange to 
borrow the securities in time to make delivery to the buyer within the standard three-
day settlement period. As a result, the seller fails to deliver securities to the buyer when 
delivery is due (known as a „failure to deliver‟ or „fail‟)‖. Our study investigates the 
impact of the presence of the option to fail and the resultant naked short-selling 
(hereafter "naked shorting") on market distortions, pricing efficiency, and liquidity. 
There has been an enormous amount of discussion in the media, and serious 
concerns have been repeatedly voiced by regulators and market participants about the 
potentially adverse impact of naked shorting. Naked short-sellers have been widely 
alleged to have inflated the supply of shares by creating ‗phantom shares‘ and 
contributed to the financial crisis by precipitating sharp price declines of financial firms. 
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Several investor associations and high-profile CEOs have lobbied aggressively against 
naked shorting, and the huge volume of litigation alleging naked-shorting-based stock 
price manipulation has led to naked shorting being called the ―Holy Grail ….bigger than 
tobacco‖ for lawyers (Stokes, 2009).30 The litigation has also often created credible 
doubts about potential motives for strongly emotive opinions of certain public figures, 
academics, and lawyers.
31
 As per the Wall Street Journal (Asia, March 20, 2009), the 
SEC received over 5,000 complaints alleging price manipulation through naked 
shorting over the two years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. And, a Factiva 
search shows over 4,600 printed articles on naked shorting in English-language outlets 
over that period.  
Settlement failures are neither uncommon nor necessarily illegal in financial 
markets. From a legal perspective, Culp and Heaton (2007) emphasize that naked 
shorting has not been malum in se (wrong in itself), but malum prohibitum (wrong when 
and because prohibited).
32
 On one hand, it has always been acceptable for bonafide 
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 Examples of such investor associations include The Movement for Market Reform, the National 
Coalition Against Naked Short Selling (NCANS) and the Coalition for the Reform of Regulation SHO.  
Examples of high-profile CEOs crusading against naked shorting include Patrick Byrne, CEO of 
Overstock.com, whose corporation also filed lawsuits against both naked-shorters and financial 
institutions accused by them of facilitating naked shorting; and Richard Fuld, then CEO of Lehman 
Brothers who, in his testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and 
Reform on October 6, 2008, alleged that "naked short selling .... dealt a critical, if not fatal, blow to Bear 
Stearns", and also contributed significantly to the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Examples of lawsuits 
include The Biovail lawsuit against Stephen Cohen, Gradient, and others; the Overstock lawsuit against 
Rocker Partners, Gradient, and others; and the The NFI lawsuit against Bank of America (the Specialist) 
and the Prime Brokers. 
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 For example, the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation ("DTCC") issued a long press release on 
March 15, 2006 to say that the report of (former Under-Secretary) Robert Shapiro ―is intended to confuse 
reality ….deliberately‖ because ―he is a paid consultant for ….legal firms, which have been suing DTCC 
with respect to naked short selling".  
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 The Regulation SHO requirement to "locate" stock prior to a short trade was not effective legal 
"prohibition" of all naked shorting, since the rules specifically allowed ―Easy to Borrow‖ lists to be used 
to provide ―reasonable grounds‖ for believing that the security is available for borrowing without the 
need to contact the source of the borrowed securities to locate a specific bloc of shares (Welborn, 2008). 
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market-making. On the other, it has always been illegal (under section 10(b) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5) if deemed to be fraudulent 
misrepresentation or manipulation undertaken with the intent to deceive, manipulate or 
defraud. However, even intensive individual case analysis in the courts has been 
ineffective in successfully proving such ex-ante intention; and in spite of the flood of 
lawsuits, Stokes (2009) documents that no private plaintiff had won a final judgment 
with damages based on naked shorting.
 
 
From an economic perspective, in the presence of an option to fail, ex ante 
intention about going naked does not even need to definitively exist at the time of the 
short trade. This is because all short sales should only locate but not actually borrow the 
shares on the trade date since, as argued by Geczy et al (2002), it is not economically 
rational for short-sellers to pay extra borrowing fees by borrowing prior to the due date 
of delivery three days after the trade. The trader need not know at the time of the trade 
whether or not s/he will decide to fail and be naked, because that decision need not be 
taken on trade day t, but only by day t+3. From a purely economic perspective, this will 
depend on the cost of stock-borrowing. Irrespective of intention, the short will borrow 
and deliver if the cost of stock-borrowing is less than the interest earned on the cash 
from the short sale and ―go naked‖ when that stock-borrowing cost exceeds that interest 
earning, i.e., when rebate rates in the OTC stock-borrowing "market" become negative; 
and Evans, et al. (2008) empirically link fails to rebate rates hitting zero. The resultant 
naked shorting should then exert a (potentially beneficial) downward pressure on stock 
borrowing costs. 
                                                                                                                                               
The "close-out" requirement imposing additional delivery obligations on broker-dealers, albeit effective, 
was applicable only for ―threshold-list‖ securities with a relatively high number of FTDs. 
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Another relevant and important institutional feature is that the Depository Trust 
and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) electronic settlement system ordinarily triggers 
immediate delivery of the stock to the buyer on settlement day through automatic 
borrowing of the stock from a voluntary pool of lenders; and when this pool is empty, 
the buying broker in an unrequited fail has two choices - either immediately force 
delivery through a buy-in of the stock (and without being identified since the DTCC 
system also delinked the buyer and seller after the trade), or remain as a (voluntary) 
lender of the security at zero rebate rates, responsible for mark-to-market margin cash 
flows on the open position to the DTCC, and
 
earning full interest on the proceeds of the 
short-sale.
33
 Accordingly, not only is the distinction between naked and covered short 
sales not necessarily definable or objectively observable prior to settlement day, 
covered and naked short sales are also functionally indistinguishable (Culp and Heaton, 
2007). Hence, given the extensive literature that short-selling in general (without 
distinguishing between naked and covered) is beneficial for pricing efficiency and 
liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia (1987); Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003); 
Miller (1977); Bris et. al. (2007); Diether et al. (2009); Boehmer et al. (2008)), both 
covered and naked short sales should contribute to the price discovery process by 
enabling value-traders to more quickly and easily bring the prices of overpriced 
securities in line with their ―true value‖ and financial intermediaries and other liquidity 
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 In the case of a buyer becoming a voluntary lender at zero rebate rates, the stock lending was from the 
broker, and the buyer‘s security account was often credited with the security. This did create "phantom 
shares‖, but these were not "phantom shares" in the context of market trading, but "phantom shares" only 
in the context of corporate voting: a genuine but more general problem with stock lending practices, not 
naked shorting per se, arising from brokers lending client stock without adequate control systems on loss 
of client voting rights. 
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suppliers should be able to provide liquidity more effectively and expeditiously in the 
presence of both covered and naked short-selling.  
While one would expect naked shorting to be at least as beneficial from the 
perspective of pricing efficiency and liquidity as covered short-selling (hereafter 
"covered shorting"), and while naked shorting should also exert a beneficial downward 
pressure on stock borrowing costs when these costs are high, the SEC relaxed covered-
shorting restrictions by removal of the uptick rule, but increased naked-shorting 
restrictions: first, through the ―locate‖ and ―close-out‖ requirements introduced under 
Regulation SHO in January 2005; second, by banning naked shorting for select 
financial institutions between July 21 and August 12, 2008 in the wake of the heavy and 
rapid price-falls in financial sector stocks; and finally, by removing the option to fail 
(except for market-makers and under specified conditions) immediately after the 
Lehman collapse in September 2008 by mandating a presumption of deceptive intent 
from a failure to deliver (through Rule 10b-21), and by requiring a compulsory "close-
out" of a fail through borrowing or purchase by the broker by the morning following the 
day of the fail (through Rule 204T, later made permanent).
34
  
Notwithstanding the extensive concerns voiced by market participants, and the 
effective SEC ban from September 2008, the SEC (in Report No. 450, March 2009) 
acknowledges that "there is hardly unanimity in the investment community or the 
financial media on either the prevalence, or the dangers, of “naked” short selling…. 
Despite its assertions regarding the potential of danger of “naked” short selling and 
                                                 
34
 German regulators have also called for a pan-European ban on "naked short-selling" since around 2010, 
but their concerns about naked short-selling have often been directed at credit default swaps, and the 
issues involved in that context are  qualitatively different from the issues addressed in this paper.  
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the growing interest in the subject, the [SEC] Report can cite to no bona fide studies or 
empirical data regarding the practice‟s market impact." The financial press (for 
example, The Economist, ―Naked Fear‖, July 24, 2008) has also occasionally expressed 
concern about severe restrictions being placed on naked shorting with little concrete 
evidence linking it to market manipulation.  
 We first provide empirical evidence that shows, independent of our main 
analyses, that failures-to-deliver (hereafter ―FTDs‖) have been mainly caused by naked 
shorting rather than routine settlement failures arising from human errors and 
processing delays, and our FTD-based measure is an excellent proxy for naked shorting. 
Using data on a sample of 1,492 NYSE securities over 2005 to 2008, we estimate that 
naked shorting has affected about 95% of NYSE securities, though naked shorting 
volume is order(s) of magnitude lower than covered shorting volume, accounting on 
average for only about 1% of total short selling. 
As a first test of causation, we form daily portfolios on changes in naked 
shorting and show that increases in naked shorting lead to decreases in pricing errors, 
pricing error volatility, return volatility, bid-ask spreads and order imbalances, even 
after controlling for changes in covered shorting. We find also a slight decline in prices. 
We extend our testing framework by implementing panel OLS regressions in which we 
control for both covered shorting and for systemic market effects, and arrive at the same 
findings. Given the complex and endogenous interrelationships between market quality 
metrics, we further estimate a vector autoregressive model and find that an increase in 
naked shorting equivalent to 10 basis points of the number of outstanding shares leads 
to approximately a 1% reduction in spreads, a 2% reduction in order imbalances, a 10% 
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reduction in the magnitude of positive pricing errors, a 13% decline in pricing error 
volatility and a 1% reduction in stock price volatility. These results are consistent with 
traders employing naked shorting to provide liquidity when it is particularly needed, 
and value arbitrageurs enhancing pricing efficiency through naked shorting. As we are 
more likely to find negative effects associated with naked shorting when it is heaviest, 
we also focus on a sample of the most naked shorted securities. Even in this sample, we 
find a similar, positive impact on market quality. And, consistent with our expectations, 
we find that the market impact of covered and naked shorting is similar in all cases. 
Finally, we estimate impulse response functions and find that positive shocks in naked 
shorting lead to lower pricing error volatility, lower spreads, lower order imbalances 
and lower returns' volatility over the following day, without significant subsequent 
corrections.  
 The SEC September 2008 Rule 204T (discussed earlier in this section) forced 
day (t+4) close-out of FTDs by market participants other than market-makers, since the 
concerns of ―abusive‖ naked shorting related to these ―other‖ public traders, not to 
market-makers. We use the average level of naked shorting post-204T to benchmark the 
relative proportion of (potentially speculative) naked shorting that originated pre-204T 
from public traders (i.e., traders other than market makers). We re-estimate our VAR 
models separately for two groups with low and high levels of public trader naked 
shorting, and find that our results hold also for each group separately. We conclude that 
the beneficial impact of naked shorting on pricing efficiency and liquidity is not driven 
just by market makers, but also by naked short sales of public traders.  
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Since naked short sellers have been widely alleged in the media to have 
contributed to the financial crisis by precipitating manipulative price declines of 
financial firms in 2008, we analyze a few high-profile financial firms that experienced 
dramatic stock price declines: in particular, Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (hereafter 
Bear Stearns), Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (hereafter Lehman), Merrill Lynch & Co. 
Inc. (hereafter Merrill), and American Insurance Group (hereafter AIG). We find that, 
most of the time, naked shorting volume was too low to reasonably ―cause‖ significant 
stock price distortions, and when naked shorting did become abnormally heavy, it was 
after dramatic price declines, not before, indicating that naked short sellers were 
responding to public domain information about the firms, rather than being responsible 
for triggering the observed precipitous price decline. We further analyze how naked 
shorting changes around public news of credit rating downgrades, and again find that 
naked shorting increases after rather than before the announcement. Our findings are 
consistent with naked short sellers responding to public information, rather than being 
responsible for triggering price declines. 
We also analyze the market impact of the SEC naked shorting ban on 19 
financial securities between July 15 and August 12, 2008. During the ban, we find 
higher absolute pricing errors and lower trading volumes, indicating that the naked 
shorting ban hampered price discovery and reduced liquidity. Returns, albeit negative, 
were not significantly affected, indicating that the ban failed to slow the price decline of 
the related securities.  
Overall, our results have important implications for regulation and public policy. 
It is true that we should have legitimate concerns about naked shorting because of the 
54 
disruptions that can be created by delivery fails. We cannot also condone potentially 
willful and blatant disregard for the rules that provide the framework for orderly 
markets. However, it is also true that the vast majority of FTDs are only delays rather 
than "failures" of delivery since the median age of fails is only 3 days (Boni, 2006), and 
the beneficial impact of naked shorting on pricing efficiency and liquidity is the same as 
that of covered shorting. There is also no empirical support for naked shorting having 
market-destabilizing effects. Hence, totally removing the right to fail for the majority of 
market participants is debatable, since we know from Merrick, et al. (2005) that the 
right to fail is an important release valve for settlement related pressures and 
manipulative distortions, and particularly valuable when borrowing is too expensive for 
covered short sellers, which is exactly when liquidity is most needed in the stock-
borrowing market (Evans, et al., 2008). Naked shorting protects traders from the 
extreme vagaries of this less regulated stock borrowing market. Progressive fines for 
settlement delays may be more expedient than blanket bans; and irrespective, it is 
essential to have greater focus on removing the economic incentives for naked shorting 
by improving the liquidity, transparency and regulation of the stock borrowing market.  
Our research also adds to the vast literature on short selling, which has not 
hitherto distinguished between naked and covered shorting. First, we construct effective 
metrics that enable accurate identification of the extent of each of the two practices. 
Second, we underscore the functional equivalence of the practices in the framework of 
stock borrowing mechanisms. Third, we estimate and compare the impact of covered 
and naked shorting separately in the context of market liquidity and pricing efficiency. 
Fourth, we provide strong evidence that focusing regulatory efforts on curbing naked 
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shorting instead of improving the practices and the efficiency of the stock borrowing 
market is questionable, since most naked shorting has the same  beneficial impact on 
market quality as covered shorting; and there is no evidence that naked shorting has 
contributed to (potentially manipulative) price distortions in any way.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops our 
hypotheses. Section 3 motivates our naked shorting measure, and provides empirical 
evidence to show that it as an effective proxy for naked shorting. Section 4 defines the 
other measures and variables we use. Section 5 documents our core empirical methods 
and results.  Finally, Section 6 presents concluding remarks. 
 
2. Development of hypotheses 
2.1. Naked short selling and pricing efficiency 
Fails to deliver in the US equity market have exacerbated the sharp declines in share 
prices of financials. -- Helen Avery in ―Short selling: The naked truth‖, Euromoney 
(December, 2008). 
 
False rumors …. may be further exacerbated by “naked” short selling…. [and if] 
significant financial institutions are involved, this chain of events can threaten 
disruption of our markets. -- Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release no. 58166 / July 
15, 2008. 
 
As discussed in Section 1, while there is no empirical evidence in this regard 
specifically on naked shorting, there is reasonably strong consensus that covered and 
naked short sellers collectively enhance price efficiency. Since covered and naked short 
sales are functionally and observationally indistinguishable at the time of the trade, our 
first hypothesis is H1: Naked short selling improves pricing efficiency. 
To test Hypothesis H1, we empirically investigate several aspects of pricing 
efficiency.  
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1. First, naked short sellers will contribute to pricing efficiency if they enter the 
market when securities are over-priced: then, their trades will arguably reduce 
the positive pricing errors of these overpriced securities. Hence, we test whether 
naked shorting leads to a reduction in positive pricing errors. 
2. Second, a reduction in positive pricing errors should make the market more 
informationally efficient, and such a market should display a lower dispersion of 
pricing errors (Hasbrouck, 1993). Hence, we test whether naked shorting leads 
to reduced volatility of pricing errors. 
3. Third, higher pricing efficiency should translate into more orderly markets, and 
hence we test whether naked shorting leads to a reduction in stock price 
volatility. 
4. Finally, if naked shorting contributes to pricing efficiency, we should observe 
that the SEC ban on naked shorting in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis leads 
to reduced pricing efficiency. Accordingly, we test whether the July/August 
2008 and the September 2008 SEC bans on naked shorting lead to higher 
volatility of pricing errors, higher spreads and lower trading volume.  
 
2.2. Naked short selling and liquidity 
In certain circumstances, naked short selling contributes to market liquidity….  Because 
it may take a market maker considerable time to purchase or arrange to borrow the 
security, a market maker engaged in bona fide market making, particularly in a fast-
moving market, may need to sell the security short without having arranged to borrow 
shares….  SEC Report "Key Points about Regulation SHO", April 11, 2005, updated 
2008. 
 
The Commission has repeatedly stressed the fact that the practice [of naked short-
selling] can provide needed market liquidity in certain circumstances …. SEC Report 
No. 450, March 18, 2009.  
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The SEC has clearly acknowledged that naked shorting can be employed by 
market makers and other liquidity providers to quickly and efficiently fulfill orders. 
Naked shorting offers an alternative to short sellers when the cost of borrowing in 
security-lending markets is too high (Evans, et al., 2009), which is more likely when 
liquidity is most needed. Hence, our second hypothesis is H2: Naked short selling 
improves liquidity. 
We test Hypothesis H2 in two ways. First, we test whether naked shorting leads 
to lower spreads and reduced order imbalances. Second, if naked shorting contributes to 
liquidity, we should observe that the SEC ban on naked shorting introduced in the wake 
of the 2008 financial crisis leads to a reduction in liquidity. Accordingly, we also test 
whether the July/August 2008 and the September 2008 SEC bans on naked shorting 
lead to lower trading volumes and higher spreads. 
2.3. Manipulative naked short selling and the 2008 financial crisis 
We have been concerned about „naked‟ short selling and, in particular, abusive „naked‟ 
short selling, for some time.  -- SEC Report No. 450, March 18, 2009. 
 
Illegal naked short selling, according to Robert Shapiro, a former Under Secretary of 
Commerce, has cost investors $100 billion and driven 1,000 companies into the ground. 
-- ―Watch Out, They Bite!‖, Time Magazine (November 9, 2005).  
 
As discussed in the introduction, extensive concerns have been articulated in the 
media, and by investor groups and company CEOs, about naked short-sellers 
undertaking ―bear raids‖, causing stock prices to decline, particularly during the 2008 
financial crisis. Regulators have also accused naked short sellers of manipulatively 
depressing stock prices. Accordingly, our third hypothesis is H3: Naked short selling 
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contributed adversely to the 2008 financial crisis. We empirically investigate 
Hypothesis H3 in several different ways.  
1. First, commentators have blamed naked short sellers for the price crashes of 
Bear Stearns, Lehman, AIG and Merrill. Accordingly, we test for the presence 
of high levels of naked shorting prior to the large price declines in the stock 
prices of those companies. 
2. Second, we note that naked short-sellers are typically thought of as undertaking 
―bear raids‖ to trigger downward price spirals with the aim of achieving credit 
downgrades so as to also profit from potentially simultaneous positions in the 
CDS market. In this context, we test whether naked shorting intensifies prior to 
credit rating downgrades. In a similar spirit, we investigate whether naked 
shorting intensifies prior to large stock price declines, particularly for securities 
issued by highly levered firms. 
2.4. Other questions: impact of covered vs. naked short-sales and public traders vs. 
market makers 
We address two other overarching questions though we do not formally frame 
them as numbered hypotheses. First, in view of the functional and observational 
equivalence of covered and naked shorting, we examine whether the (beneficial) impact 
of covered shorting on our pricing efficiency and liquidity metrics is different from that 
of naked shorting. Second, in the context of the widespread pejorative (or at least 
negative) association of naked shorting with potentially parasitic ―speculators‖, we 
analyze whether the proportion of naked shorting undertaken by public traders other 
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than registered market-makers changes our inferences on the impact of naked shorting 
on pricing efficiency and liquidity.   
Table 9 summarizes the totality of variables we use all through the paper. 
Liquidity measures, and the other variables in Table 9, are defined and estimated as 
commonly done in the literature. The other variables are discussed in the next two 
sections. 
3. Fails to deliver and naked short selling 
… the majority of these failures-to-deliver are not the result of honest mistakes or bad 
processing -- Former SEC commissioner Roel Campos in an interview reported in 
“Short Sellers Squeezed All Around”, The Wall Street Journal (April 7, 2009) 
 
FTDs result from three reasons: honest mistakes or delays in processing, 
potentially illegal (―abusive‖) naked shorting done with ex-ante intent to deceive, 
defraud, or manipulate, and bonafide legal naked shorting. As discussed earlier in the 
introduction, even though it may be tempting to think about the ex-ante intention of the 
short-seller at the time of the trade, such ex-ante intention is neither observable nor even 
definitively exists at the time of the trade. Any attempt to infer ex-ante intention will 
have to be anchored in highly subjective and restrictive modeling frameworks. As 
emphasized earlier, even the courts drilling down into detailed evidence in individual 
cases have not been able to adjudicate damages against a single short-seller in spite of 
extensive litigation on naked shorting (Stokes, 2009). Hence, in constructing our 
measure of naked shorting, we estimate aggregate naked shorting, without trying to 
distinguish between illegal and legal naked shorting. Our results reflect the overall 
impact of all naked shorting. Given that a naked short sale cannot be objectively defined 
at the time of the trade t, the only way a trade can be credibly defined or classified as 
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naked or covered is on the basis of the actual ex-post failures as of settlement day t+3, 
i.e., in accordance with the definition hitherto used by the SEC. Accordingly, we 
construct a measure of naked shorting that is based on FTDs actually observed ex-post 
as of settlement day, daily data on which has been made available by the SEC under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) since March 22, 2004.  
We proxy naked shorting by the Outstanding Naked Short Ratio (ONSR) defined 
for each day t as the number of shares that represent outstanding fails to deliver as of 
day t scaled by the total number of shares of the firm. Since failure is recorded only on 
day t+3, we calculate cumulative naked short sales till day t by adjusting the 
outstanding failures to deliver (Outstanding FTDs) from the SEC data by adding the 
naked short sales that have already taken place but have not yet been observed (New 
FTDs) because they will show up only after settlements are duly completed over days 
t+1, t+2, and t+3. For each day t, the difference between cumulative FTDs on day t and 
cumulative FTDs on day t-1 is equal to the number of new naked shorted shares minus 
the number of previously outstanding FTDs closed on day t. We approximate the 
number of previously outstanding FTDs settled on a particular day on the basis of the 
SEC Office for Economic Analysis memorandum dated August 21, 2006, ―Fails to 
Deliver Pre- and Post- Regulation SHO‖, and the assumption of constant settlement 
rates. Our results are robust to different settlement rate assumptions. Accordingly: 
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Extant literature provides good support for FTDs being a good basis for 
proxying for naked shorting. In particular, Evans et al. (2008) find that the number of 
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FTDs is strongly related to rebate rates, indicating that FTDs originate largely from 
(naked) short transactions; and Boni (2006) shows that the number of FTDs is related to 
the number of short sales, and offers evidence that market makers ‗strategically‘ fail to 
deliver when borrowing costs are high, again pointing to FTDs being governed by 
(naked) shorting. However, Edwards and Hanley (2010) suggest that FTDs ―in price 
supported IPOs may arise [also] from the mechanism of the offering process.‖ To avoid 
the possibility of IPO-related FTDs, we exclude from our analysis securities that started 
trading during our sample interval. In addition, to prevent the possibility of similar 
FTDs in conjunction with other share issues, we exclude securities for which we 
observe significant changes in the number of shares outstanding from our sample. 
However, our FTD-based ONSR measure is still a proxy and not a perfect 
measure of aggregate naked shorting because FTDs generated by human errors or 
processing delays will always add some random noise. In this section, we report the 
results of our own empirical analysis that provides strong support for our FTD-based 
ONSR measure being an excellent proxy for naked shorting.  
First, in results not formally reported in tables for brevity, we find that the 
number of new FTDs on day t+3 is significantly (p-value<<0.01) and positively  related 
only to ‗short volume‘, i.e. the daily trading volume arising from short sales on day t, 
rather than ‗non-short‘ volume, the daily trading volume arising from regular sales on 
day t. This indicates that FTDs arise overwhelmingly from short-sales and not from 
settlement-related delays arising from regular sales. 
Second, we examine time-series changes in ONSR during a period in which we 
have good economic reason to independently expect those changes to be driven only by 
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naked shorting, that is, during the SEC ban on naked shorting of the stocks of 19 
publicly traded financial institutions from July 21 to August 12, 2008. During this ban 
period, the SEC order required that ―no person may effect a short sale in these securities 
…. unless such person or its agent has borrowed or arranged to borrow the security or 
otherwise has the security available to borrow in its inventory prior to effecting such 
short sale.‖ (SEC Release 58166, 2008). Accordingly, we employ event study 
methodology to investigate the variation in FTDs around the SEC ban period from July 
21 to August 12, 2008. Data for 17 of the 19 affected securities, listed in Table 10, were 
available to us from CRSP. We construct a matched sample as follows. We start from 
the universe of firms listed on CRSP as of January 1, 2008. For each of our target 
securities, we identify common equity of the firm sharing the same  4-digit SIC code 
with the closest market capitalization to that of our targets (as of January 1, 2008) and 
not affected by the ban. Then, for each of the 34 securities (the 17 affected securities 
and the 17 unique matches) and for each day in the interval January 1 to August 12, 
2008, we compute the Outstanding Naked Short Ratio (ONSR). We then compute Mean 
ONSR for both event and control samples over a pre-ban period (January 1 to July 20, 
2008), for each week in the ban period (July 21
 
to August 12, 2008), and for the three-
week period following the ban (August 13 to September 2, 2008), finishing well before 
the tumultuous period starting in the second week of September 2008. We report these 
results in Table 10.  
Importantly, for the sample of securities that are affected by the ban, we find an 
extremely significant and monotonic reduction in Mean ONSR of more than 40% over 
the first week of the ban, more than 93% by the second week of the ban, and more than 
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96% by the third week of the ban. In fact, in the second and the third weeks of the ban 
period, Mean ONSR is statistically indistinguishable from zero for the sample of 
securities that are affected by the ban. We believe that Mean ONSR took a few days to 
reduce to virtually zero in the ban period because it is derived from a measure of 
outstanding rather than new FTDs, and some time is required for the old outstanding 
fails to clear (Boni, 2006). As soon as the naked shorting ban ends, Mean ONSR again 
increases monotonically and very significantly to several multiples of its end-of-ban 
value. In contrast, Mean ONSR increased over the ban period for control firms.
35
 The 
difference between Mean ONSR for the event and control firms is positive and 
significant prior to the ban, negative and significant during the ban, and again positive 
and significant after the ban is lifted. Assuming that the SEC ban was effective in 
curtailing naked shorting, our results clearly indicate that the vast majority of FTDs (> 
95%) originate from naked shorting, rather than processing delays or human errors, and 
at the very least, FTDs provide an excellent basis for a proxy for naked shorting.
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4. Definitions of other measures and variables 
Our main proxy for naked shorting, the Outstanding Naked Short Ratio (ONSR) 
has been defined in the preceding section. In order to control for the effects of covered 
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 While we do not formally investigate this increase, it would appear reasonable for both covered and 
naked shorting to increase over July and August 2008 for financial firms, due to news of deteriorating 
financial performance and liquidity.  
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 The SEC Office for Economic Analysis (OEA) has analyzed the number of FTDs around the 
introduction of their October 2008 rule removing the right to fail except for market-makers and under 
certain conditions (OEA Memoranda ―Impact of Recent SHO Rule Changes on Fails to Deliver‖ dated 
November 26, 2008, ―Impact of Recent SHO Rule Changes on Fails to Deliver‖ dated March 20, 2009, 
and ―Impact of Recent SHO Rule Changes on Fails to Deliver‖ dated April 16, 2009). They also report a 
significant drop in FTDs though, as expected, much less of a drop than was seen in July/August 2008 
when all naked shorting was banned. Irrespective, their reported results again show that it is naked 
shorting, and not human errors or processing delays, which primarily generates FTDs.   
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shorting, we similarly estimate the Outstanding Covered Short Ratio (OCSR), the daily 
outstanding covered shorted shares scaled by the number of shares outstanding. The 
number of daily outstanding covered shorted shares is computed by subtracting the 
outstanding naked shorted shares from the contemporaneously outstanding total shorted 
shares, estimated using total short-interest data and the total volume of daily short sales 
from the NYSE short sales dataset.  
In order to examine the effect of naked shorting on pricing efficiency, we 
construct, for each sample security, a daily estimate of the information-efficient 
―random-walk‖ or "fundamental" price of the security; and accordingly define the 
―pricing error‖ on the day as the difference between the observed price that day and the 
estimated information-efficient price. The unobservable information-efficient price, a 
"latent" stochastic variable, is estimated using a Kalman-filter methodology as in 
Hamilton (1985). The procedure involves establishing two equations. The first equation 
dictates the evolution of the latent variable, and in our case we assume, in the spirit of 
Hasbrouck (1993), that the logarithm of the stock‘s underlying or information-efficient 
value, )(tF , follows a random walk with a drift,  , and  a white noise innovation, )(t , 
with mean zero and variance 
2
 : 
  
  
The second equation relates the observed and latent variables, i.e., specifies the pricing 
error process. In our case, we assume that the pricing error Y(t) follows a mean-
reverting process around zero, with α, the rate of mean-reversion, ranging between 0 
2( ) ( 1) ( ), ~ (0, )    F t F t t       N       
2( ) ( 1) ,      ~ (0, )   Y t Y t (t) N        
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and 1. Pricing errors correct fully in one period when α is equal to one, and not correct 
at all when α is equal to zero. 
 
The observed log of stock price )(tS  is the sum of the fundamental price and 
pricing error:    
                  )()()( tYtFtS   
  )()()(    , )()1()1()1()( Hence, tttttFtStS    
 The Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster, et al., 1977) is 
employed to compute the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimate of the unobservable 
variable, F(t), based on data relating to the observed variable, S(t). Hamilton (1985) 
employs such an approach to estimate expected quarterly inflation, the latent variable, 
based on observed actual inflation. In exactly the same way, we utilize the observed 
daily stock prices to infer the daily unobserved "fundamental price", and hence the daily 
pricing error, using daily closing price data from CRSP. The state-space representation 
of the system is as follows. 
 
To assure ourselves of the unbiasedness and efficacy of our pricing error estimation 
process, we run 500 simulations of both fundamental price and pricing error for a 
hypothetical stock over 252 trading days assuming a range of volatility parameters and 
mean reversion parameters. In each case, we add the fundamental price and the pricing 
error to arrive at the equivalent of a simulated "observed" price. Then, we run our 
Kalman-filter estimation procedure on this "observed" price series to determine our 
Kalman-filter estimate of the originally simulated fundamental price. Finally, we run a 
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regression of changes in the originally simulated fundamental price on changes in our 
Kalman-filter estimate of that fundamental price. In each and every case, the regression 
intercept is not significantly different from zero, and the regression slope is not 
significantly different from one; and the root mean square error in the estimated 
fundamental price is economically small in magnitude. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Data and samples  
Data regarding the number of fails-to-deliver is available from late March 2004 
onwards. To calculate and control for covered shorting, we use short interest data from 
www.shortsqueeze.com and short sales data available from January 2005 onwards from 
the NYSE. We obtain the number of shares outstanding from CRSP. Our market quality 
measures are based on NYSE TAQ data. Our main sample consists of all common 
shares of US-listed securities (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) for which we have 
complete data across the various databases we use and which are listed on the NYSE. 
However, we restrict our main sample to securities that are listed for at least six months 
(as we require at least six months of data to estimate the vector autoregressive model at 
the heart of our empirical analysis) and that have been trading for at least one year prior 
to our period of interest. Having a year of trading data allows us to estimate pricing 
errors as discussed in section 4. It also leads to excluding shares of recent IPOs, thus 
controlling for the unusual volumes of FTDs around IPOs documented by Edwards and 
Hanley (2010). In the same spirit, we further require that the number of shares 
outstanding does not vary by more than 10% over any single day to further eliminate 
the potential for confounding effects on market quality due to share issuance or 
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repurchases. That said, we also re-sample without this last constraint and find that our 
results are robust. 
A series of restrictions on both covered and naked shorting were initiated with a 
temporary naked shorting ban on 19 securities in July/August 2008 and culminated in 
severe restrictions on naked shorting in all stocks from September 2008 onwards 
(through SEC Rules 204T) by mandating delivery against an FTD by the clearing 
agency member on the morning of the day after settlement day. Extending our joint 
analysis of naked and covered shorting beyond June 2008 could not offer additional 
insight in view of these major restrictions on naked shorting. Our main sample for the 
comparative analysis of naked and covered shorting consists of 1,492 NYSE securities 
over the period January 2005 to June 2008.  
5.2. Preliminary descriptive analysis  
Table 11 reports descriptive statistics relating to our main variables of interest. 
We find that mean ONSR is about 6 basis points. By construction, ONSR varies by 
decile: the mean is less than 1 basis point in decile 1 and about 43 basis points in decile 
10. Notably, though not formally in the table, ONSR is higher prior to the introduction 
of Regulation SHO in January 2005 by an average of about 9 basis points. The mean 
Naked to Total Shorts ratio is about 1% for the overall sample, 2.8% for decile 10 and 
0.1% for decile 1. We find that OCSR is similarly higher in decile 10 (13.4%) than in 
decile 1 (3.95%), which is indicative of a positive correlation between OCSR and 
ONSR. Securities in deciles 1 and 10 do not differ significantly in terms of mean pricing 
errors. However, we find that securities with high naked shorting differ significantly 
from securities with low naked shorting in several other ways. Securities with higher 
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naked shorting display significantly higher positive pricing errors and pricing error 
volatility, which is consistent with naked shorting intensifying when securities are 
overpriced. Similarly, higher levels of naked shorting are associated with higher, 
positive order imbalances and higher stock price volatility but lower spreads. Our 
analysis also reveals that naked shorting is significantly greater for relatively smaller 
firms, as average market capitalization for firms in decile 1 (USD 12.5 billion) is almost 
ten times larger than for firms in decile 10 (USD 1.48 billion). We recognize that the 
direction of causality cannot be inferred from such univariate analyses and, hence, 
refrain from further interpretation of these findings. Instead, we focus in the following 
section on several methodologies – portfolio analysis, OLS panel regressions and VAR 
analysis – which allow us to draw some inferences about causation.  
5.3. Naked short-selling and market quality 
In this section, we test Hypotheses H1 and H2 by investigating the relationship 
between naked shorting and measures of pricing efficiency and liquidity. We formally 
test for causality by employing three different modeling frameworks: (1) a portfolio 
approach, (2) panel OLS regressions employing controls for systemic effects, and (3) a 
vector autoregressive (VAR) modeling framework to control for both systemic effects 
and endogenous interrelationships. Our naked shorting data is available only at a daily 
frequency, and therefore, our analyses are based on data at daily frequency.   
5.3.1. Portfolio approach 
 As a first test of the impact of naked shorting on market quality, on each day t in 
our sample spanning January 2005 to June 2008, we group our sample of 1,492 
securities into nine portfolios of securities based on changes in ONSR and OCSR. We 
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start by estimating the time-series standard deviation in ONSR by security. We include 
securities with a one-standard deviation or greater decrease in ONSR into an ‗ONSR 
Decrease‘ portfolio and, similarly, securities with a one-standard deviation or greater 
increase in ONSR into an ‗ONSR Increase‘ portfolio. We include all remaining 
securities into an ‗ONSR No Change‘ portfolio. In order to control for the extent of 
covered shorting, we replicate the same procedure on the basis of covered shorting, 
proxied by changes in OCSR, thus forming the portfolios ‗OCSR Decrease‘, ‗OCSR No 
Change‘ and ‗OCSR Increase‘. Finally, we intersect those groups of securities, forming 
nine final portfolios (‗ONSR Decrease and OCSR Decrease‘, ‗ONSR Decrease and 
OCSR No Change‘, ‗ONSR Decrease and OCSR Increase‘ and so forth). For each 
portfolio, we then compute average changes in our metrics of price levels, return 
volatility, market liquidity, pricing errors, pricing error volatility and order imbalances 
for the following day (t+1). All variables are standardized and winsorized (at three 
standard deviations) by security.  We compute next-day average changes for the 
portfolios ‗ONSR Decrease, OCSR No Change‘ and ‗ONSR Increase, OCSR No 
Change‘; and we further test for differences between these averages. 
 The results of this analysis are presented in Table 12: for ease of interpretation, 
we convert standardized average changes into base units. For the portfolio ‗ONSR 
Increase, OCSR No Change‘, we find, on the following day, a 16 bps decrease in 
pricing error, an 82 bps reduction in pricing error volatility, a 1 bp decrease in spreads, 
a 24 bp decrease in order imbalances and a 6 bps decrease in stock price volatility – all 
results being statistically significant at the 1% level; we also find a decrease in prices, 
but the result is not statistically significant. For the portfolio ‗ONSR Decrease, OCSR 
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No Change‘, the only result we document that is statistically significant (at the 5% 
level) is a 2 bps increase in volatility and an increase in prices on the following day. We 
further investigate the differences in next-day metrics between the portfolios ‗ONSR 
Increase, OCSR No Change‘ and ‗ONSR Decrease, OCSR No Change‘. The increase 
portfolio displays higher next-day returns, lower prices, pricing errors, pricing error 
volatilities, spreads, order imbalances and volatility, with all results being statistically 
significant at the 1% level, with the exception of the change in prices, significant at the 
5% level. Further, we compute the difference between then changes in market quality 
metrics estimated for the ‗ONSR Increase, OCSR No Change‘ and the ‗ONSR Decrease, 
OCSR No Change‘ portfolios. Consistent with the above findings, all results are 
statistically significant.  
 Clearly, this initial analysis offers evidence consistent with Hypotheses H1 and 
H2: naked shorting is associated with improvements in both market liquidity and 
pricing efficiency. Given the limitations of this univariate framework, we conduct 
multivariate analysis in the following section, employing OLS regressions to investigate 
the relationship between naked shorting and market quality while controlling for 
covered shorting and systemic factors.  
5.3.2. Panel OLS regressions  
In this section, we estimate panel regressions to investigate the impact of naked 
shorting on market quality metrics: pricing errors, pricing error volatility, prices, return 
volatility, spreads and order imbalances. Accordingly, we estimate six separate 
regressions, with changes in market quality metrics as responses. Our main explanatory 
variables are lagged (previous-day) changes in ONSR and OCSR. As controls, we 
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include, in each regression, lagged changes of the dependent variable, to account for 
possible autocorrelations.  In addition, to control for systemic effects, we include 
market averages of the changes in the same quality metrics. Finally, when modeling 
changes in pricing errors, we add interaction variables between changes in ONSR and 
OCSR and a binary variable identifying positive pricing errors to investigate the 
asymmetric impact of shorting on pricing errors. All regressions contain security fixed-
effects and standard errors are time-clustered. The models we estimate are as follows 
(variables are as defined in Table 9 and the „M‟ subscript indicates a market-wide 
equally weighted average).  
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Results for the overall sample are presented in Table 13. As reported, an 
increase in ONSR is associated with a next-day decrease in spreads (significant at 1%), 
return volatility (at 10%) and pricing error volatility (at 1%).  ONSR is also associated 
with a decrease in pricing errors when those are positive and an increase in pricing 
errors when those are negative significant (both significant at 1%). Prices are not 
significantly affected.    
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This second set of results is highly consistent with our previous findings: naked 
shorting is related to improvements in liquidity and pricing efficiency. In the next 
section, we discuss results from a vector autoregressive framework that duly controls 
for endogeneity and interrelations between market quality metrics.                                  
5.3.3. Vector autoregressive framework 
In our third methodology, we test for causality while controlling for endogenous 
interrelationships using three vector autoregressive (VAR) models, with additional 
exogenous variable(s) added as controls. The system of equations underlying each of 
these models is formally specified in Table 14. 
In VAR Model 1, our VAR variables are changes in Outstanding Naked Short 
Ratio, Covered Short Ratio, Pricing Error, Volatility, Spread and Order Imbalance. In 
the pricing error equation, we add, as a predictor, an interaction between lagged changes 
in Outstanding Naked Short Ratio and a lagged binary variable set equal to one when 
pricing error is positive. Accordingly, we are able to separately estimate the impact of 
naked shorting on pricing error when the pricing error is positive in contrast to when the 
pricing error is negative. We add two more predictors to each of the equations in which 
the change in ONSR and OCSR are the response variables: a lagged binary variable set 
equal to one when order imbalance is positive and zero otherwise and a lagged binary 
variable set equal to one when pricing error is positive and zero otherwise. This allows 
us to check whether positive order imbalances and positive pricing errors lead to higher 
naked and covered shorting. Finally, in each equation we add, as an exogenous variable, 
the market-wide equally-weighted average of the dependent variable, to control for 
possible systematic effects. In VAR Model 2, we replace Pricing Error by Pricing 
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Error Volatility, or effectively the absolute value of the Pricing Error, and in VAR 
Model 3, we replace Pricing Error by Price.  
We estimate VAR Models 1, 2 and 3 separately for each security. The results we 
report in Table 14 are based on estimating the models by first standardizing all variables 
by subtracting the security-specific mean and dividing by the security-specific standard 
deviation, and then winsorizing at three standard deviations from the mean.
37
 Based on 
an analysis of the Schwarz information criteria (SIC), we determine that, for all models, 
it is most appropriate to use a VAR of order one. In order to draw inferences about the 
true population parameters, we average coefficient estimates obtained for each security 
as in Fama and MacBeth (1973). Similarly, we use cross-sectional estimates of standard 
errors. To account for possible underestimation of those standard errors due to cross-
correlations, we correct standard errors as in Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001).  
 We estimate VAR Models 1, 2 and 3 for both our ‗entire market‘ sample and for 
a subset of our sample containing only the 10% of most-naked-shorted securities based 
on mean ONSR over the sample period, January 2005 to June 2008. We focus on the 
subset of securities with most naked shorting to find whether the impact of naked 
shorting differs when it is heaviest. We find that the sign and the significance of the 
various inter-relationships involved are economically reasonable for both samples. For 
compactness, ease of interpretation and to preserve the focus on the specific equations 
of interest to us, we report in Table 14 only those relationships that are relevant to the 
issues addressed in the paper.  In particular, we report, for all three models and for both 
                                                 
37
 For robustness, we also estimate all three models without standardizing variables, but we sometimes 
run into problems with the convergence of our maximum likelihood estimation algorithm, likely driven 
by the extreme differences in magnitude across our variables. For those securities for which we manage 
to obtain results without standardizing variables, our results are qualitatively similar to those reported.  
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samples, the effects of both covered and naked shorting, i.e. how covered and naked 
shorting impact each of our market quality metrics after controlling for endogenous 
interactions. We present estimated coefficients and related statistical significance in 
Table 14, Panels A and B. 
 First, interestingly, we do not find statistically significant evidence of a causal 
relationship from naked shorting to stock prices. On the other hand, in our overall 
market sample, we do find that covered shorting is followed by significantly lower 
stock prices in the following period. 
 Second, irrespective of the measure used as proxy for pricing efficiency or 
liquidity, naked shorting has a significantly beneficial effect on pricing efficiency and 
liquidity, strongly supporting Hypotheses H1 and H2. In particular, we reach the 
following conclusions:  
1. When pricing errors are positive, naked shorting significantly reduces pricing 
errors, consistent with naked short-sellers functioning as value arbitrageurs 
(statistically significant at 1%). 
2. Naked shorting significantly reduces the volatility of pricing errors, which is 
also consistent with an increase in pricing efficiency (statistically significant at 
1%).  
3. An increase in naked shorting significantly reduces stock return volatility, 
consistent with improved market stability (significant at 1% in five models and 
at 5% in the sixth).  
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4. An increase in naked shorting significantly reduces order-imbalances, consistent 
with naked short-sellers contributing to improvement in liquidity (significant at 
1%). 
5. Coefficient estimates uniformly indicate that an increase in naked shorting 
reduces spreads but results are not statistically significant.  
6.  Coefficient estimates uniformly indicate that an increase in naked shorting 
reduces prices, but results are not statistically significant.  
 Finally, the direction and significance of all results relating to the impact of 
naked shorting are qualitatively similar to the direction and significance of all results 
relating to the impact of covered shorting. The exceptions are that the impact of covered 
shorting on prices and spreads is statistically significant in some models, while not 
significant for naked shorting.  
 To further investigate the impact of naked shorting on pricing efficiency and 
liquidity, we compute impulse response functions based on the vector autoregressive 
models of Table 14. We estimate accumulated impulse response function parameters for 
each security and then present cross-sectional means of the parameter estimates. 
Standard errors employed in the computation of confidence intervals are cross-
sectional. We present the results related to accumulated impulse response functions 
depicting the impact of one-standard deviation increase in naked shorting on pricing 
error volatility, return volatility, spreads and order imbalances in Figure 2.
38
 For 
comparison, we present a similar set of impulse response functions for the impact of 
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 We opt to utilize accumulated, rather than orthogonalized, impulse response functions because, 
consistent with what is expected on the basis of the general econometric literature in this regard, the latter 
are extremely sensitive to the ordering of variables in the model, thus adding a level of arbitrariness to the 
estimation procedure. In unreported analysis, we estimate orthogonalized impulse response functions for 
models differing in order of the variables and find the results not to be robust to the ordering of variables.  
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covered shorting in Figure 3. For brevity, we only report impulse response functions 
related to the VAR models including pricing error volatility, omitting the models 
including pricing errors and prices; given the similarities in estimated and reported 
VAR coefficients, the omitted impulse response function sets are extremely similar. 
As the impulse response functions indicate, the impact of naked shorting on 
market quality metrics – pricing errors, pricing error volatility, prices, return volatility, 
spreads, order imbalances – documented in Table 14 occur over the day following a 
shock in naked shorting. On subsequent days, accumulated responses are mostly flat, 
indicating no further correction or reversal.   
5.3.4. Naked vs. covered short-selling  
 Overall, when qualitatively comparing the impact of naked and covered 
shorting, the direction and significance of our results are virtually identical, indicating 
that the two practices have very similar impacts. That said, we note that the coefficients 
measuring the impact on market quality in Table 14, Panels A and B are, in most cases, 
much larger in magnitude for covered shorting than for naked shorting. This is arguably 
what we should expect given that the vector autoregressive models we employ are 
based on standardized variables, and the average standard deviation of covered shorting 
is much greater than that of naked shorting. Hence, a one standard deviation change in 
covered shorting clearly results in a much greater change in the level of overall short-
selling relative to a one standard deviation change in naked shorting, and a greater level 
of overall short-selling should arguably have a greater beneficial impact on market 
quality. In this context, we next examine the economic significance of the impact of 
naked and covered shorting by estimating the market-quality impact of a given amount 
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of naked and covered shorting in terms of the incremental number of shares sold short 
(or proportion sold short relative to the total number of outstanding shares). The results 
are reported in Table 14, Panels C and D for the impact of naked and covered shorting 
respectively. 
Based on the ‗entire market‘ sample, we find that an increase in naked shorting 
corresponding to 10 basis points of the total number of outstanding shares leads to about 
a 1% reduction in spreads, a 1.7% reduction in order imbalances, a 9.8% reduction in 
the magnitude of positive pricing errors, a 12.9% decline in pricing error volatility and a 
1% reduction in stock price volatility. The impact on prices, aside from not being 
statistically significant, is tiny, with a reduction of 0.01%. In comparison, again based 
on the ‗entire market‘ sample, we find that an increase in covered shorting 
corresponding to the same 10 basis points of the total number of outstanding shares 
leads to about a 0.7% reduction in spreads, a 1.3% reduction in order imbalances, a 
4.9% reduction in the magnitude of positive pricing errors, a 7.4% decline in pricing 
error volatility and a 0.7% reduction in stock price volatility. The impact on prices is 
similarly tiny, at 0.01%. Overall, the economic significance of the estimated impact is 
of roughly similar magnitude, but naked shorting has a slightly stronger beneficial 
impact than covered shorting.  Inferences based on the most-naked shorted sample are 
weaker. This could potentially be because a certain amount of naked shorting has a 
weaker impact when existing levels of naked shorting are higher.  
The bottom-line is that the market-quality impact of both covered and naked 
shorting is economically significant and very similar, which is in line with our 
expectations, since naked and covered shorting are indistinguishable at the time of the 
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trade. The impact is also in the direction of being clearly beneficial for market quality. 
Our results, quite unequivocally, also provide strong support to Hypotheses H1 and H2. 
Naked short-sellers appear to have a considerably positive effect on market quality, first 
by enhancing pricing efficiency through correction of security overvaluation and 
reduction of volatility, and second by providing and improving liquidity through 
reduction of order-imbalances and spreads. 
5.3.5. Naked Short-Selling: market makers vs. public traders 
Market-makers have routinely employed naked shorting to cheaply and quickly 
provide liquidity. It is therefore conceivable that the beneficial effects of naked shorting 
on market quality arise entirely due to such market-making activities, and that there are 
no beneficial effects from any naked shorting done by public traders, where we define 
the term ―public trader‖ in this context to mean all market participants other than 
registered market-makers. Notably, it is these public traders that have been the primary 
focus of negative media and regulatory attention. To estimate the impact of naked 
shorting done specifically by public traders (relative to the impact of naked shorting by 
market-makers), we need to classify securities based on the proportion of naked 
shorting originating from public traders. In order to accomplish that, we employ an 
exogenous event – a ban that essentially affected only naked shorting by public traders 
but not market-makers. Clearly, if there are no beneficial effects of naked shorting done 
by public traders, our estimated naked-shorting related improvement in market quality 
in the pre-ban period will be relatively weaker for securities that have a relatively 
greater proportion of naked shorting by public traders.  
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Our investigation of the issue is based on the SEC temporary rule 204T enacted 
in September 2008 (and later made permanent) that required all market participants 
other than registered market makers to purchase or borrow securities to close out their 
FTD position by the beginning of day t+4, effectively banning naked shorting for 
anyone other than a market maker. Hence, we compute average naked shorting across 
our entire sample of NYSE securities for two periods: pre-204T from January 1, 2005 to 
June 30, 2008; and post-204T from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2010. We 
intentionally omit the period July to October 2008 because of multiple short-selling and 
naked-short-selling rule changes, and omit November and December 2008 to allow 
outstanding naked short positions to fully clear and thereby enable accurately gauging 
the impact of post-204T naked shorting. Across all securities, we find a drop in average 
ONSR of approximately 71%, suggesting that less than 30% of all naked shorting was 
initiated by market-makers prior to September 2008.  
For each security in our sample, we use the proportional change in mean ONSR 
between the two sub-periods as our proxy for naked shorting by public traders. We 
accordingly rank securities on the basis of this proportional decline and allocate 
securities to terciles. We then re-estimate our VAR for January 2005 to June 2008 for 
the two terciles ―Low Proportion of Public Traders‖ (i.e., securities with the lowest 
decline in mean ONSR) and ―High Proportion of Public Traders‖ (i.e., securities with 
the highest decline in mean ONSR). Our underlying assumption here is that naked 
shorting originating from market makers is fairly constant over time and that the 
observed decline indicates the quantity of naked shorting originating from public 
traders.  
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Our results are reported in Table 15. For both samples, our coefficient estimates 
are of the same sign as those of the overall sample. For the ―High Proportion of Public 
Traders‖ sub-sample, all previously documented results continue to remain strong and 
statistically significant for all market quality metrics even though the sample size is 
much smaller than the overall sample. The results for the ―Low Proportion of Public 
Traders‖ subsample are also statistically significant for magnitude of pricing error, 
returns volatility, and order imbalances, but are not statistically significant for spreads 
and the sign and level of pricing errors. Clearly, our results indicate that, if anything, the 
impact of naked shorting is stronger for the subset of securities with a relatively high 
proportion of naked shorting from public traders, rather than the subset with a high 
proportion of market maker initiated naked shorting. Hence, at the very least, our results 
are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the beneficial effects of naked shorting arise 
entirely from naked shorting by market-makers. They show that naked shorting by 
public traders also leads to improvement in market quality.  
5.4. The market quality impact of restrictions on naked short selling. 
In this sub-section, we report the effect on market quality of restrictions on 
naked shorting. We employ a natural experiment: the one-time SEC ban on naked 
shorting in July/August 2008. Given our previous results that naked shorting positively 
impacts market quality, we expect deterioration in market quality in the presence of a 
ban on naked shorting. Our sample is constructed as in our analysis of the same event in 
Section 3. For each of our 17 sample securities affected by the ban and the 17 unique 
control sample matches, and for each day in the interval January 1, 2008 to September 
9, 2008, we compute ONSR, Pricing Error Volatility, Return, Volatility, Spread and 
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Order Imbalance, as in Table 9. We average each of these six variables across securities 
to obtain a daily mean for the affected and control samples. We then run six separate 
OLS regressions: in each regression, the response variable is the affected sample mean 
of either Outstanding Naked Short Ratio, Pricing Error Volatility, Return, Volatility, 
Spread or Order Imbalance, while the explanatory variables include an intercept, the 
control sample mean of the variable of interest and a binary variable, Event, set equal to 
1 on all days during which restrictions were in place and equal to 0 on all other days. 
Our results, presented in Table 16, indicate that the number of naked shorted shares 
outstanding declines heavily during the ban (as expected and as discussed in section 3). 
Further, we observe significantly higher return volatility and pricing error volatility, 
both significant at the 1% level. Finally, we document higher spreads, significant at 
10%. The impact of the ban on returns and order imbalances is not statistically 
significant. Overall, our results are in line with expectations, indicating that a ban on 
naked shorting adversely impacts the stock‘s liquidity,39 and hampers the price 
discovery process, providing further strong support to Hypotheses H1 and H2. 
Interestingly, our results also indicate that the ban failed to slow the price decline of the 
affected securities.  
5.5. Naked short selling and the 2008 financial crisis. 
Bear Stearns failed because it went bankrupt. However, the pace of the collapse of the 
stock price was clearly accelerated by the enormous naked short-sale activity. -- Robert 
                                                 
39
 Our results are consistent with contemporaneous work of Kolasinski, et al. (2009). While their main 
focus is on the different impact of restrictions vs. bans on short selling, they analyze the same event 
(interpreting it as a temporary short selling restriction) and find that the ban negatively impacted liquidity 
of the affected securities. Our results on this particular issue are also consistent with contemporaneous 
work of Boulton and Braga-Alves (2009). 
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Shapiro, former Under Secretary of Commerce quoted in ―Short selling: The naked 
truth‖, Euromoney (December, 2008). 
Like all the great merchants of the bubble economy, Bear and Lehman were leveraged 
to the hilt and vulnerable to collapse. Many of the methods that outsiders used to knock 
them over were mostly legal: credit markers were pulled, rumors were spread through 
the media, and legitimate short-sellers pressured the stock price down. But when Bear 
and Lehman made their final leap off the cliff of history, both undeniably got a push — 
especially in the form of a flat-out counterfeiting scheme called naked short-selling. -- 
"Wall Street's Naked Swindle", Rolling Stone (October 2009). 
Fails to deliver in the US equity market have exacerbated the sharp declines in share 
prices of financials. Although the SEC is clearing up the mess caused by naked short-
selling, more drastic measures might be needed to restore confidence. -- “Short selling: 
The naked truth”, Euromoney (December, 2008). 
 
 In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, the media has consistently pointed an 
accusing finger at naked short-sellers, blaming them for having caused, or at least 
accelerated, sharp declines in stock prices, particularly of financial firms. Naked short-
sellers have often been described as villains who deliberately undertake ―bear raids‖ to 
drive prices down, create conditions that trigger credit downgrades, and profit from the 
downward price spiral and the eventual collapse of the financial institutions involved. In 
this context, we test Hypothesis H3 by specifically examining whether significant naked 
shorting preceded (and hence potentially triggered) the price crashes associated with the 
four major casualties of the 2008 financial crisis, i.e., Bear Stearns, Lehman, AIG and 
Merrill, and similarly preceded credit downgrades and large price decline episodes in 
other financial firms; or did significant naked shorting take place after these price 
crashes and in response to negative public news.  
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5.5.1. Bear Stearns 
 The first large financial casualty of the 2008 financial crisis was Bear Stearns, 
the fifth largest investment banking firm in the nation at the time of its demise. We 
analyze naked shorting on the days preceding and immediately following the dramatic 
loss of market value that led to the demise of the firm. Figure 4 provides a time-line 
about the crisis. Outstanding suspicions about liquidity problems at Bear Stearns were 
reported in the media from March 10 onwards, along with news that the company‘s 
management was repeatedly denying rumors about such problems. The first major 
price-crash took place on Friday, March 14, when the price per share dropped from $57 
to $30 after a 9 a.m. announcement that Bear would receive an unprecedented loan from 
the Federal Reserve System; and two days later, on Sunday March 16, JP Morgan Chase 
proposed buying Bear Stearns for $2 per share.
40
 When markets opened on March 17, a 
second major price crash materialized, and the price dropped to a close of $4.81.  
 We compute ONSR for Bear Stearns on each trading day from January 1 to 
March 28, 2008. We also compute a control variable for the same period - an equal 
weighted average ONSR for four other financial institutions with the same primary SIC 
code as Bear Stearns, and with the closest market value as of the end of the fiscal year 
2007 - and test for the statistical significance each day of the difference, i.e. the 
―abnormal‖ naked shorting.41 Our results are presented in Table 17, Panel A.   
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 See, for example, ―Fed Races to Rescue Bear Stearns in Bid to Steady Financial System Storied Firm‖, 
The Wall Street Journal (March 15, 2008) and ―JP Morgan Chase to Acquire Bear Stearns‖, J.P. Morgan 
News Release (March 16,2008). 
41
 The four control stocks are: Raymond James Financial Corporation, Ameritrade Holdings 
Corporation, Ameriprise Financial Inc. and Charles Schwab Corporation. To construct a t-statistic for 
the difference in means: we compute the mean and standard error of this difference over the period 
January 1 to February 15, 2008; we subtract this historic mean from the daily difference and divide the 
result by the historic estimate of the standard deviation of the difference. 
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 Even though negative media attention started on March 10, Table 17, Panel A 
and Figure 4 show that abnormal naked shorting was statistically insignificant or 
significantly negative up to March 11. While naked shorting did increase significantly 
on March 12 and 13, the increase was still relatively tiny from an economic perspective 
since it was tiny relative to the total number of shares outstanding, tiny relative to the 
typical overall short volume, and tiny relative to what took place on or after March 14: 
the outstanding naked shorted shares were only 1.06% of shares outstanding until 
market close on March 13. Naked shorting increased to 2.24% (t-stat. 20.7) on March 
14, but increased massively only on March 17, reaching 12.18% (t-stat. 137.3). 
Importantly, given that the Fed announcement was at the start of trading on March 14, 
even the (relatively small) increase in naked shorting on March 14 was clearly 
subsequent to the public release of tangibly negative news in the form of the 
announcement and the consequent immediate precipitous price-drop. By the time naked 
shorting really spiked on March 17, the company was already in an open distress sale. 
The evidence clearly shows that the abnormal incidence of naked shorting did not 
precede the price decline but followed it; and the decline in stock price was triggered by 
other well-identified negative economic news.
42
  
 Even in this extreme scenario, often cited as a glaring example of the negative 
role of naked short sellers in financial markets, we fail to find any evidence of naked 
short sellers engaging in manipulative ―bear-raid‖ type activity. Rather, they appeared 
to be following strategies in response to public information. The decline in stock price 
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 However, media journalists have aggressively reinforced rumors that the price collapse happened 
because of naked-shorting. See, for example, "Wall Street's Naked Swindle", Rolling Stone (October 
2009). See also opinions cited in ―Short Sellers Aren‘t Jackals, They‘re Bears, Fleckenstein Says‖, 
Bloomberg.com (October 29, 2008). 
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appears motivated by unrelated and clearly identifiable factors; and consistent with our 
previous results, naked short sellers appear to be facilitating price discovery, rather than 
increasing pricing errors. Overall, we find no support for Hypothesis H3. 
5.5.2. Lehman 
 The second notable casualty of the financial crisis of 2008 was Lehman. To 
investigate the link between naked shorting and the stock price crash, we employ the 
same method we used for Bear Stearns. We analyze naked shorting on the days 
surrounding the dramatic loss of market value of the firm on September 9, 2008, 
estimating "abnormal" naked shorting and associated t-statistics using a methodology 
similar to that employed above for Bear Stearns. Our results are in Table 17, Panel B. In 
Figure 5A we present the relationship between ONSR and stock price for the period 
from January 2008 to Lehman‘s bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. We present a 
closer look at the period surrounding Lehman‘s bankruptcy in Figure 5B. 
 The above table and figures indicate abnormally low naked shorting in the days 
leading to September 9, with abnormal ONSR at only around 0.01%. 
43
 But, by 
September 9, the firm‘s stock price had already lost approximately 87% of its value as 
of the beginning of the year. The biggest single-day price drop, about 45%, occurred on 
September 9, following news that talks with the Korea Development Bank (previously 
rumored to be considering a 25% stake in Lehman) had failed. While ONSR increases 
on that day, outstanding naked short shares still represent less than 0.16% of shares 
outstanding. Abnormal ONSR increased more dramatically only after September 10, 
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 A recent article ―Naked Short Sales Hint Fraud in Bringing Down Lehman‖, Bloomberg (March 19, 
2009), notes that a rumor about Barclays Plc buying Lehman for a 25% discount to market value was 
responsible for a 11% fall in Lehman‘s stock price on June 30. We find that ONSR spikes significantly on 
June 27, the day preceding the rumor, but the spike is still just 0.06%, far too miniscule to conclude that 
naked shorting, rather than negative information, was responsible for the price decline. 
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well after widespread coverage of negative news about Lehman and the associated price 
crash. On September 11, as shareholders rejected a management rescue plan, the stock 
price fell by an additional 42% and ONSR further increased to 3.3%. Over the following 
days, talks of a possible acquisition by Bank of America and Barclays failed, triggering 
further declines in stock price and an increase in ONSR to 4.9%. Lehman announced its 
bankruptcy on September 15, and ONSR increased beyond 8% on September 17. 
 In sum, our analysis shows that, first of all, the incidence of naked shorting, 
even at its peak, was too low to justify the decline in price that took place. Second, our 
analysis indicates that naked shorting intensified not before but after the stock had lost 
most of its value and in reaction to negative news about the company, which is 
inconsistent with stock price manipulation. Again, we find no support for Hypothesis 
H3. 
5.5.3. Merrill and AIG  
 We report the relationship between ONSR and the stock price for Merrill and 
AIG in Figure 6 and Figure 7 respectively. In both cases, the stock price declines were 
fairly gradual through the year and were not accompanied by any significant increase in 
naked shorting. For Merrill, ONSR reached its highest value of only 0.18% on October 
14, 2008, well after the Merrill had lost most of its value. AIG had also lost about 40% 
of its market value by the end of August 2008, and the largest single-day price drop was 
on September 15, 2008 when Standard & Poor‘s cut AIG‘s credit rating. Following the 
announcement, the company‘s stock price dropped by about 60%. Yet, naked shorting 
remained low, and ONSR reached its highest value only a fortnight later on September 
29, 2008, and even this highest value was only 0.32%. Given that naked shorting 
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remained so extremely small all through the financial crisis period for both Merrill and 
AIG, we do not engage in any further statistical testing. There is clearly no evidence of 
naked-shorting linked manipulation, or any support for Hypothesis H3.   
5.5.4. Naked short selling and credit rating downgrades 
Naked short-sellers have been alleged to engage in (manipulative) naked 
shorting by creating conditions that trigger credit downgrades specifically to profit not 
just from the downward price spiral but also from linked credit default swap positions 
on the associated stock. In this context, we examine naked shorting around credit rating 
downgrades for a sample of the most affected financial securities. As our sample of 
financial firms, we use Bear Stearns and the 17 securities used earlier in section 3 for 
which the SEC had temporarily banned naked shorting in mid-2008, and for which data 
was available; but we exclude Lehman, as its credit rating downgrade was soon 
followed by a bankruptcy. For this sample of companies, we identify 21 long term 
issuer downgrades by S&P over the year 2008.  
 For each downgrade, we compute ONSR for the security of interest for 40 
trading days preceding and following the announcement. We then compute average 
ONSR for each day in the event day calendar, where day 0 is the day of the downgrade. 
We estimate abnormal daily ONSR and its significance using a standard mean-adjusted 
event study methodology with an estimation window of 100 trading days ending 20 
days prior to the credit rating downgrade. The results are reported in Table 18, Panel A.  
If it were true that naked short-sellers were manipulatively creating conditions 
that triggered the downgrade, we would expect to find abnormally high naked shorting 
in the days preceding the credit rating downgrade. However, what we do find is the 
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polar opposite: naked shorting is actually abnormally low in the days preceding the 
credit rating downgrade. Naked shorting becomes abnormally high only in the days 
following the downgrade. This abnormal naked shorting is sustained for approximately 
one month following the rating downgrade. This evidence is again consistent with 
naked short sellers reacting to negative news regarding the company, rather than 
engaging in naked shorting with a manipulative intent, and is hence inconsistent with 
our hypothesis H3. 
5.5.5. Naked short selling and large price drops 
 Similar to our analysis of naked shorting around credit rating downgrades, we 
analyze whether naked shorting intensifies prior to large price drops. We start with a 
sample including all NYSE common stocks of US-based firms (CRSP share codes 10 
and 11) included in the CRSP and TAQ databases over the interval January 1, 2008 to 
July 20, 2008, with no large changes (>10%) in the number of shares outstanding during 
the same period.
44
 For each security, we standardize daily returns by subtracting the 
mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Our ―event‖ days of large abnormal 
negative stock price returns are the 83 security-days with standardized returns smaller 
than -2.  
 For each security-day in the interval between day -20 and day +20 (where day 0 
is the previously-identified day with the large negative abnormal return), we compute 
daily Abnormal ONSR, by subtracting mean ONSR, estimated over a split interval 
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 We aim at investigating the role of naked short sellers during the financial crisis, hence we focus on the 
year 2008. We restrict our analysis to the period ending July 20, 2008, as the SEC introduced various 
restrictions on both covered and naked shorting over the subsequent period, hence making it difficult to 
draw inferences regarding the relationship between naked shorting and stock returns. In unreported 
results, we find that including the subsequent period (until December 31, 2008) yields qualitatively 
similar results, with no evidence of intense naked shorting prior to the largest stock price declines.  
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containing the 50 trading days ending 21 trading days prior to the identified event date 
and the 50 trading days starting 21 trading days after the identified event date. We 
cumulate Mean Abnormal ONSR over various event-windows in the interval between 
day -20 and day +20 and test for significance using a Brown-Warner (1980, 1985) 
adjustment in the computation of standard errors, to account for the clustering of event 
dates. As indicated by the results presented in Table 18, Panel B, Mean Cumulative 
Abnormal ONSR is significantly negative at the 1% level over the 20, 10 and 5 day 
windows preceding the event date. Mean Abnormal ONSR is positive but statistically 
insignificant on the event date. In contrast, Mean Cumulative Abnormal ONSR is 
positive and statistically significant over the 5, 10 and 20 day intervals following the 
event. Once again, naked shorting does not precede large price drops but follows them.  
To further investigate whether naked short sellers specifically target companies 
with a view to triggering credit rating downgrades, we investigate whether there is 
greater evidence of manipulative naked shorting among securities of highly levered 
firms, as those would be more vulnerable to credit downgrades. Accordingly, we obtain 
Total Assets and Long Term Debt as of the end of the fiscal year 2006 from the 
Compustat database and compute Leverage as the ratio of Long Term Debt to Total 
Assets. We then rank securities on Leverage and assign those with leverage below the 
sample median to a ‗low leverage‘ group and those with leverage above the sample 
median to a ‗high leverage‘ group. We then repeat our analysis on these two subsets and 
present results in Table 18, Panel B. The results for the two subsets do not differ 
qualitatively from those of the overall sample (except for a lack of significance of the 
abnormal return on the 20-day post-event window for the low leverage sample). 
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Overall, our results show that naked short sellers do not intensify their activity prior to 
the largest stock price declines, specifically hold also for the subset of high leverage 
firms, which are the ones that are most likely to be targeted by potential manipulators.  
 
6. Conclusions 
There has been intense regulatory and media concern about manipulative distortions 
associated with naked shorting even though naked shorts are functionally 
indistinguishable from covered shorts at the time of trade, and should arguably have the 
same beneficial impact on liquidity and pricing efficiency as documented for short-
selling in general. In this paper, we empirically investigate the impact of the option to 
fail and the resultant naked shorting on market distortions, pricing efficiency and 
liquidity. Our focus is on aggregate naked shorting without trying to isolate "abusive" 
naked shorting since the intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud is very difficult to 
ascertain ex-ante, and since ex ante intention about going naked does not even need to 
definitively exist at the time of the short trade. 
We first demonstrate empirically that the overwhelming majority of FTDs 
originate from naked short sales and not from human errors or processing delays. We 
accordingly construct and analyze an accurate FTD-based proxy for naked shorting. We 
find that the impact on market quality of naked shorting is very similar to that of 
covered shorting and, overall, beneficial for both pricing efficiency and liquidity. On 
average, naked short sellers function as liquidity providers reducing order imbalances 
and as value arbitrageurs who stabilize markets and reduce the mispricing of overvalued 
securities. An increase in naked shorting of 10 basis points of the number of outstanding 
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shares leads to approximately a 1% reduction in spreads, a 2% reduction in order 
imbalances, a 10% reduction in the magnitude of positive pricing errors, a 13% decline 
in pricing error volatility, and a 1% reduction in stock price volatility. Further, we find 
that the beneficial impact of naked short sales on market-quality is not driven just by the 
naked-shorting of market makers, but even more strongly by the naked shorting by 
public traders. And, consistent with naked shorting having a beneficial impact on 
pricing efficiency and liquidity, we find that the SEC ban on naked shorting in select 
financial securities between July and August 2008 led to higher absolute pricing errors, 
higher spreads and lower trading volumes.  
 We analyze naked shorting in Bear Stearns, Lehman, Merrill and AIG around 
the days surrounding their dramatic declines in market value and find that abnormal 
naked shorting in these flagship victims of the 2008 financial crisis took place after and 
not before their major stock price declines and associated negative news; and hence 
their demise or other fate was not triggered by naked short sellers. We also analyze 
naked shorting around credit rating downgrades of financial firms in 2008, and again 
find that abnormal naked shorting takes place only in response to these downgrade 
announcements, and not prior to them. Similarly, we analyze naked shorting around the 
steepest stock price declines of financial firms during our 2008 financial crisis sample-
period, and find yet again that abnormal naked shorting lags price declines, and that the 
direction of significant causality is from steep price falls to naked shorting, not vice-
versa. Overall, our results indicate that, contrary to media and regulatory perceptions, 
naked short sellers did not precipitate the collapse of major financial firms in 2008, nor 
did they trigger credit rating downgrades or large stock price declines of financial firms. 
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 Our findings are in sharp contrast with the extremely negative pre-conceptions 
that appear to exist among media commentators and market regulators in relation to the 
impact of naked short-sellers on market quality. They indicate that naked and covered 
short-sellers are not polar opposites in this context, and naked short-sellers are not 
necessarily the unadulterated villains in the marketplace. Our results have important 
implications for regulatory policy. While there clearly needs to be zero tolerance for 
individual cases of abusive naked shorting, we need to recognize that there is no 
evidence whatsoever that indicates that, in aggregate, naked short-sellers systematically 
and manipulatively precipitated price declines, or otherwise contributed adversely to 
any market distortions, even in the extreme situation of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Instead, the gently regulated naked shorting that existed after Regulation SHO up to 
mid-2008 was net beneficial for pricing efficiency and market liquidity, and this 
beneficial impact of naked shorting was similar to the well-accepted benefits of covered 
shorting. In this context, the rigid inflexible removal of the option to fail for the vast 
majority of market participants appears questionable, since the option to fail arguably 
reduces stock borrowing costs at the time when such costs are the highest, and thereby 
protects traders from the extreme lack of liquidity sometimes seen in the less regulated 
stock borrowing market. This option to fail, through naked shorting, is valuable for 
markets, also because it can prevent (potentially manipulative) distortions in the stock 
borrowing and lending market from getting transformed into serious pricing and 
liquidity distortions in the mainstream stock market. We believe that regulators can 
alternatively consider progressive fines for settlement delays rather than blanket 
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removal of the option to fail; and should also significantly increase their focus on 
generating liquidity and transparency in the stock borrowing market.  
 Our empirical analysis is limited to NYSE stocks. We recognize that stock price 
manipulation, through naked shorting or other means, is more likely in less regulated 
markets populated by smaller capitalization firms. Possible directions for future 
research would be an examination of other markets – especially OTC markets – and an 
investigation of the intraday impact of naked shorting on market liquidity and pricing 
efficiency. In both cases, the challenge would lie in being able to find data that can 
enable construction of a good proxy for naked short sales within the day and across 
different markets. 
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 Chapter 3: Is Hedging Bad News? Evidence from Corporate 
Hedging Announcements45 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Gold prices soared 8% yesterday, its biggest gain in four months, after Placer Dome 
Inc. said it was winding down its hedging position in expectation of an improved gold 
market…. Shares of Placer Dome (PDG/TSE) rose 24%, up $3.05 to $15.70. -- Reuters, 
Friday, 02/05/2000. 
 
Despite a growing literature, researchers have failed to arrive at a consensus on 
whether corporate hedging creates value for shareholders.46 Theory argues that it 
should, by mitigating the costs of financial distress, financial constraints, taxes, 
underinvestment, etc.47 However, the empirical evidence in support of these hedging 
rationales is mixed.48 Additionally, recent studies have documented that a majority of 
firms use derivatives not only to hedge their risk exposure but also to incorporate 
market timing into their hedging programs,49 which suggests that these firms believe 
they have valuable private information. Yet, very little is known about the informational 
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 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Chitru Fernando. 
 
46 
See, for example, Allayannis and Weston (2001), Chidambaran, Fernando and Spindt (2001), Guay and 
Kothari (2003), Adam and Fernando (2006), Jin and Jorion (2006), and Mackay and Moeller (2007). 
47 
See, for example, Smith and Stulz (1985), Bessembinder (1991), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), 
and Leland (1998). 
48
 See, for example, Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Tufano (1996), Mian (1996), Géczy, Minton and 
Schrand (1997), Haushalter (2000) and Graham and Rogers (2002). 
49
 See, for example, Dolde (1993), Stulz (1996), Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998), Glaum (2002), 
Faulkender (2005), Adam and Fernando (2006), Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006), Beber and Fabbri 
(2006), and Géczy, Minton and Schrand (2007). 
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superiority of firms, although casual empiricism as reflected in the above press report 
would suggest that markets do react strongly to firms‘ hedging announcements. 
However, the literature has failed to document any benefit to shareholders from such 
selective hedging activity,50 suggesting that firms may not have as much private 
information as they think they do. 
In this paper, we address these puzzles by studying the information content of 
hedging announcements, an approach that is new to the corporate risk management 
literature as far as we are aware but well established in other areas of corporate 
finance.51 The hedging announcements in our study are made by a sample of gold 
mining companies. Our study permits us to re-examine three questions that are currently 
unresolved in the literature: (a) whether commodity firms have private information 
about the underlying commodity market; (b) whether changes in hedging policies also 
reveal private information about the firm and its industry; and (c) whether hedging 
decisions affect shareholder value. The answer to the first question would shed new 
light on the pervasive practice of selective hedging while the answers to the second and 
third questions would provide new evidence on the motives for corporate hedging and 
the extent to which it is consistent with theoretical rationales especially from the 
standpoint of maximizing shareholder wealth. 
We hand-collect a sample of 153 announcements pertaining to changes in 
hedging policies made by gold mining companies between 1991 and 2008. Using this 
sample we test for the informational effects of hedging. First, we study the effect of 
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 See Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006). 
51
 See, for example, Smith (1986), Eckbo and Masulis (1995) and Ritter (2003). 
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hedging announcements on the underlying commodity market. To the extent there is a 
reaction in the commodity market to hedging announcements, it could be taken as 
evidence that the market believes the firm is informed. Stulz (1996) argues that firms 
that are informed can enhance shareholder wealth by hedging selectively, i.e., by 
incorporating their market views into their hedging programs. Therefore, by examining 
the informational superiority of commodity firms, we can contribute to our 
understanding of the potential effects of selective hedging on shareholder wealth.  
We find evidence to support the hypothesis that changes in hedging policies 
provide valuable gold price information to other market participants. Specifically, we 
find that announcements about decreases in hedging are associated with strong positive 
abnormal returns in the gold market, with increases in hedging eliciting a considerably 
weaker negative gold price response. We rule out the possibility that our results are due 
to the spot market impact of hedging changes on gold supply by cross-sectional analysis 
and also by studying the gold market reaction to 103 announcements of central bank 
gold sales during the same time period. We find that the gold market reaction to central 
bank announcements is neither statistically nor economically significant, despite 
average central bank gold sales exceeding average corporate hedging changes by a 
factor of three. As central bank announcements are unlikely to be driven by market 
timing objectives, we regard this finding as further evidence in support of the 
information hypothesis, i.e., that markets deduce private gold price information from 
the hedging announcements of gold mining firms. This conclusion is surprising in light 
of the evidence provided by Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown, Crabb and 
97 
Haushalter (2006) that firms do not create any value for shareholders when they 
incorporate market timing practices into their hedging programs. 
Second, we study the effect of hedging announcements on stock prices. A 
change in hedging policy could, all else equal, signal a change in the value of the firm 
as predicted by hedging theory. Specifically, keeping all else equal, an increase in 
hedging should increase stock prices and vice versa. However, if a firm changes its 
hedging policy in response to a change in its forecast of future gold prices, an increase 
in hedging could signal that the firm expects a deterioration in its financial condition 
due to a lower gold price forecast and we would expect to observe a decrease in the 
stock price, and vice versa. By examining the stock price reaction to firm-level 
information revealed by hedging policies, we add a new dimension to the debate on the 
effect of hedging on shareholder wealth.  
We document several interesting results that strongly support our hypothesis that 
a change in hedging policy reveals private information about a change in the firm‘s 
financial condition. First, stock prices react negatively to an increase in hedging, and 
vice versa, after controlling for the fact that the gold price response to the 
announcement also affects gold company stocks directly. Second, firms with higher 
leverage react more negatively (positively) to increases (decreases) in hedging than 
lower levered firms. Third, changes in hedging policies by individual firms also cause 
an industry-wide contagion. Stock prices of other gold mining firms, after controlling 
for changes in gold prices, react negatively (positively) to announcements of increases 
(decreases) in hedging by individual firms. 
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A negative (positive) stock price reaction for firms that announce increases 
(decreases) in hedging could also arise in situations where managers and shareholders 
disagree about the firm‘s optimal hedging policy.52 However, this possibility is 
effectively ruled out by our finding of a similarly strong industry-wide reaction to the 
announcement. While our firm and industry results are not inconsistent with shareholder 
value maximizing rationales for hedging, our findings show that any shareholder benefit 
of a hedging increase is more than offset by the negative news conveyed by the hedging 
increase about the change in the firm‘s prospects, and vice versa. Thus, our findings 
provide new insights into the endogeneity associated with hedging policy changes and 
the confounding effect of this endogeneity on measuring the relation between hedging 
and the value of the firm. 
In the next section we discuss the relevant literature and develop our empirical 
hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe the data and discuss our empirical methodology. 
We present and discuss our empirical findings pertaining to the gold market impacts in 
Section 4. We present and discuss our empirical findings pertaining to the equity market 
impacts in Section 5. In Section 6, we examine whether the hedging changes following 
announcements by gold mining firms are consistent with the announcements. Section 7 
concludes.  
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 See, for example, DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), Tufano (1996), Tufano (1998b), Knopf, Nam and 
Thornton (2002), and Kumar and Rabinovich (2010). 
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2. Empirical Hypotheses 
2.1. Background 
The extant literature provides numerous theoretical arguments in support of the 
notion that corporate hedging creates value for shareholders by mitigating market 
imperfections that cause departures from a Modigliani-Miller world. First, hedging can 
reduce firms‘ expected costs of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985). This 
argument also suggests that hedging will help firms increase their debt capacity and the 
tax shields they can realize from debt (Leland, 1998; Graham and Rogers, 2002). 
Furthermore, by reducing the cost of financial distress, hedging can also enhance credit 
quality and reduce the cost of debt financing (Chidambaran, Fernando and Spindt, 
2001). Second, when a firm faces a convex tax function, lowering the volatility of 
earnings by hedging can help reduce a firm‘s expected tax burden (Smith and Stulz, 
1985; Graham and Smith, 1999). Finally, growth firms that find external financing to be 
more expensive than internally generated funds could employ hedging practices to 
reduce the underinvestment problem by ensuring that they have sufficient internal funds 
available to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities (Froot, Scharfstein, 
and Stein, 1993) and by reducing the cost to equity holders of financing these 
investment opportunities externally (Bessembinder, 1991).  
Empirical studies that examine these theories provide mixed evidence. Nance, 
Smith and Smithson (1993) provide evidence suggesting that firms with more convex 
tax functions, more financial constraints and more growth opportunities hedge more. In 
contrast, Tufano (1996) finds little evidence in favor of shareholder value maximization 
theories, instead finding support for the idea that a firm‘s hedging practices are related 
100 
to managerial incentives, specifically stock and option compensation. Géczy, Minton 
and Schrand (1997) find that firms with greater growth opportunities and firms with 
greater financial constraints are more likely to employ currency derivatives to hedge 
their foreign exchange exposure, Haushalter (2000) finds a positive relation between the 
extent to which a firm hedges and its financial leverage. Neither of the latter two studies 
find support for notion that hedging is tied to managerial utility or for the tax convexity 
hypothesis. Graham and Rogers (2002) provide evidence suggesting that although tax 
convexity does not seem to be a factor in hedging decisions, firms appear to be hedging 
to increase their debt capacity and thereby increase tax shields. They also find that firms 
hedge to reduce expected distress costs. 
Recent studies have also examined the relation between firm value and hedging. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) find that the market value of firms using foreign 
currency derivatives is 4.87% higher on average than for nonusers. Chidambaran, 
Fernando and Spindt (2001) show that hedging is associated with an enhancement in a 
firm‘s credit quality, thereby lowering financing costs. Graham and Rogers (2002) 
argue that derivatives-induced debt capacity increases firm value by 1.1% on average. 
Adam and Fernando (2006) find that their sample of gold mining firms consistently 
realized abnormal positive cash flows from their derivative transactions due to positive 
risk premia. They do not find a corresponding increase in systematic risk and hence 
infer that these derivative transactions increased shareholder value. Mackay and 
Moeller (2007) find that by hedging concave revenues and leaving concave costs 
exposed, their sample of 34 oil refiners could have increased their market values 
between 2% and 3%.  
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On the other hand, Guay and Kothari (2003) find that for most of their sample 
firms, the cash flow and market value sensitivities to their derivative portfolios are 
small relative to the magnitude of sensitivities to traditional measures of economic 
exposures. Jin and Jorion (2006) study 119 oil and gas companies and find that hedging 
does not affect market value of these companies although it does lower their stock price 
sensitivity to oil and gas prices. 
Furthermore, recent studies have documented that many firms not only hedge 
but also speculate with derivatives by varying the size and timing of their derivatives 
transactions based on their market views, a practice known as ―selective hedging.‖ For 
example, Dolde (1993) reports that almost 90% of firms in his survey of 244 Fortune 
500 firms at least sometimes base the size of their hedges on their views of future 
market movements. Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998) survey derivatives policies by 
399 U.S. non-financial firms and find that about 50% of their sample firms admit to 
sometimes (and 10% frequently) altering the size and/or the timing of a hedge based on 
their market views. Glaum (2002) surveys the risk management practices of the major 
non-financial firms in Germany and finds that the majority follows forecast-based, 
profit-oriented risk management strategies. These findings suggests that the practice of 
hedging departs considerably from the underlying assumption in the theoretical 
literature that firms use derivatives to reduce risk, not to speculate. 
For selective hedging to be value increasing, Stulz (1996) argues that firms 
would need to possess private information about future market prices and the ability to 
act on this information without jeopardizing their core businesses. Adam and Fernando 
(2006) find considerable evidence of selective hedging in their sample of gold mining 
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firms but find no economically significant cash flow gains on average from selective 
hedging. Brown, Crabb, and Haushalter (2006) also study selective hedging in the gold 
mining industry and arrive at a similar conclusion. While these findings do not rule out 
the possibility that some gold mining firms are privately informed about future gold 
prices,53 they suggest that the firms that do engage in speculation are unlikely to be 
privately informed. Private information possessed by firms about future gold prices 
could potentially influence other aspects of their hedging behavior and the overall gold 
market as well.  
2.2.  Market reaction to hedging announcements 
The literature reviewed in the previous subsection suggests that researchers have 
failed to arrive at a consensus on whether firms have private information about the 
underlying commodity market and whether hedging decisions affect shareholder value. 
In addition, the question of whether changes in hedging policies also reveal private 
information about the firm and its industry has not been previously addressed in the 
literature. In this subsection we develop a series of empirical hypotheses that are aimed 
at examining these questions based on how the gold and stock markets react to hedging 
announcements. 
If a commodity firm announces a change in its hedging policy, it is possible that 
in doing so it will reveal (a) any private information it has about future gold prices 
and/or (b) private information about changes in the firm‘s financial condition that 
precipitated the hedging change, while also allowing for the possibility that a change in 
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 Indeed, Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006) report that of the 13 gold producers who responded to 
their survey, only two respondents believed that gold prices were ―never predictable,‖ also noting that the 
two most important factors determining the extent to which the companies in their survey hedged were ―a 
long-term market view on gold prices‖ and a ―short term market view on gold prices.‖ 
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hedging policy could, all else equal, signal a change in the value of the firm as predicted 
by hedging theory. We develop our first set of hypotheses based on ―(a)‖ to examine the 
gold price impact of the announcement and our second set of hypotheses based on ―(b)‖ 
to examine the firm and industry impact of the announcement.  
2.2.1. Announcement effect of hedging change on the gold price 
If a commodity firm that has private information about the price of the 
commodity announces a change in its hedging policy and other market participants 
believe that the firm‘s information is of value, they can be expected to draw inferences 
about the firm‘s expectation of future commodity prices. Consider, for example, a 
commodity company that has just announced that it is closing out all its hedge 
positions. The market could construe this change in policy as a credible signal of the 
firm‘s greater confidence in the future prospects for the commodity. If so, we expect an 
announcement of an increase (decrease) in hedging by a commodity firm to be 
associated with a negative (positive) abnormal return in the corresponding commodity 
market. 
However, the commodity market may also react to changes in hedging policies 
because hedging transactions can affect the supply in the gold markets and therefore the 
spot price of the commodity, and not necessarily because of the signaling power of the 
announcement.54 For example, if a gold mining firm initiates a hedging program by 
selling gold forward, the counterparty to the transaction will typically hedge its 
exposure by borrowing gold and selling it in the spot market, thereby increasing the 
spot supply and depressing prices. While both the information hypothesis and the 
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 See Cross (2000) and Brown, Crabb and Haulhalter (2006) for further discussion on the potential 
market impact of hedging changes. 
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market impact hypothesis predict the same directional change in response to the 
announcement, any spot price reaction caused by a market supply impact will depend 
only on the quantity of gold involved and not on any other attribute of the hedging 
announcement or of the company making the announcement. Additionally, we can 
separate out information and market impact driven gold price movements by examining 
the gold sales of entities that are unlikely to be in the market for information reasons, in 
our case central banks that periodically rebalance their treasury portfolios by selling 
gold reserves.55  
2.2.2. Announcement effect of hedging change on equity prices 
In addition to revealing information about the firm‘s expectation of gold prices, 
a change in hedging policy could also signal either a move designed to increase (or 
decrease) the benefits of hedging predicted by hedging theory and/or a readjustment in 
the level of hedging in response to a change in the firm‘s financial condition.56 Under 
the former argument, hedging theory would lead us to expect a stock price increase 
(decrease) if the firm increased (decreased) its hedging. Under the latter argument, an 
increase in hedging could signal that a firm's probability of financial distress has 
increased (thereby increasing the need for hedging) and we would expect to observe a 
decrease in the stock price (albeit partially mitigated by any benefits of an increase in 
hedging), whereas a decrease in hedging could signal that the firm‘s probability of 
financial distress has decreased (thereby decreasing the need for hedging) which would 
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 For example, Russia sold significant quantities of gold in the early 1990s to repay its international debt 
and the United Kingdom reduced its gold reserve by half between 1998 and 2004, in order to diversify 
and reduce risk. 
56
 See Smith (1986) for a discussion of the latter argument in the context of capital structure changes. 
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lead us to expect an increase in the stock price (albeit partially suppressed by the 
adverse effects of a decrease in hedging).  
Furthermore, if firms change their hedges to move closer to optimal hedge 
levels, firms with higher leverage will react more positively to an increase in hedging 
and more negatively to a decrease in hedging. In contrast, a market readjustment to 
firms‘ financial condition would predict that firms with higher leverage will react more 
negatively to an increase in hedging and more positively to a decrease in hedging.  
 A negative (positive) stock price reaction for firms that announce increases 
(decreases) in hedging could also arise in situations where managers and shareholders 
disagree about the firm‘s optimal hedging policy. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) show 
how manager-shareholder conflicts can arise regarding a firm‘s optimal hedging policy 
in the context of information disclosure, while Tufano (1996) and Knopf, Nam and 
Thornton (2002) find evidence of such conflicts in the context of managerial 
compensation. Tufano (1998b) and Kumar and Rabinovich (2010) argue that in the 
presence of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, cash-flow hedging 
strategies can be used to reduce shareholder wealth, since they remove the valuable 
discipline that obtaining new external financing imposes on managers.  
However, any stock price reaction due to manager-shareholder agency conflict 
will be confined only to the firm making the announcement. In contrast, to the extent 
that changes in hedging policy by a firm due to expected gold price changes also 
implies a change in the probability of financial distress due to the gold price change, we 
should expect to find industry wide contagion effects of hedging announcements over 
and above the direct effect of changes in gold prices on the firm making the 
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announcement.57 Furthermore, unlike the agency conflict hypothesis, the information 
hypothesis also implies that announcements that are identified as solely being motivated 
by the companies' view of market prices should cause a greater reaction in the 
commodity and equity markets.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
We use a Factiva guided search to hand-collect announcements made by 
individual firms related to changes in their hedging policies.58 These announcements 
include hedging program initiations, closures, and changes, between January 1991 and 
February 2008. Furthermore, we search for firm-specific news in the Factiva database 
and categorize hedging announcement events as contaminated when the related 
company has other news/events in the interval between days -1 and +1 and as 
uncontaminated otherwise. We obtain 153 hedging announcements made by 26 
different gold mining firms during our sample period. In addition to the date of the 
announcement, we also record data on the announced change in the quantity of hedging, 
reason for the change in hedging policy and whether the change is to be implemented or 
has already been implemented. An event is categorized as Market View when the firm 
making the hedging announcement explicitly states that the change in hedging policy is 
a result of its expectations about future gold prices. Beatty, Chen and Zhang (2008) find 
that changes in corporate hedging policies that are consequences of debt covenants are 
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 Jorion and Zhang (2007) find that credit events, such as Chapter 11 and 7 bankruptcies and large jumps 
in credit default swap spreads, are associated with industry wide contagion effects rather than competition 
effects. 
58
 We include numerous sources such as Reuters news, PR Newswire, Business Wire, Dow-Jones 
Newswires, Wall Street Journal and Major English Dailies in the United States. We search for stories 
which include any word starting with ―Hedg‖ in the headline or in the first 200 words.  
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mostly devoid of market timing intentions. Accordingly, we segregate hedging policy 
changes that firms attribute to loan related transactions and categorize them as Bank 
Loans. We further verify hedging transactions that may be driven by debt covenants by 
studying 10-K filings and annual reports to verify the classification. The remaining 
events are categorized as Others. Events are categorized as Ex ante (Ex post) when the 
change in hedging policy is announced before (after) its implementation.  
Table 19 provides further details of the sample of hedging announcements. 
Announcements about decreases in hedging significantly outnumber announcements 
about hedging increases. Stricter disclosure and accounting regulations such as the 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (SFAS 133) were implemented 
between 1999 and 2001. These regulations were aimed at providing shareholders with a 
greater clarity on the use of derivative instruments in corporate risk management. 
Accordingly, we find more announcements in the post-2000 period.  
We obtain financial data from Compustat. Stock market return data is obtained 
from the CRSP database. Gold production figures are obtained from firms‘ financial 
statements. NYMEX near-month contract prices are used as a proxy for daily gold 
prices.59 We obtain data on gold prices from Bloomberg. We estimate Firm Size, 
Leverage (Distress), Quick Ratio and Tax Savings in accordance with Tufano (1996). 
Information Asymmetry is calculated as the percentage error in analyst‘s forecasts of 
earnings. We calculate Hedge Proportion as the ratio of change in quantity of hedging 
to the following year's total gold production. Summary statistics of these variables are 
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 Although it can be argued that futures prices are more appropriate for testing the information 
hypothesis, it must be noted that the spot-future arbitrage relationship ensures that changes in spot prices 
reflect changes in the entire term-structure of gold prices. Furthermore, lack of data on the maturity of 
forward contracts associated with our hedging announcements makes using futures prices impractical. 
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presented in Table 20. As seen from Table 20, hedging policies are not trivial corporate 
decisions. As a consequence of a change in hedging policy, derivative positions can be 
changed on as much as 87.5% of next year‘s gold production. The scale of the impact of 
changes in hedging policies adds further credence to the notion that these policy 
changes must be a consequence of changes in expectations of future cash flows and 
hence, should convey significant incremental information to the market about firm 
value. 
We test our empirical hypotheses using standard event study methodologies 
(Brown and Warner, 1985) and OLS regressions. To estimate the abnormal returns in 
the commodity market, we employ a mean-adjusted methodology. The mean or 
expected return is calculated based on returns from day -110 to -10, where the day of 
the hedging announcement is identified as day zero. Since we are able to accurately 
establish the timing of the hedging announcements, we use a one-day event window 
(day zero) for the study.   
As shown by Tufano (1998a), gold mining firms have a significant exposure to 
gold price risk. Also, Tufano (1998a) documents that other variables such as interest 
rates and exchange rates do not enter as significant factors in the gold mining firm 
market model. Accordingly, we employ a two-factor model to measure the abnormal 
returns in the equity market. The expected return model for firm i on day t is shown 
below: 
 i ,t i i ,Mkt Mkt ,t i ,Gold Gold ,t i ,t
R R R      
 
(1) 
where i ,tR  is the total daily return on stock i from t-1 to t, Mkt ,tR  is the daily return on 
CRSP value-weighted index, and Gold ,tR  is the return on the near-month gold contract 
109 
traded on the NYMEX.60  For robustness, we also employ a five-factor model that 
augments the two-factor model with the Fama-French and momentum factors. The five-
factor model is as follows: 
 i ,t i i ,Mkt Mkt ,t i ,Gold Gold ,t i t i t i t i ,t
R R R s SMB h HMB uUMD         
 
(2)
 
where SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt are the returns to the Small-Minus-Big, High-Minus-
Low, and Up-Minus-Down portfolios meant to capture size, book-to-market, and return 
momentum effects, respectively.61 
We employ an estimation period of 255 days ending 45 days prior to the event 
date. The day of the hedging announcement is identified as day zero. For reasons 
mentioned earlier, we use a one-day event window.  
Since some of our hedging announcements are clustered in calendar time, it is 
imperative to control for the cross-sectional correlation in abnormal returns. To this 
effect, we compute t-statistics using the ―crude dependence adjustment‖ (CDA)62 of 
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). This methodology is robust to cross correlation of 
event day abnormal returns because the standard error used in the statistic is based on 
the time-series standard deviation of average (portfolio) excess returns from the 
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 We only use daily spot rates and do not consider daily lease rates when calculating the daily gold 
return. Tufano (1998a) reports that gold betas calculated using only spot gold prices are statistically 
equivalent to those calculated by considering both spot price returns and daily lease rates. 
61
 The daily factor returns for the SMB, HML, and UMD portfolios are generously provided on Ken 
French‘s website.  
62
 For examples of other applications see Campbell, Cowan and Salotti (2010) , Kothari and Warner 
(2007) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998). 
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estimation period. Furthermore, as a test of the median CAR, we also report a non-
parametric statistic -- Generalized sign Z (Cowan, 1992).63 
We use unsigned event-day CARs for all cross-sectional regressions: 
  
 
 
 (3) 
 
 
Employing unsigned event-day CARs alleviates some of the problems associated with 
using a smaller sample by enabling us to combine observations from the hedging 
increase and decrease samples into a single cross-sectional regression, especially since 
we have no reason to expect the relation between CARs and other firm and event 
variables to be conditional on the direction of change in hedging policies. 
 
4. Announcement Effects in the Gold Market 
4.1. Gold returns and hedging announcements 
We first examine the effect of hedging announcements on abnormal returns in 
the gold market. Results for the event studies of hedging decreases and increases are 
presented in Table 21. 
Panel A of Table 21 indicates that the mean abnormal gold return for the event 
day in response to a hedging decrease is positive and significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level. The gold CARs of 0.5% and 0.6% on the event day and 3-day interval 
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 For examples of other applications see Harvey, Lins and Roper (2004), Karpoff, Lee and Vendrzyk 
(1999) and Singh (1997). 
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around it, respectively, are also economically significant. There is some evidence of a 
gold price run-up prior to the announcement and no evidence of a reversal of the 
announcement return in the ten days following the event. 
Panel B of Table 21 reports the event study results for announcements of 
increases in hedging. Although the abnormal return associated with hedging increases is 
negative on the announcement date, it is not statistically different from zero. However, 
the cumulative abnormal returns between days +1 and +5 (-0.3%) and days +1 and +10 
(-1.4%) are negative and significantly different from zero based on the Generalized 
Sign Z and CDA test statistics, respectively. This evidence indicates that 
announcements about hedging increases have a weak negative impact on the gold 
market. The lack of statistical significance for the event-day abnormal return may be an 
artifact of the smaller sample size for hedging increases (35) compared to hedging 
decreases (117) or because the gold market interprets hedging increases differently from 
hedging decreases.64  
The market impact hypothesis also predicts that announcements regarding 
increases (decreases) in hedging will be associated with decreases (increases) in gold 
abnormal returns. We conduct two tests to distinguish between the information and 
market impact hypotheses: a cross-sectional regression of unsigned abnormal returns 
and a comparison of the impact of announcements made by commodity companies with 
the impact of announcements made by central banks. 
4.1.1. Cross-Sectional regressions of unsigned gold abnormal returns 
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 As we show later, we observe strong stock price reactions for the firm and for the gold mining industry 
to both decreases and increases in hedging. 
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We use the combined (decrease and increase) hedging sample to examine the 
relationship between abnormal returns in the gold market, and different attributes of the 
event and the firm making the announcement. The overall idea is that if the market 
impact hypothesis is to prevail, the abnormal returns should be related only to the 
expected change in quantity of hedging and not to any other attribute of the event or the 
firm. The results of the regressions are presented in Table 22. It is important to note that 
the dummy variable Market View is consistently significant and negative across 
different specifications. This implies that the reaction in the gold market is much 
stronger when the firm making the announcement explicitly claims that the change in 
hedging policy is a result of its expectation about future gold prices. The use of the 
Market View dummy helps us differentiate between the information and the market 
impact hypotheses, and our findings strongly support the former. While a negative 
coefficient on the hedging quantity change variable could be interpreted as evidence in 
support of either the market impact or the information hypothesis (the latter because 
bigger adjustments in private information may be associated with larger hedging 
changes), we find that the hedging quantity change coefficient is not statistically 
significant.  
To the extent that the proportion of change in hedging can be considered as a 
proxy for the strength of the signal, the information hypothesis would predict a negative 
sign on the variable. The results indicate that although the variable has a negative sign it 
is not statistically different from zero. We employ a dummy variable Big Five to proxy 
for firm size. The dummy variable is equal to 1 when the firm making the 
announcement is one of the five largest firms in the sample. As argued by Stulz (1996) 
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and Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006), large firms are more likely to acquire 
valuable private information about the gold market. Although firm size (Big Five) is 
negatively related to abnormal returns, it is not statistically significant in any of the 
specifications. The Inc_Dec dummy variable that indicates whether the announcement 
pertained to a hedging increase or decrease is also insignificant. This implies that, all 
else equal, announcements about hedging increases and hedging decreases have impacts 
of similar magnitude on gold returns. This observation adds credence to our previous 
suggestion that the lack of statistical significance for event-day abnormal gold returns in 
response to hedging increases is a consequence of our small sample. An insignificant Ex 
post dummy implies that the gold market reacts similarly to announcements made prior 
to and following the execution of the hedging policy change, which may be indicative 
of the opaqueness of the gold market. In one of our three specifications, the 20-day 
historical gold CAR, Car_Pre_Gold is weakly negatively related to announcement 
returns in the gold market. Finally, the contamination of hedging announcements by 
other announcements does not have a significant effect on the abnormal returns in the 
gold market. 
4.2. Gold market reaction to central bank gold sales 
In this subsection, we examine how the gold spot market reacts to 
announcements of central bank gold sales to further separate out information driven and 
market supply impact driven gold price movements. As we have noted, central bank 
gold sales are unlikely to be motivated by private information about future gold prices, 
which is confirmed by the reasons given in the announcements. Moreover, the fact that 
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the only gold transactions by central banks during our 18-year sample period are gold 
sales also suggests the absence of market timing.  
We hand-collect central bank announcements related to the sale or purchase of 
gold reserves using a Factiva guided search. We find 103 central bank gold sale 
announcements between January 1991 and February 2008.65 Our sample includes one 
announcement by the European Central Bank and one announcement by the 
International Monetary Fund. Panel A  of Table 23 provides further details on the 
central bank announcement sample. Although 54% of the observations are from the 
Canadian Central Bank, we have verified in unreported work that the gold market 
reactions to Canadian announcements are not significantly different from reactions to 
the rest of the announcements. We carry out an event study of the gold market reaction 
to central bank gold sales and the results are presented in Panel B of Table 23. 
The event day CAR of -0.1% is neither statistically not economically significant, 
despite average central bank gold sales exceeding average corporate hedging changes 
by a factor of three. This finding stands in stark contrast to our finding for the gold 
market impact of corporate hedging announcements (hedging decreases in particular) 
and we regard this finding as further evidence against the market impact hypothesis and 
in support of the information hypothesis, i.e., that markets deduce private gold price 
information from the hedging announcements of gold mining firms. 
To summarize, our findings in this section provide strong evidence in favor of 
the information hypothesis, which implies that gold market participants credibly infer a 
firm‘s change in expectation of future gold prices from hedging decreases. While our 
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 We find no central bank gold purchase announcements during our study period. 
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findings in support of the information hypothesis for hedging increases are considerably 
weaker, this could be due either to our smaller sample or to an asymmetry in the ways 
the gold market deduces hedging decreases and increases. Our findings in support of the 
information hypothesis are further strengthened by the insignificant gold market price 
reaction to central bank gold sales, which provides no support for the alternative 
hypothesis that the observed price response is due to the spot market supply impact of 
hedging changes. 
 
5. Announcement Effects in the Equity Market 
5.1. Equity returns and hedging announcements 
We next examine the effect of hedging announcements on the equity market and 
analyze the relation between abnormal returns in the equity market and characteristics 
of the firm making the announcement and of the announcement itself.  
Table 24 presents results from event studies on hedging decreases and increases, 
respectively. In Panels A and C, abnormal returns are calculated using a two-factor 
model to control for daily changes in gold prices and hence, cannot be attributed to any 
information related to gold prices. As reported in Panel A of Table 24, the mean 
abnormal return on the event day in response to a hedging decrease is +1.49%, which is 
highly significant both economically and statistically (at the 1% level). Further, there is 
no evidence of mean reversion in abnormal returns. As reported in Panel C of Table 24, 
the mean abnormal return on the event day in response to a hedging increase is negative 
(-2.05%) and highly significant. Similar to the hedging decreases sample, there is no 
evidence of mean reversion in abnormal returns. As reported in Panels B and D, the 
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results are substantively identical when using a five-factor model that includes the gold 
factor together with the Fama-French and momentum factors.66 In sum, increases 
(decreases) in hedging result in strong negative (positive) abnormal returns that are 
statistically and economically significant. These results are in accordance with the 
hypothesis that firms change their hedging policy in response to a change in their 
financial condition (especially their cost of financial distress), perhaps tied to their new 
gold price forecast. Our finding suggests that changes in hedging policies reveal 
hitherto private information about the firm‘s financial condition and hence signal 
changes in firm value. 
5.1.1. Cross-Sectional regressions of unsigned equity abnormal returns 
Next, we examine the relationship between equity abnormal returns, and firm 
and event characteristics. The results of the cross-sectional regression are presented in 
Tables 25 and 26.  Unsigned event-day abnormal return is the dependent variable in all 
the specifications, and in all our analysis we control for pre-announcement abnormal 
returns in both the gold and equity markets. In Table 25 the abnormal returns are 
obtained from the two-factor model and in Table 26 they are obtained from the five-
factor model. Tables 25 and 26 report several noteworthy results, and the results in the 
two tables are substantively identical. 
First, the Market View variable is again negative and significant in all the 
models. This implies that the greater the content of information regarding future gold 
prices, the stronger is the reaction in the equity market. This finding is not predicted by 
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 A change in hedging policy by itself can change a firm‘s gold beta. In such a case, abnormal returns 
obtained from gold betas estimated using pre-event data might be inaccurate. To address this concern, we 
re-run our event studies using gold betas estimated from post-event data. In unreported results, we find 
that the event-day reactions are substantively similar to those reported here. 
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the market impact and the agency conflict hypotheses, and provides strong support for 
the information hypothesis. In contrast, the size of the hedging change is not significant 
in any of the specifications.  
Second, leverage (Distress) is negatively related to unsigned abnormal returns in 
all the specifications, which implies that highly levered firms react more negatively 
(positively) to increases (decreases) in hedging than other firms. This finding is robust 
to controlling for information asymmetry (Info_Assy), measured by the percentage error 
in analysts‘ annual earnings forecasts. Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that firms with 
more leverage are expected to derive greater benefits from hedging than their 
counterparts with less leverage. Our finding suggests that the signal about the change in 
a firm‘s financial condition implied by the hedging change is amplified by leverage 
despite more levered firms deriving higher benefits from hedging.  
While information asymmetry (Info_Assy) is not statistically significant, we find 
weak evidence that larger firms react less negatively (positively) than smaller firms to 
hedging increases (decreases). We find no evidence that firms with more tax savings 
(tax savings, measured by the total tax loss carry forward to proxy for the convexity of 
the firm‘s tax schedule as in Tufano (1996)) react differently to hedging changes than 
firms with more tax savings. 
In all our specifications, Car_Pre_Gold is strongly positively related to the 
firm‘s announcement return, suggesting that the equity market reacts less negatively 
(positively) to hedging increases (decreases) when the 20-day historical gold CAR is 
positive. We find somewhat weaker evidence suggesting that the firm‘s stock price also 
reacts less negatively (positively) to hedging increases (decreases) when the 20-day 
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historical equity CAR for the firm making the announcement, Car_Pre_Firm, is 
positive. These findings suggest that conditions in the gold market and the equity 
market for the firm making the announcement can either moderate or exacerbate  the 
equity announcement effect. 
5.2. Industry effects of hedging announcements 
Finally, we examine the industry-wide contagion effects of hedging 
announcements made by commodity firms by studying the impact of the announcement 
on all firms in the gold mining industry (SIC = 1041) excluding the firm making the 
announcement. The results for industry effects of hedging decreases and increases are 
presented in Table 27. In line with the industry contagion hypothesis, we find that 
hedging increases (decreases) by individual firms are associated with strong and highly 
significant negative (positive) abnormal returns for the rest of the industry. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence of mean reversion in abnormal returns in either of the 
cases. As in our previous analysis for the announcing firms, it should also be noted that 
because abnormal returns are calculated using both two- and five-factor models that 
account for daily changes in gold prices, these reported contagion effects cannot be 
attributed to changes in gold prices. This evidence adds further credence to the 
argument that changes in hedging policies convey information about changes in the 
expected financial condition of commodity firms, associated with the revised gold price 
forecast implied by the hedging announcement.  
Next, we examine the relationship between day 0 abnormal returns experienced 
by gold mining firms (excluding the firm making the announcement), and their 
characteristics and event attributes. The results of this cross-sectional analysis are 
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presented in Table 28. Unsigned event-day abnormal return obtained from the two-
factor model is the dependent variable in all the specifications.67 Although the industry-
wide cross-sectional regression results are weaker than those obtained for firms making 
the hedging announcements, they are still largely consistent with the readjustment to 
financial condition hypothesis. Specifically, we find that leverage (Distress) is negative 
and significant in three of the four model specifications. As in the case of individual 
firms, we find that the leverage result holds even after controlling for the level of 
information asymmetry (Info_Asy). The Market View variable is negative and 
statistically significant in two of our four model specifications. Moreover, unlike for 
individual firms, we find weak evidence that the proportion of change in hedging, 
which can be considered as a proxy for the strength of the announcing firm‘s 
information, is also statistically significant at the 10% level. The industry-wide effects 
of the 20-day historical performance in the gold and equity markets are essentially the 
same as the previously documented effects of these variables on the firm making the 
announcement. In all our specifications, Car_Pre_Gold is strongly positively related to 
announcement returns in the gold industry sample (excluding the firm making the 
announcement), suggesting that the gold industry sample firms also react less negatively 
(positively) to hedging increases (decreases) when the 20-day historical gold CAR is 
positive. As before, we find somewhat weaker evidence suggesting that the gold 
industry sample firms react less negatively (positively) to hedging increases (decreases) 
when the 20-day historical equity CAR for the gold industry sample firms (minus the 
firm making the announcement), Car_Pre_Industry, is positive.  
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 In unreported results, we find substantively identical results when the unsigned abnormal returns are 
obtained from the five-factor model. 
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To summarize, our findings in this section provide strong evidence in favor of 
the hypothesis that changes in hedging policies reveal private information to the market 
about a change in the expected cost of financial distress of the firm and its industry, 
presumably arising from the revision in the gold price forecast. While a similar stock 
price reaction for firms that announce hedging changes also could arise in situations 
where managers and shareholders disagree about the firm‘s optimal hedging policy, this 
possibility is effectively ruled out by our finding of a strong industry-wide reaction to 
the announcement. While our firm and industry results are not inconsistent with 
shareholder value maximizing rationales for hedging, our findings show that any 
shareholder benefit of a hedging increase is more than offset by the negative news 
conveyed by the hedging increase about the change in the firm‘s prospects, and vice 
versa. 
 
6. Are Hedging Changes Consistent with Announcements? 
The market reactions we document in the previous sections suggest that the 
hedging announcements are credible in the sense that the market believes firms put their 
money where their mouth is by following through on their announced hedging changes. 
In this section, we examine the validity of this premise. The data on hedge positions of 
gold mining firms is obtained from quarterly reports compiled by the VM Group68 
between the second quarter of 2002 and the first quarter of 2008. The quarterly reports 
provide information on all outstanding gold derivatives positions, their size, maturities, 
and the respective delivery prices for each instrument. The derivatives positions are 
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 Publicly available on their website  http://www.virtualmetals.co.uk/index.php?inc=products&id=cp8. 
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composed of forward instruments (forwards, spot-deferred contracts, and gold loans) 
and options (put and call). Tufano (1996) and Adam and Fernando (2006) employ an 
earlier version of the data that we use.  
We use the Total Committed Hedge measure – the theoretical maximum a 
producer might have to sell due to derivative positions – to track the changes in a firm‘s 
hedge book. Since our data on hedging positions starts only in the second quarter of 
2002, we are unable to conduct the analysis for hedging announcements prior to Q2 of 
2002. Also, since all the announcements after Q2 of 2002 are hedging decreases, we are 
able to conduct this analysis only for announcements of hedging decreases. In total, we 
are able to obtain data on changes in hedging positions for 34 announcements. The 
results are presented in Table 29. We find that Total Committed Hedge as a proportion 
of yearly production drops by 10.42% in one quarter and 36.52% in one year after the 
announcement of a hedging decrease. Both these changes are statistically significant at 
the 1% level. This result helps to confirm the credibility of corporate hedging 
announcements and is consistent with our finding that the gold and equity markets react 
to hedging announcements. Gold mining firms follow up their announcements with 
actions that are consistent with the announcements, thereby reinforcing the credibility of 
their announcements as signals of changes in expectations of future gold prices and 
bankruptcy risks. 
 
7. Conclusions 
We examine the informational effects of hedging changes on gold prices and 
shareholder wealth. We use a hand-collected sample of 153 announcements related to 
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changes in hedging policies made by gold mining companies between 1991 and 2008. 
We hypothesize that changes in hedging policies provide incremental information to 
other market participants about changes in expected gold prices and corresponding 
changes in a firm‘s expected financial condition. We find strong evidence in favor of 
these hypotheses. Specifically, we find that announcements about decreases in hedging 
are associated with strong positive abnormal returns in the gold market, with increases 
in hedging eliciting a considerably weaker negative gold price response. To differentiate 
between the market impact hypothesis – that hedging announcements move spot market 
prices due to the implied change in market supply – and the information hypothesis, we 
examine the relation between gold market abnormal returns and event characteristics. 
We find that gold market reactions are stronger when firms change their hedging 
policies because of their stated view of the future market price of gold. Also, we find 
that the gold market reacts more strongly to announcements made by gold mining 
companies than to announcements made by central banks. Indeed, the market reaction 
to central bank announcements is neither statistically nor economically significant 
despite the much larger size of average central bank sales. As central bank 
announcements are unlikely to be driven by market timing objectives, we regard this as 
further evidence in support of the information hypothesis. 
Further, we argue that changes in hedging policies reveal private information 
about changes in a firm‘s expected financial condition (expected costs of financial 
distress), presumably associated with the revised gold price forecast imputed by the 
market from the hedging change. In support of this hypothesis we find that, after 
controlling for gold market returns, announcements of increases (decreases) in hedging 
123 
are associated with negative (positive) abnormal market returns in the corresponding 
firm‘s equity, and we also find similar industry-wide contagion effects of hedging 
announcements. 
In summary, we add to the literature on corporate risk management by being the 
first to systematically study the informativeness of corporate hedging announcements 
and by showing that hedging announcements reveal private information about both the 
underlying commodity market and the expected financial condition of firms and the 
industry. Our findings on the gold market reaction to hedging changes is consistent with 
the market believing that firms have credible private information about future gold 
prices. This is puzzling in light of extant evidence that firms cannot successfully time 
the market when they hedge, and points to the need for further research to address the 
inconsistency between our findings and previous studies. Our findings also shed 
valuable new insights on the endogeneity associated with hedging policy changes. 
Firms increase hedging in anticipation of adverse future conditions and decrease 
hedging in anticipation of favorable future conditions. Moreover, their hedging 
announcements convey this information to the market, thereby confounding the 
measurement of the effect of hedging on the value of the firm. Consequently, our study 
highlights the need to better control for this endogeneity in studies that examine the 
relation between hedging and the value of the firm. Since hedging practices are 
widespread across many industries and economic segments, the implications of our 
study extend well beyond the gold industry. 
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Appendix A: Tables
  
1
3
4
 
Table 1. Variable Definition, Chapter 1 
Variable Description 
Trader Analysis  
Modification Ratio 
Ratio of total number of order modifications (positive and negative) and order submissions. It is calculated for each trader, across 
all stocks, and through all the trading days in the sample. 
 
Cancellation Ratio 
Ratio of total number of order cancellations and order submissions. It is calculated for each trader i, across all stocks, and through 
all the trading days in the sample. 
Revision Ratio Sum of Cancellation Ratio and Modification Ratio. 
Closing Ratio 
Average of the  ratio of a trader's daily closing position and his daily total trading volume. It is calculated for each trader, first for 
all trading days in each stock, and then averaged across all stocks. 
Trader Frequency 
Average number of times a trader trades in a day through the sample. It is calculated for each trader, first by 
stock, and then averaged across all  stocks in the sample.  
Trader Size 
Average size of trades placed by a trader through the sample. It is calculated for each 
trader, first by stock, and then averaged across all  stocks in the sample.   
Network Trading Ratio 
Percentage  number of times a trader has multiple orders on both sides of the book  in one minute snapshots of a stock's order 
book. It is calculated for each trader, first by stock, and then averaged across all  stocks in the sample. 
Hazard Analysis 
Order Size Natural logarithm of the product of the total quantity and price of the order. 
Spreads Ratio of the difference between the best buy and sell prices and the midquote prevailing 5 seconds before order submission. 
Lagged Volatility Absolute value of returns over the five minutes leading to order submission. 
P
Relative
 
For a buy order, it is the difference between the limit price and best bid prevailing at the time of order submission, expressed as a 
percentage of the latter; it is analogously defined for a sell order. 
Lagged Volume Natural logarithm of the total trading volume over the five minutes leading to order submission. 
LPR Natural logarithm of the average price of the stock over the entire sample period. 
Dealer Binary variable equal to 1 when the trader is identified as a member of the exchange in the dataset. 
Individual Binary variable equal to 1 when the trader is identified as an individual trader in the dataset. 
  
1
3
5
 
Hazard Analysis 
 
Δqt
same
 
For a buy order, it is the change in the best bid between time t and an instant after order submission, expressed as a percentage of 
the latter; it analogously defined for a sell order. 
 
 
 
Δqt
Opposite
 
For a buy order, it is the change in the best ask between time t and an instant after order submission, expressed as a percentage of 
the latter; it analogously defined for a sell order. 
ΔInventory_Stockt 
Natural logarithm of the change in a trader's net inventory over the period (t-5secs, t]. Net inventory is defined as the difference in 
buy side and sell side inventories. 
ΔInventory_Relatedt 
Natural logarithm of the change in a trader's net inventory in stocks belonging to the same industry (2 digit SIC) as the concerned 
stock, over the period (t-5secs, t]. Net inventory is defined as the difference in buy side and sell side inventories. 
ΔInventory_Industryt Sum of ΔInventory_Stockt and ΔInventory_Relatedt.   
ΔInventory_Unrelated t  
Natural logarithm of the change in a trader's net inventory in stocks not belonging to the same industry (2 digit SIC) as the 
concerned stock, over the period (t-5secs, t]. Net inventory is defined as the difference in buy side and sell side inventories. 
Panel Regressions 
Total Revisions
P
 Value weighted average of the number of revisions trader i employed on the orders he placed in stock s on day t. 
Price Agg
P
 
Value weighted average of the price aggressiveness of the orders trader i placed in stock s on day t. Price aggressiveness, for a buy 
order, is the difference between the limit price and best bid prevailing at the time of order submission, expressed as a percentage of 
the latter; it is analogously defined for a sell order. 
Past Volatility
P
 Value weighted average of the volatility of returns prevailing 1 hour prior to the submission of trader i's orders in stock s on day t. 
Log Quantity
P
 Natural logarithm of the value weighted average of the total quoted quantity of the orders submitted by trader i in stock s on day t. 
Buy
P
 Value weighted proportion of buy orders submitted by trader i in stock s on day t. 
Hidden
P
 Value weighted proportion of hidden orders submitted by trader i in stock s on day t. 
Past Trading 
Frequency
P
 
Value weighted average of the number of trades prevailing 1 hour prior to the submission of trader i's orders in stock s on day t. 
Number of Orders
P
 Natural logarithm of the number of orders submitted by trader i in stock s on day t. 
Ex post Ratio
P
 
Value weighted ex post performance of all orders submitted by trader i in stock s on day t. Ex post performance, for a buy order, is 
calculated as the ratio of the difference between the best bid 60 mins after execution and the execution price of the order, and the 
price of the stock an instant before order submission; it is zero for unexecuted orders. 
  
1
3
6
 
Panel Regressions 
Price Impact Ratio
P
 
Value weighted price impact ratio of all orders submitted by trader i in stock s on day t. Price impact ratio, for a buy order, is 
calculated as the ratio of the difference between the midquote at the time of order submission and the execution price of the order, 
and the price of the stock an instant before order submission; it is zero for unexecuted orders.  
Opportunity Cost Ratio
P
 
Value weighted opportunity cost ratio of all orders submitted by trader i in stock s on day t. Opportunity cost ratio, for a buy order, 
is calculated as the ratio of the difference between the closing price of the stock and the midquote at the time of order submission, 
and the price of the stock an instant before order submission; it is zero for fully executed orders. 
Total Cost Ratio
P
 
Value weighted total cost ratio of all orders submitted by trader i in stock s on day t. Total cost for each order  is calculated as 
weighted sum of  the difference between price impact and ex post performance , and opportunity cost, where the weights are 
volume of the order executed and unexecuted, respectively. Total cost ratio is the ratio of Total Cost and the price of the stock an 
instant before order submission. 
 
 
Earnings Day Binary variable equal to 1 when stock s has an earnings announcement on day t. 
  
1
3
7
 
Table 2. Characteristics of Sample Stocks 
This table presents trading characteristics of the 50 stocks that make up  the Standard & Poor's CNS  Nifty index at the National Stock Exchange (NSE), India. 
The various characteristics are calculated for each of the 50 stocks using the entire sample data of 56 trading days — April to June, 2006. These Nifty constituent 
stocks cover 21 sectors of the economy including, and represent about 60% of market capitalization on the NSE. 
  Mean Median Max Min Q1 Q3 
Market Capitalization (USD Billions) 7 4 38 1 3 7 
Daily Turnover per stock (USD Millions) 21 13 159 1 6 25 
Effective Spread in basis points 3 3 8 2 3 4 
Daily Number of Trades per stock 19,121 12,710 70,129 2,870 6,597 24,390 
Daily Order Submissions per stock 24,907 18,334 94,355 4,210 9,142 35,345 
Number of Order Cancellations  (% of Total  Number of Limit Orders) 24.24% 25.04% 30.17% 17.10% 21.61% 27.10% 
Volume of Order Cancellations  (% of Total  Volume of Limit Orders) 44.83% 46.35% 58.93% 22.05% 41.91% 50.12% 
Number of Order Modifications (% of Total  Number of Limit Orders) 15.51% 15.28% 20.62% 12.73% 14.37% 16.37% 
Volume of Order Modifications (% of Total  Volume of Limit Orders) 26.29% 27.19% 35.48% 18.26% 22.72% 29.65% 
Number of Order Revisions (% of Total  Number of Limit Orders) 35.71% 36.13% 41.49% 30.18% 32.79% 37.84% 
Volume of Order Revisions (% of Total  Volume of Limit Orders) 61.30% 62.62% 69.47% 42.97% 58.99% 65.10% 
 
  
  
1
3
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Table 3.Trader Categories 
This table describes the different trader categories identified in the data. Their share of total limit order volume submitted in the sample, and the proportions of 
their limit order volume that are cancelled, modified and revised (cancelled or modified) are also presented. The proprietary data from the NSE identifies 14 
different trader clienteles, which are further classified into 4 broader categories: Individuals, Financial Institutions, Dealers and Other Institutions. 
Trader Category Description 
Number of 
Traders 
Percentage of 
Total Limit Order 
Volume Submitted 
Percentage of Limit Order Volume 
Cancelled Modified Revised 
 
Individual 
     Individuals Non-Residential Indians 1,070,125  32.18% 32.33% 22.68% 49.12% 
 
HUF (Families) 
     
       
 
Mutual Fund 
     
 
Bank 
     Financial Institutions Insurance 5,771  16.45% 10.00% 34.06% 41.96% 
 
Other Domestic Financial Institutions 
     
 
Foreign Financial Institutions 
     
       Dealers Exchange Members 509  40.68% 67.94% 16.32% 73.84% 
       
 
Public and Private companies 
     
 
Partnership Firms 
     Others Institutions Trusts and Societies 153,894  10.69% 38.23% 23.94% 54.67% 
 
Other Corporate Bodies 
     
 
Statutory Bodies  
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Table 4.Order Revisions and Trader Attributes 
These tables present results from the analysis of trader categories, trader styles and intensity of order 
revisions. Panel A reports results relating to trader categories and Panel B reports the same for trader 
styles. Measures of order revision activity and trader styles are calculated for each trader i using the entire 
sample of 50 stocks and 56 trading days — April to June, 2006. Please refer to Table 1 for variable 
definitions. Two tailed p-values are reported (within parentheses).  
 
Panel A: Order Revisions and Trader Categories 
    
Individual 
Traders 
Institutional Traders 
Institutional 
- Individual 
p- value 
    
Financial 
Institutions 
Dealers 
Other 
Institutions 
  Median 0.167 0.552 0.480 0.106     
Revision Ratio Mean  0.257 0.705 0.534 0.242 0.237 (<0.001) 
 
P90 0.667 1.375 0.916 0.667 
  
  Median 0.000 0.006 0.196 0.000     
Cancellation Ratio Mean  0.061 0.065 0.222 0.055 0.053 (<0.001) 
 
P90 0.208 0.198 0.462 0.200 
  
  Median 0.083 0.498 0.224 0.000     
Modification Ratio Mean  0.196 0.640 0.312 0.187 0.184 (<0.001) 
 
P90 0.500 1.267 0.634 0.500 
  
N 
 
1,070,125 5,771 509 153,894 
  
 
Panel B: Order Revisions and Trader Styles 
 
iiiiii tioTrading RaNetwork SizeTraderFrequencyTradertioClosing RaRatioRevision      4321
iiiiii tioTrading RaNetwork SizeTraderFrequencyTradertioClosing RaRatioonCancellati      4321
iiiiii tioTrading RaNetwork SizeTraderFrequencyTradertioClosing RaRatio onModificati     4321
 
Variable Revision Ratio Cancellation Ratio Modification Ratio 
Intercept 14.292% 12.091% 2.201% 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Closing Ratio -16.399% -10.265% -6.134% 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Trader Frequency 7.414% 0.840% 6.574% 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Trader Size 1.903% 0.080% 1.823% 
 
(<0.001) (0.001) (<0.001) 
Network Trading Ratio 11.593% 10.434% 1.159% 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
N 1,170,355 1,170,355 1,170,355 
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Table 5. Order Cancellations and Trader Inventories: Duration Analysis 
 
This table presents results from the analysis of limit order cancellations using Cox's proportional hazard 
duration models. The cancellation hazard is modeled as follows: 
 
Specification 1:











iis
so
Relative
sosososo
iso
IndividualDealerLPR
VolumeLaggedpVolatilityLaggedSpreadsSizeOrder
tth
876
,5,4,3,2,1
0,,
   
exp)()(


  
Specification 2: 











itsii
opposite
tso
same
tsos
so
Relative
sosososo
iso
StockInventoryIndividualDealerqqLPR
VolumeLaggedpVolatilityLaggedSpreadsSizeOrder
tth
,,1098,,7,,65
,5,4,3,2,1
0,,
_
   
exp)()(


  
Specification 3: 
















its
itsii
opposite
tso
same
tsos
so
Relative
sosososo
iso
RelatedInventory
StockInventoryIndividualDealerqqLPR
VolumeLaggedpVolatilityLaggedSpreadsSizeOrder
tth
,,12
,,11109,,8,,76
,5,4,3,2,1
0,,
_
_
   
exp)()(



  
Specification 4: 














 itsii
opposite
tso
same
tsos
so
Relative
sosososo
iso IndustryInventoryIndividualDealerqqLPR
VolumeLaggedpVolatilityLaggedSpreadsSizeOrder
tth ,,11109,,8,,76
,5,4,3,2,1
0,, _
   
exp)()( 

  
Specification 5: 
















its
itsii
opposite
tso
same
tsos
so
Relative
sosososo
iso
UnrelatedInventory
StockInventoryIndividualDealerqqLPR
VolumeLaggedpVolatilityLaggedSpreadsSizeOrder
tth
,,12
,,11109,,8,,76
,5,4,3,2,1
0,,
_
_
   
exp)()(




 
 
Where  ho,s,i is the estimated hazard of cancellation for order o of stock s, submitted by trader i, 
at time t.   is the unspecified baseline hazard rate and time t is measured from the moment of order o's 
submission. Please refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. A random sample of 10,000 orders are 
selected from each stock. Orders are tracked through their first 2 minutes. Order executions are treated as 
competing events. Orders from all the stocks are stacked, and a pooled analysis is conducted. The 
standard errors are clustered by stock. Two tailed p-values are reported (within parentheses) below the 
parameter estimates.  
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Variable (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Order Size 0.287 
 
0.286 
 
0.286 
 
0.286 
 
0.286 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
Spreads 0.003 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
(0.708) 
 
(0.726) 
 
(0.725) 
 
(0.726) 
 
(0.726) 
Lagged Volatility 0.088 
 
0.059 
 
0.059 
 
0.059 
 
0.059 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
Relativep  0.185 
 
0.185 
 
0.185 
 
0.185 
 
0.185 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
Lagged Volume 0.027 
 
0.029 
 
0.029 
 
0.029 
 
0.029 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
LPR -0.036 
 
-0.035 
 
-0.035 
 
-0.035 
 
-0.035 
 
(0.162) 
 
(0.175) 
 
(0.172) 
 
(0.170) 
 
(0.170) 
Dealer 0.615 
 
0.616 
 
0.616 
 
0.615 
 
0.616 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
Individual -0.757 
 
-0.751 
 
-0.751 
 
-0.752 
 
-0.751 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
<.0001 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
same
tq  
  
0.037 
 
0.037 
 
0.037 
 
0.037 
   
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
opposite
tq  
  
0.005 
 
0.005 
 
0.005 
 
0.005 
   
(0.688) 
 
(0.689) 
 
(0.690) 
 
(0.690) 
ΔInventory_Stockt 
  
0.013 
 
0.013 
   
0.013 
   
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
   
(<.001) 
ΔInventory_Relatedt 
    
0.008 
    
     
(0.008) 
    
ΔInventory_Industryt 
      
0.011 
  
       
(<.001) 
  
ΔInventory_Unrelatedt 
        
0.002 
                  (<.463) 
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Table 6. Positive Order Modifications and Trader Inventories: Duration Analysis 
 
This tables presents results from the analysis of positive order modifications using Cox's proportional 
hazard duration models. The hazard of positive modifications is modeled as follows: 
 
Specification  1:







 

s
so
Relative
sosososo
iso
LPR
VolumeLaggedpVolatilityLaggedSpreadsSizeOrder
tth
5
,5,4,3,2,1
0,,
   
exp)()(


  
Specification 2: 











itsii
opposite
tso
same
tsos
so
Relative
sosososo
iso
StockInventoryIndividualDealerqqLPR
VolumeLaggedpVolatilityLaggedSpreadsSizeOrder
tth
,,1098,,7,,65
,5,4,3,2,1
0,,
_
   
exp)()(


  
Specification 3: 
















tis
itsii
opposite
tso
same
tsos
so
Relative
sosososo
iso
RelatedInventory
StockInventoryIndividualDealerqqLPR
VolumeLaggedpVolatilityLaggedSpreadsSizeOrder
tth
,,10
,,1098,,7,,65
,5,4,3,2,1
0,,
_
_
   
exp)()(



  
Specification 4: 














 itsii
opposite
tso
same
tsos
so
Relative
sosososo
iso IndustryInventoryIndividualDealerqqLPR
VolumeLaggedpVolatilityLaggedSpreadsSizeOrder
tth ,,1098,,7,,65
,5,4,3,2,1
0,, _
   
exp)()( 

  
 Where ho,s,i is the estimated hazard of positive order modifications for order o of stock s, 
submitted by trader i, at time t.   is the unspecified baseline hazard rate and time t is measured from the 
moment of order o's submission. Please refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. A random sample of 
10,000 orders are selected from each stock. Orders are tracked through their first 2 minutes. Order 
executions and cancellations are treated as competing events. Orders from all the stocks are stacked, and 
a pooled analysis is conducted. The standard errors are clustered by order ( Lee, Wei, and Amato, 1992). 
Two tailed p-values are reported (within parentheses) below the parameter estimates. 
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Variable (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Order Size 0.372 
 
0.376 
 
0.376 
 
0.375 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
Spreads 0.082 
 
0.112 
 
0.112 
 
0.112 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
Lagged Volatility 0.082 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.021 
 
(<.001) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.060) 
Relativep  0.188 
 
0.188 
 
0.188 
 
0.188 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
Lagged Volume 0.028 
 
0.035 
 
0.035 
 
0.035 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
LPR 0.066 
 
0.064 
 
0.064 
 
0.064 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
Dealer 0.460 
 
0.446 
 
0.446 
 
0.449 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
Individual -0.152 
 
-0.155 
 
-0.155 
 
-0.151 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
same
tq  
  
0.054 
 
0.054 
 
0.054 
   
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
opposite
tq  
  
0.099 
 
0.099 
 
0.099 
   
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
ΔInventory_Stockt 
  
-0.063 
 
-0.063 
  
   
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
  
ΔInventory_Relatedt 
    
~0.000 
  
     
(0.995) 
  
ΔInventory_Industryt 
      
-0.041 
              (<.001) 
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Table 7. Negative Order Modifications and Trader Inventories: Duration Analysis 
 
This tables presents results from the analysis of negative order modifications using Cox's proportional 
hazard duration models. The hazard of negative modifications is modeled as follows: 
 
Specification  1:
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
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Specification 4: 

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 Where ho,s,i is the estimated hazard of negative order modifications for order o of stock s, 
submitted by trader i, at time t. 0  is the unspecified baseline hazard rate and time t is measured from the 
moment of order o's submission. Please refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. A random sample of 
10,000 orders are selected from each stock. Orders are tracked through their first 2 minutes. Order 
executions and cancellations are treated as competing events. Orders from all the stocks are stacked, and 
a pooled analysis is conducted. The standard errors are clustered by order ( Lee, Wei and Amato, 1992). 
Two tailed p-values are reported (within parentheses) below the parameter estimates. 
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Variable (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Order Size 0.317 
 
0.316 
 
0.316 
 
0.317 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
Spreads ~ -0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
(0.987) 
 
(0.856) 
 
(0.857) 
 
(0.726) 
Lagged Volatility 0.019 
 
0.004 
 
0.004 
 
0.004 
 
(0.167) 
 
(0.768) 
 
(0.769) 
 
(0.773) 
Relativep  0.173 
 
0.172 
 
0.172 
 
0.172 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
Lagged Volume -0.085 
 
-0.081 
 
-0.081 
 
-0.081 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
LPR -0.047 
 
-0.046 
 
-0.046 
 
-0.047 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
Dealer 0.412 
 
0.417 
 
0.417 
 
0.416 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
Individual -0.248 
 
-0.256 
 
-0.256 
 
-0.257 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
<.0001 
 
(<.001) 
same
tq  
  
-0.083 
 
-0.083 
 
-0.083 
   
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
opposite
tq  
  
-0.089 
 
-0.089 
 
-0.089 
   
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
ΔInventory_Stockt 
  
0.024 
 
0.024 
  
   
(<.001) 
 
(<.001) 
  
ΔInventory_Relatedt 
    
0.009 
  
     
(0.2821) 
  
ΔInventory_Industryt 
      
0.019 
       
(<.001) 
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Table 8. Order Revisions and Performance: Panel Regressions 
 
This tables presents results from panel regressions of different measures of performance on order 
revisions, other order characteristics and market variables. The different specifications employed in the 
analysis are as follows: 
 
Specifications 1a and 1b: 
tsi
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,si
P
ts,i,
Of OrdersNumberFrequencyTradingPastVolatilityPastHidden
BuyQuantityLogPrice AggRevisionsTotalRatioPostEx
,,8765
4321
                           
    



  
Specifications 2a and 2b: 
tsi
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,si
P
ts,i,
Of OrdersNumberFrequencyTradingPastVolatilityPastHidden
BuyQuantityLogPrice AggRevisionsTotalct RatioPrice Impa
,,8765
4321
                           
  




 
 Specifications 3a and 3b: 
tsi
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,si
P
ts,i,
Of OrdersNumberFrequencyTradingPastVolatilityPastHidden
BuyQuantityLogPrice AggRevisionsTotalRatioy CostOpportunit
,,8765
4321
                           
   



  
Specifications 4:
 
tsi
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,si
P
ts,i,
Of OrdersNumberFrequencyTradingPastVolatilityPastHidden
BuyQuantityLogPrice AggRevisionsTotal RatioTotal Cost
,,8765
4321
                           
  



  
Specification 5: 
tsi
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,
tstS
P
ts,i,
P
ts,i,si
P
ts,i,
Of OrdersNumberFrequencyTradingPast
VolatilityPastHiddenBuyQuantityLogPrice Agg
DayEarningsDayEarningsRevisionsTotalRevisionsTotal RatioTotal Cost
,,87
65432
,10,91
                        
                       
*  






 
 All the variables with superscript P are value weighted averages of trader i's  portfolio (P) of 
orders in stock s on day t. Please refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. The panel regressions are 
conducted with trader and stock fixed effects —   and  , respectively. Further, to control for 
contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation in residuals, the standard errors are cluster by day (t). Panels 
A, B, C and D report results relating to financial institutions (FIN), other institutions (Others), dealers 
(Dealer) and individuals (Individuals). In all panels, columns 1a-3a include all trader portfolios; columns 
1b and 2b consider only trader portfolios with either partial or complete execution; coefficients in column 
3b are obtained by including only trader portfolios with zero or partial executions. Two tailed p-values 
are reported (within parentheses) below the parameter estimates. 
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Panel A – Order Revisions and Performance: Financial Institutions 
Variable Ex post ratio 
 
Price impact ratio 
 
Opportunity cost ratio 
 
Total cost ratio 
 
All Orders 
If fill rate 
> 0%  
All Orders 
If fill rate 
> 0%  
All Orders 
If fill rate 
< 100%  
All Orders All Orders 
 
(1a) (1b) 
 
(2a) (2b) 
 
(3a) (3b) 
 
(4) (5) 
Total Revisions
P 
0.057% 0.057% 
 
0.069% 0.080% 
 
-0.012% -0.059% 
 
-0.010% -0.009% 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.009) (<0.001) 
 
(0.097) (0.141) 
Total Revisions
P
 * Earnings Day 
          
-0.050% 
           
(0.068) 
Earnings Day 
          
0.090% 
           
(0.082) 
Price Agg
P
 
-1.791% -4.824% 
 
4.114% 12.544% 
 
-3.703% 2.044% 
 
1.721% 1.725% 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (0.054) 
 
(0.087) (0.086) 
Log Quantity
P
 0.006% 0.006% 
 
-0.009% -0.007% 
 
0.025% 0.052% 
 
0.016% 0.016% 
 
(0.400) (0.472) 
 
(<0.001) (0.002) 
 
(<0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.022) (0.022) 
Buy
P
 -0.072% -0.078% 
 
-0.025% -0.023% 
 
-0.061% -0.156% 
 
-0.006% -0.005% 
 
(0.328) (0.330) 
 
(0.197) (0.241) 
 
(0.216) (0.332) 
 
(0.927) (0.935) 
Hidden
P
 -0.012% -0.014% 
 
-0.019% -0.025% 
 
0.039% 0.128% 
 
0.042% 0.042% 
 
(0.568) (0.566) 
 
(0.021) (0.009) 
 
(0.017) (0.009) 
 
(0.066) (0.066) 
Past Volatility
P
 18.421% 20.956% 
 
4.654% 7.680% 
 
27.128% 91.517% 
 
14.949% 14.681% 
 
(0.048) (0.047) 
 
(0.143) (0.048) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.164) (0.174) 
Past Trading Frequency
P
 0.019% 0.021% 
 
-0.003% -0.002% 
 
-0.007% -0.004% 
 
-0.025% -0.026% 
 
(0.080) (0.095) 
 
(0.249) (0.460) 
 
(0.297) (0.860) 
 
(0.017) (0.014) 
Number of Orders
P
 -0.004% -0.005% 
 
-0.002% 0.001% 
 
-0.009% -0.095% 
 
-0.009% -0.009% 
 
(0.402) (0.405) 
 
(0.228) (0.537) 
 
(0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.112) (0.113) 
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Trader Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 92,083 84,100 
 
92,083 84,100 
 
92,083 25,689 
 
92,083 92,083 
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Panel B – Order Revisions and Performance: Other Institutions 
Variable Ex post ratio 
 
Price impact ratio 
 
Opportunity cost ratio 
 
Total cost ratio 
 
All Orders 
If fill rate 
> 0%  
All Orders 
If fill rate 
> 0%  
All Orders 
If fill rate 
< 100%  
All Orders All Orders 
 
(1a) (1b) 
 
(2a) (2b) 
 
(3a) (3b) 
 
(4) (5) 
Total Revisions
P 
0.007% 0.008% 
 
0.012% 0.024% 
 
-0.016% -0.025% 
 
-0.008% -0.008% 
 
(<0.001) (0.022) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.025) (0.023) 
Total Revisions
P
 * Earnings Day           
~0.000% 
           
(0.991) 
Earnings Day 
          
0.113% 
           
(0.051) 
Price Agg
P
 
-0.944% -2.316% 
 
2.102% 11.828% 
 
-3.073% 0.636% 
 
-0.153% -0.155% 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.005) (0.565) 
 
(0.904) (0.902) 
Log Quantity
P
 -0.002% -0.004% 
 
0.009% 0.021% 
 
-0.005% -0.024% 
 
0.008% 0.008% 
 
(0.495) (0.501) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.060) (<0.001) 
 
(0.065) (0.068) 
Buy
P
 -0.115% -0.158% 
 
-0.045% -0.054% 
 
-0.146% -0.312% 
 
-0.073% -0.073% 
 
(0.072) (0.080) 
 
(0.170) (0.205) 
 
(0.260 (0.301) 
 
(0.592) (0.592) 
Hidden
P
 -0.006% -0.008% 
 
-0.035% -0.049% 
 
0.059% 0.114% 
 
0.038% 0.039% 
 
(0.701) (0.677) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.073) (0.071) 
Past Volatility
P
 -0.108% 0.279% 
 
-21.244% -19.870% 
 
41.120% 98.183% 
 
21.738% 21.188% 
 
(0.988) (0.978) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.002) (<0.001) 
 
(0.033) (0.038) 
Past Trading Frequency
P
 0.002% 0.003% 
 
-0.010% -0.016% 
 
-0.003% 0.015% 
 
-0.013% -0.014% 
 
(0.798) (0.741) 
 
(0.002) (<0.001) 
 
(0.748) (0.463) 
 
(0.117) (0.084) 
Number of Orders
P
 0.001% 0.001% 
 
-0.005% 0.002% 
 
0.001% -0.037% 
 
-0.005% -0.005% 
 
(0.767) (0.865) 
 
(0.002) (0.347) 
 
(0.788) (0.006) 
 
(0.254) (0.271) 
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Trader Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 480,806 384,244  480,806 384,244  480,806 203,470  480,806 480,806 
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Panel C – Order Revisions and Performance: Dealers 
Variable Ex post ratio 
 
Price impact ratio 
 
Opportunity cost ratio 
 
Total cost ratio 
 
All Orders 
If fill rate 
> 0%  
All Orders 
If fill rate 
> 0%  
All Orders 
If fill rate 
< 100%  
All Orders All Orders 
 
(1a) (1b) 
 
(2a) (2b) 
 
(3a) (3b) 
 
(4) (5) 
Total Revisions
P 
0.003% 0.004% 
 
0.004% 0.006% 
 
-0.004% -0.006% 
 
-0.001% -0.001% 
 
(0.083) (0.117) 
 
(0.201) (0.298) 
 
(0.088) (0.012) 
 
(0.656) (0.591) 
Total Revisions
P
 * Earnings Day 
          
0.018% 
           
(0.186) 
Earnings Day 
          
-0.006% 
           
(0.849) 
Price Agg
P
 
-0.860% -2.035% 
 
1.899% 6.179% 
 
-1.868% -1.238% 
 
0.506% 0.506% 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.013) (0.123) 
 
(0.570) (0.570) 
Log Quantity
P
 0.002% 0.002% 
 
0.008% 0.013% 
 
-0.014% -0.021% 
 
-0.008% -0.008% 
 
(0.002) (0.038) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Buy
P
 -0.077% -0.108% 
 
-0.023% -0.037% 
 
-0.313% -0.459% 
 
-0.256% -0.256% 
 
(0.116) (0.117) 
 
(0.367) (0.308) 
 
(0.105) (0.101) 
 
(0.154) (0.154) 
Hidden
P
 0.005% 0.002% 
 
-0.026% -0.029% 
 
0.043% 0.042% 
 
0.023% 0.024% 
 
(0.538) (0.843) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (0.010) 
 
(0.092) (0.090) 
Past Volatility
P
 2.033% 2.154% 
 
-0.547% 2.068% 
 
29.897% 47.054% 
 
28.506% 28.465% 
 
(0.605) (0.659) 
 
(0.800) (0.460) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
Past Trading Frequency
P
 -0.005% -0.005% 
 
-0.001% -0.002% 
 
0.006% 0.014% 
 
0.013% 0.012% 
 
(0.194) (0.251) 
 
(0.764) (0.478) 
 
(0.352) (0.147) 
 
(0.033) (0.036) 
Number of Orders
P
 0.002% 0.001% 
 
~0.000% 0.003% 
 
0.002% -0.007% 
 
-0.001% -0.001% 
 
(0.122) (0.224) 
 
(0.748) (<0.001) 
 
(0.209) (0.023) 
 
(0.781) (0.783) 
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Trader Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 163,160 147,048 
 
163,160 147,048 
 
163,160 109,647 
 
147,048 147,048 
  
 
1
5
0
 
Panel D – Order Revisions and Performance: Individuals 
Variable Ex post ratio 
 
Price impact ratio 
 
Opportunity cost ratio 
 
Total cost ratio 
 
All Orders 
If fill rate   
> 0%  
All Orders 
If fill rate   
> 0%  
All Orders 
If fill rate  
< 100%  
All Orders All Orders 
 
(1a) (1b) 
 
(2a) (2b) 
 
(3a) (3b) 
 
(4) (5) 
Total Revisions
P 
0.007% -0.002% 
 
0.062% 0.105% 
 
-0.079% -0.220% 
 
-0.014% -0.013% 
 
(0.070) (0.505) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.327) (0.353) 
Total Revisions
P
 * Earnings 
Day           
-0.046% 
           
(0.354) 
Earnings Day 
          
0.183% 
           
(0.026) 
Price Agg
P
 
-0.777% -1.712% 
 
2.149% 11.965% 
 
-3.058% 2.113% 
 
-0.257% -0.260% 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (0.007) 
 
(0.695) (0.695) 
Log Quantity
P
 -0.011% -0.013% 
 
0.007% 0.015% 
 
0.005% -0.020% 
 
0.024% 0.024% 
 
(0.005) (0.009) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.253) (0.062) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
Buy
P
 -0.140% -0.202% 
 
-0.041% -0.041% 
 
-0.172% -0.358% 
 
-0.071% -0.072% 
 
(0.013) (0.013) 
 
(0.215) (0.341) 
 
(0.214) (0.283) 
 
(0.613) (0.609) 
Hidden
P
 0.014% 0.019% 
 
-0.045% -0.050% 
 
0.059% 0.071% 
 
0.008% 0.008% 
 
(0.067) (0.042) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.576) (0.566) 
Past Volatility
P
 -4.986% -6.424% 
 
-20.373% -20.362% 
 
32.379% 90.750% 
 
17.653% 16.583% 
 
(0.402) (0.441) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
 
(0.017) (0.024) 
Past Trading Frequency
P
 -0.003% -0.004% 
 
-0.009% -0.017% 
 
-0.006% 0.006% 
 
-0.011% -0.014% 
 
(0.563) (0.625) 
 
(0.004) (<0.001) 
 
(0.458) (0.753) 
 
(0.193) (0.105) 
Number of Orders
P
 0.005% 0.008% 
 
-0.004% -0.007% 
 
-0.005% -0.052% 
 
-0.013% -0.013% 
 
(0.256) (0.134) 
 
(0.075) (0.015) 
 
(0.436) (0.004) 
 
(0.049) (0.057) 
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Trader Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 13,962,603 11,206,706 
 
13,962,603 11,206,706 
 
13,962,603 5,182,729 
 
13,962,603 13,962,603 
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Table 9. Variable Definitions, Chapter 2 
 
This table defines the variables used in our analysis. All variables are estimated daily, unless otherwise 
specified. 
 
Short Selling 
Outstanding Naked Short Ratio 
(ONSR) 
Ratio of the estimated number of outstanding fails to deliver 
over total shares outstanding.  
Outstanding Covered Short Ratio 
(OCSR) 
Ratio of the estimated number of outstanding covered-
shorted shares over total shares outstanding.  
Naked to Total Shorts Ratio Ratio of the estimated number of outstanding naked shorted 
shares to estimated total shorted shares. 
    
Pricing Error   
Pricing Error (PE) The non-random walk component of a daily return series 
estimated using a Kalman filter methodology. 
Negative Pricing Error (Negative 
PE) 
A variable set equal to the pricing error when pricing error is 
negative, to zero otherwise. 
Positive Pricing Error (Positive PE) A variable set equal to the pricing error when pricing error is 
positive, to zero otherwise. 
Pricing Error Volatility (PE 
Volatility) 
The absolute value of the pricing error. 
Positive PE Dum A binary variable set equal to one if pricing error is positive, 
to zero otherwise.  
    
Liquidity Related Metrics   
Order Imbalance (OIB) The daily sum of the 5-minute difference between the market 
value of shares traded in buyer initiated trades and the market 
value of shares traded in seller initiated trades, divided by 
total daily dollar trading volume.  
Positive OIB Dum A binary variable set equal to 1 if OIB is positive and to zero 
otherwise. 
Spread The daily average of the ratio of the difference between bid 
and ask and the mid-quote.  
Volume Daily number of shares traded. 
    
Other   
Price The natural log of the daily average of the 5-minute 
midquote. 
Volatility  The daily standard error of the 5-minute stock price return. 
Market Value The number of shares outstanding multiplied by the closing 
price for the day. 
 
 
 
  
 152 
 
Table 10. FTDs as a Proxy for Naked Short Selling 
 
This table presents the behavior of ONSR during different naked short selling regimes in 2008. ―Event 
Securities‖ are our sample of 17 stocks that were subject to the ban on naked short selling between July 
21, 2008 and August 12, 2008, i.e., the ―Ban Period‖ (while the ban affected 19 securities, we have data 
for 17 of these: Bank of America Corporation, Barclays, Bear Stearns Companies Inc., Citigroup Inc., 
Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank Group AG, Allianz SE, Goldman, Sachs Group Inc, Royal Bank 
ADS, HSBC Holdings PLC ADS, J. P. Morgan Chase & Co., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Mizuho 
Financial Group, Inc., Morgan Stanley, UBS AG, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae). ―Control Securities‖ 
are the sample of 17 market capitalization and industry matched stocks that were not subject to any 
increased restrictions on naked short selling during the ―Ban Period‖. The ―Pre-Ban Period‖ refers to the 
interval January 1, 2008 to July 20, 2008. The ―Post-Ban Period‖ refers to the interval August 13, 2008 to 
September 2, 2008. ONSR is computed for the Event and Control stocks on a daily basis over the interval 
January 1, 2008 to August 12, 2008.  Reported p-values are for a test of whether ONSR has changed 
significantly in relation to the pre-ban period. ―*‖, ―**‖, and ―***‖ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively.   
 
 
 
 
  Event Securities Control Securities Event-Control 
  Mean p value Mean p value Mean p value 
Pre Ban  0.106%     0.015%     0.091% <0.01 *** 
                    
Ban, 1st Week 0.063%     0.054%     0.010% 1.34   
Change from Pre Ban  -0.043% <0.01 *** 0.039% <0.01 *** -0.081% <0.01 *** 
                    
Ban, 2nd Week 0.007%     0.024%     -0.017% -2.38 ** 
Change from Pre Ban  -0.099% <0.01 *** 0.009% <0.01 *** -0.108% <0.01 *** 
                    
Ban, 3rd Week 0.004%     0.014%     -0.009% -1.30   
Change from Pre Ban  -0.102% <0.01 *** -0.001% 0.24   -0.100% <0.01 *** 
                    
Post Ban 0.028%     0.006%     0.023% <0.01 *** 
Change from  Ban (3rd 
Week ) 
0.024% <0.01 *** -0.008% 0.25   0.032% <0.01 *** 
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Table 11. Summary Statistics 
 
All variables are as defined in Table 9. The sample is built as follows: ONSR is computed for all NYSE common stock of US-based firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) 
listed for at least 18 months over the interval January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008, and with no daily large changes (>10%) in the number of shares outstanding and for which we 
had all required data (n= 1,492). We rank each security by mean ONSR and allocate securities on that basis to decile 1 (lowest) through 10 (highest). Daily statistics are 
computed by security, security averages are further averaged over deciles and for the entire sample.  This table reports mean, median and standard deviation for the sample, 
means for deciles 1 and 10 and the difference between those, along with results of a t-test for differences in means across deciles 1 and 10. ―*‖, ―**‖, and ―***‖ indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
 
Variables 
Sample 
Mean 
Sample 
Median 
Sample 
STD 
Decile 1 
Mean 
Decile 10 
Mean 
Decile 10 - 
Decile 1 
p-value 
ONSR  0.06% 0.01% 0.22% <0.01% 0.43% 0.40% <0.01 *** 
OCSR 5.45% 4.34% 5.30% 3.95% 13.38% 9.43% <0.01 *** 
Naked to Total Shorts Ratio 0.97% 0.43% 5.09% 0.10% 2.77% 2.67% <0.01 *** 
Pricing Error  -0.15% 0.00% 4.33% 0.02% -0.50% -0.52% 0.35   
Positive Pricing Error 0.51% 0.10% 1.47% 0.38% 1.11% 0.73% <0.01 *** 
Pricing Error Volatility 1.18% 0.21% 4.96% 0.74% 2.75% 2.01% <0.01 *** 
Order Imbalance 6.72% 6.92% 5.71% 3.84% 7.98% 4.14% <0.01 *** 
Spread 0.18% 0.11% 0.27% 0.38% 0.26% -0.12% 0.01 ** 
Volatility 0.21% 0.20% 0.08% 0.21% 0.29% 0.08% <0.01 *** 
Market Value (US$ M) $8,223  $2,088  $2,421  $12,500  $1,480  ($11,020) <0.01 *** 
Number of Obs. 1,492 1,492 1,492 149 150       
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Table 12. Naked Short Selling and Market Quality, Portfolio Approach 
 
All variables are as defined in Table 9. All variables are standardized and winsorized by security. The reported results are converted to base units for ease of interpretation. 
The sample is built as follows:  we include all NYSE common stock of US-based firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) available in the CRSP and TAQ databases listed for at 
least 18 months over the interval January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008, and with no large changes (>10%) in the number of shares outstanding. The resulting sample includes 
1,492 securities. On each day t between January 2005 and June 2008, we allocate securities from the sample with a one-standard deviation or greater decrease in ONSR into 
an ‗ONSR Decrease‘ portfolio and, similarly, securities with a one-standard deviation or greater increase in ONSR into an ‗ONSR Increase‘ portfolio. We include all 
remaining securities into an ‗ONSR No Change‘ portfolio. In order to control for the extent of covered short selling, we replicate the same procedure on the bases of the 
intensity of covered short selling, proxied by changes in OCSR, thus forming the portfolios ‗OCSR Decrease‘, ‗OCSR No Change‘ and ‗OCSR Increase‘. Finally, we intersect 
those groups of portfolios, forming nine final portfolios. For each portfolio, we then compute averages of changes in our measures of returns, return volatility, market 
liquidity, pricing errors and order imbalances for the following day (t+1).  Table 12 presents results for the ‗Naked Increase, Covered No Change‘ and the ‗Naked Decrease, 
Covered No Change‘ portfolios, along with results of a test for differences between them. p-values are from two-sided t-tests. ―*‖, ―**‖, and ―***‖ indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
 
Response Variable 
ONSR Increase,   
OCSR No Change 
p-value 
ONSR Decrease,   
OCSR No Change 
p-value Difference p-value 
∆PE(t+1) -0.16% <0.01  *** 0.05% 0.28   -0.20% <0.01  *** 
∆PE Volatility(t+1) -0.82% <0.01  *** 0.03% 0.60   -0.84% <0.01  *** 
∆Price(t+1) -0.18% 0.34   0.44% 0.02 ** -0.62% <0.01  *** 
∆Volatility(t+1) ~0.01% <0.01  *** ~0.01% 0.05 ** ~0.01% <0.01  *** 
∆Spread(t+1) -0.01% <0.01  *** 0.00% 0.61   -0.01% <0.01  *** 
∆OIB(t+1) -0.24% <0.01  *** 0.07% 0.34   -0.31% <0.01  *** 
N (days) 842     842           
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Table 13. OLS Regressions 
This table presents results for panel regressions with firm fixed effects and time-clustered standard 
errors. All variables are standardized and winsorized by security, and are as defined in Table 9. The 
sample is built as follows: we include all NYSE common stocks of US-based firms (CRSP share 
codes 10 and 11) available in the CRSP and TAQ databases listed for at least 18 months over the 
interval January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008, and with no large changes (>10%) in the number of shares 
outstanding. The resulting sample includes 1,492 securities. The Market variable for a given predictor 
on day t is obtained by averaging the related variable across all securities on day t. All variables are 
differenced (subtracting the previous day‘s value). The p-values are in italics.  ―*‖, ―**‖, and ―***‖ 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Predictors 
Pricing 
Error(t) 
Pricing 
Error 
Volatility(t) 
Price(t) Volatility(t) Spread(t) OIB(t) 
ONSR(t-1) 0.015 -0.020 ~ 0.001 -0.005 -0.011 -0.022 
  
<0.01 
*** 
<0.01 *** 
0.96 
0.05* * 
<0.01 
*** 
<0.01 
*** 
OCSR(t-1) 0.195 -0.275 -0.004 -0.070 -0.098 -0.261 
  
0.02 *** 0.03 ** 
0.21 
0.31 0.08 * 
<0.01 
*** 
Pricing Error (t-1) -0.349           
  
<0.01 
***           
ONSR(t-1)*Positive PE(t-1) -0.033           
  
<0.01 
***           
OCSR(t-1)*Positive PE(t-1) 0.195           
  0.02 **           
Pricing Error Volatility(t-1)   -0.376         
    <0.01 ***         
Price(t-1)     -0.025       
      
<0.01 
***       
Volatility(t-1)       -0.194     
        <0.01 ***     
Spread(t-1)         -0.321   
          
<0.01 
***   
OIB(t-1)           -0.448 
            
<0.01 
*** 
Market Pricing Error(t) 0.856           
  
<0.01 
***           
Market Pricing Error 
Volatility(t)   0.836         
    <0.01 ***         
Market Price(t-1)     0.997       
    
  
<0.01 
***       
Market Volatility(t)       0.915     
        <0.01 ***     
Market Spread(t)         0.875   
          
<0.01 
***   
Market OIB(t)           0.802 
            
<0.01 
*** 
Number of Firm-Days 1,001,656 1,001,656 1,001,656 1,001,656 1,001,656 1,001,656 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 14. Summary Results, Impact of Naked and Covered Short Selling 
This table provides results for the estimation of three vector autoregressive models of order one: VAR 
with Pricing Error (Model 1), VAR with Pricing Error Volatility (Model 2) and VAR with Price (Model 
3). All variables are standardized and winsorized by security, and are as defined in Table 9. The ‗entire 
market‘ sample is built as follows:  we include all NYSE common stock of US-based firms (CRSP share 
codes 10 and 11) available in the CRSP and TAQ databases listed for at least 18 months over the interval 
January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008, and with no large changes (>10%) in the number of shares outstanding. 
For the ‗most naked-shorted‘ sample, we rank each security by mean ONSR, and allocate securities on 
that basis to decile 1 (lowest) through 10 (highest); the securities included in decile 10 constitute the 
‗most naked-shorted‘ sample. The VAR equation for Model 1is defined below; the subscripts M, i and t 
indicate, respectively, the market-wide average of the variable of interest, stock i and day t. The other 
VAR models are analogously defined.  
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Panels A and B are extracts of estimates of the parameters in Models 1, 2 and 3 above and report results 
pertaining to the impact of, respectively, ONSR and OCSR. Reported parameter estimates are averages of 
parameters estimated by security. Significance is tested employing a cross-sectional estimate of the 
standard error of the parameter estimate, as in Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000). The p-values 
from two-sided t-tests are in italics below the parameter estimate. ―*‖, ―**‖, and ―***‖ indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Panel A - Impact of Naked Short Selling 
Sample 
Response – Change 
PE 
PE (incremental effect 
when lag PE > 0) 
PE Volatility Price Volatility Spread OIB 
A:  Overall 0.046 -0.123     -0.064 -0.016 -0.046 
1,402 Securities <0.01 *** <0.01 ***     0.01 ** 0.19 <0.01 *** 
B: Most Naked Shorted 0.165 -0.288     -0.124 -0.008 -0.084 
150 securities <0.01 *** <0.01 ***     <0.01 *** 0.79 <0.01 *** 
A: Overall     -0.069   -0.070 -0.015 -0.046 
1,418 Securities     <0.01***   0.02 ** 0.24 <0.01 *** 
B: Most Naked Shorted     -0.159   -0.138 -0.005 -0.083 
150 securities     <0.01***   <0.01 *** 0.88 <0.01 *** 
A: Overall       ~-0.001 -0.064 -0.014 -0.046 
1,418 Securities       0.86 <0.01 *** 0.36 <0.01 *** 
B: Most Naked Shorted       -0.008 -0.131 -0.010 -0.087 
150 securities       0.28 <0.01 *** 0.73 <0.01 *** 
Panel B - Impact of Covered Short Selling 
Sample 
Response – Change 
PE 
PE (incremental effect 
when lag PE > 0) 
PE Volatility Price Volatility Spread OIB 
A:  Overall 0.590 -1.494     -0.996 -0.237 -0.819 
1,402 Securities <0.01 *** <0.01 ***     0.01 ** 0.19 <0.01 *** 
B: Most Naked Shorted 1.006 -1.739     -1.230 -0.072 -0.758 
150 securities <0.01 *** <0.01 ***     <0.01 *** 0.37 <0.01 *** 
A: Overall     -0.927   -1.040 -0.222 -0.808 
1,418 Securities     <0.01 ***   <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** 
B: Most Naked Shorted     -1.027   -1.290 -0.065 -0.754 
150 securities     <0.01 ***   <0.01 *** 0.43 <0.01 *** 
A: Overall       -0.023 -0.991 -0.219 -0.811 
1,418 Securities       <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** 
B: Most Naked Shorted       -0.025 -1.254 -0.081 -0.765 
150 securities       0.21 <0.01 *** 0.30 <0.01 *** 
 
 
 
  
 
1
5
8
 
Panel C: Impact of a Change in Outstanding Naked Short Ratio (ONSR) equal to 10 Basis Points of the number of outstanding shares 
 
  Overall sample Most Naked Shorted Sample 
Response Variable 
Model 1     
(PE)          
Model 2       (PE 
Volatility)     
Model 3    
(Price)             
Model 1     
(PE)          
Model 2       (PE 
Volatility)     
Model 3    
(Price)             
Positive PE -9.81%     -6.74%     
PE Volatility   -12.92%     -9.43%   
Price     -0.01%     -0.04% 
Volatility -1.04% -1.14% -1.04% -0.84% -0.94% -0.89% 
Spread -1.03% -0.99% -0.92% -0.14% -0.08% -0.17% 
OIB -1.75% -1.72% -1.73% -1.80% -1.79% -1.87% 
 
Panel D: Impact of a Change in Outstanding Covered Short Ratio (OCSR) equal to 10 Basis Points of the number of outstanding shares 
 
  Overall sample Most Naked Shorted Sample 
Response Variable 
Model 1     
(PE)          
Model 2       
(PE Volatility)     
Model 3    
(Price)             
Model 1     
(PE)          
Model 2       (PE 
Volatility)     
Model 3    
(Price)             
Positive PE -4.90%     -2.98%     
PE Volatility   -7.37%     -4.53%   
Price     -0.01%     -0.01% 
Volatility -0.69% -0.72% -0.69% -0.62% -0.65% -0.63% 
Spread -0.65% -0.61% -0.60% -0.09% -0.09% -0.11% 
OIB -1.31% -1.30% -1.30% -1.20% -1.20% -1.22% 
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Table 15. Impact of Naked Short-Selling for Securities with High/Low Proportion of Naked Short-Selling by Public Traders relative to Market Makers 
This table provides results for the estimation of three vector autoregressive models of order one: VAR with Pricing Error (Model 1), VAR with Pricing Error 
Volatility (Model 2) and VAR with Price (Model 3), as described in Table VI. All variables are standardized and winsorized by security, and are as defined in 
Table 9. The sample is built as follows: we include all NYSE common stock of US-based firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) available in the CRSP and TAQ 
databases listed for at least 18 months over the interval January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008, and with no large changes (>10%) in the number of shares outstanding. 
The resulting sample includes 1,492 securities. Mean ONSR is computed for all securities included in the sample for the period preceding the introduction of 
Rule 204T (January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008) and for a period following (January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2010). Securities are ranked according to the 
proportional change in Mean ONSR. Securities are then allocated to three quantiles – those with the highest decline in Mean ONSR are allocated to the ―High 
Proportion of Public Traders‖ sample, while those with the lowest decline in Mean ONSR are allocated to the ―Low Proportion of Public Traders‖ sample. 
Reported parameter estimates are averages of parameters estimated by security. Significance is tested employing a cross-sectional estimate of the standard error 
of the parameter estimate, as in Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000).  p-values from two-sided t-tests are in italics below the parameter estimates. ―*‖, ―**‖, 
and ―***‖ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 
Sample 
Response – Change 
PE 
PE (incremental effect 
when lag PE > 0) 
PE Volatility Price Volatility Spread OIB 
A: Low Proportion of Public Traders 0.028 -0.125     -0.041 -0.009 -0.027 
338 Securities 0.24 0.34     <0.01 *** 0.45 0.04 ** 
B: High Proportion of Public Traders 0.054 -0.117     -0.073 -0.020 -0.063 
345 Securities 0.03 ** <0.01 ***     <0.01 *** 0.09 ** <0.01 *** 
A: Low Proportion of Public Traders     -0.038   -0.045 -0.010 -0.027 
345 Securities     <0.01 ***   <0.01 *** 0.41 0.06 * 
B: High Proportion of Public Traders     -0.073   -0.079 -0.020 -0.063 
352 Securities     <0.01 ***   <0.01 *** 0.10 <0.01 *** 
A: Low Proportion of Public Traders       -0.001 -0.043 -0.011 -0.029 
345 Securities       0.79 <0.01 *** 0.32 0.07 * 
B: High Proportion of Public Traders       -0.003 -0.076 -0.022 -0.061 
352 Securities       0.19 <0.01 *** 0.07 * <0.01 *** 
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Table 16. The Impact of Restrictions on Naked Short Selling imposed by the SEC between July 21, 2008 and August 12, 2008 
 
The following table presents parameter estimates and related two-sided p-values (in italics, grey font) from five OLS regressions, one for each variable of 
interest: ONSR, Pricing Error Volatility, Price, Volatility, Spread and Order Imbalance. All variables are computed daily over the interval January 1, 2008 to 
September 9, 2008. In each k
th
 (1<= k <= 6) regression, the response variable is the mean value of the k
th
 variable of interest for the sample of the 17 stocks that 
were subject to restrictions on naked shorting. The ban affected 19 securities, but we have data for 17 of these: Bank of America Corporation, Barclays, Bear 
Stearns Companies Inc., Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank Group AG, Allianz SE, Goldman, Sachs Group Inc, Royal Bank ADS, HSBC 
Holdings PLC ADS, J. P. Morgan Chase & Co., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Mizuho Financial Group, Inc., Morgan Stanley, UBS AG, Freddie Mac, and Fannie 
Mae. Explanatory variables include, in each regression, an intercept, the mean value of the k
th
 variable of interest for the control sample, Control, and a binary 
variable, Event, equal to 1 between July 21, 2008 and August 12, 2008. All variables are standardized and winsorized by security, and are as defined in Table 9. 
―*‖, ―**‖, and ―***‖ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The OLS regression equation is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictors ONSR 
PE 
Volatility 
Return Volatility Spread OIB 
Intercept 0.001 0.197 -0.002 -0.038 -0.001 0.017 
  <0.01 *** <0.01 *** 0.16 <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** 
Control 2.014 0.625 1.179 1.353 0.941 0.496 
  <0.01 *** 0.33 <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** 
Event -0.001 0.074 -0.006 0.007 ~0.001 -0.017 
  <0.01 *** <0.01 *** 0.11 <0.01 *** 0.10 * 0.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tktkkkktk ControlEventVariableResponse ,,,2,1,    
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Table 17. Behavior of the Outstanding Naked Short Ratio (ONSR) of Bear Stearns (Ticker: BSC) and of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (Ticker: LEH) 
in 2008. 
ONSR is computed as the ratio of our estimate of outstanding fails to deliver and shares outstanding. Index ONSR is calculated as the equal weighted average of 
ONSR of common stock of 4 firms that are matched on primary SIC and market capitalization as of the end of the fiscal year 2007 to BSC in Panel A and to LEH 
in Panel B. We construct a t-statistic using the mean and standard error of the ONSR difference over the time interval January 1, 2008 to February 15, 2008 for 
BSC and over the time interval January 1, 2008 and ending 20 trading days prior to September 9, 2008 for LEH; p-values are two-sided. ―*‖, ―**‖, and ―***‖ 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
Panel A: Bear Stearns      Panel B: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 
   
Date 
BSC 
Stock 
Price 
BSC 
ONSR 
Index 
ONSR 
Difference 
in ONSR 
p-value 
3/3/2008 77.32 0.30% <0.01 0.30% 0.21 
 
 
3/4/2008 77.17 0.14% <0.01 0.14% <0.01 *** 
3/5/2008 75.78 0.14% 0.02% 0.12% <0.01 *** 
3/6/2008 69.9 0.24% 0.02% 0.22% <0.01 *** 
3/7/2008 70.08 0.12% 0.02% 0.10% <0.01 *** 
3/10/2008 62.3 0.12% 0.02% 0.10% <0.01 *** 
3/11/2008 62.97 0.28% <0.01 0.28% 0.16 
 
 
3/12/2008 61.58 1.16% 0.06% 1.10% <0.01 *** 
3/13/2008 57 1.06% 0.06% 1.00% <0.01 *** 
3/14/2008 30 2.24% 0.08% 2.16% <0.01 *** 
3/17/2008 4.81 12.18% 0.08% 12.10% <0.01 *** 
3/18/2008 5.91 11.74% 0.04% 11.70% <0.01 *** 
3/19/2008 5.33 11.74% 0.04% 11.70% <0.01 *** 
3/20/2008 5.96 11.68% 0.08% 11.60% <0.01 *** 
3/24/2008 11.25 12.26% 0.04% 12.22% <0.01 *** 
3/25/2008 10.94 14.38% 0.08% 14.30% <0.01 *** 
3/26/2008 11.21 10.92% 0.08% 10.84% <0.01 *** 
3/27/2008 11.23 11.68% 0.06% 11.62% <0.01 *** 
3/28/2008 10.78 12.36% 0.06% 12.30% <0.01 *** 
3/29/2008 10.49 12.36% 0.06% 12.30% <0.01 *** 
Date 
LEH 
Price 
LEH 
ONSR 
Index 
ONSR 
Difference 
in ONSR 
p-value 
8/25/2008 13.45 0.31% <0.01 0.31% <0.01 *** 
8/26/2008 14.03 0.16% <0.01 0.16% <0.01 *** 
8/27/2008 14.78 0.16% <0.01 0.16% <0.01 *** 
8/28/2008 15.87 0.02% <0.01 0.02% <0.01 *** 
8/29/2008 16.09 0.02% <0.01 0.02% <0.01 *** 
9/2/2008 16.13 0.02% <0.01 0.02% <0.01 *** 
9/3/2008 16.94 0.02% <0.01 0.02% <0.01 *** 
9/4/2008 15.17 0.01% <0.01 0.01% <0.01 *** 
9/5/2008 16.20 0.01% 0.02% -0.01% <0.01 *** 
9/8/2008 14.15 0.01% 0.02% -0.01% <0.01 *** 
9/9/2008 7.79 0.16% 0.03% 0.13% <0.01 *** 
9/10/2008 7.25 0.85% 0.04% 0.81% <0.01 *** 
9/11/2008 4.22 3.29% 0.04% 3.25% <0.01 *** 
9/12/2008 3.65 4.86% 0.03% 4.83% <0.01 *** 
9/15/2008 0.21 4.86% 0.05% 4.81% <0.01 *** 
9/16/2008 0.30 5.21% 0.16% 5.05% <0.01 *** 
9/17/2008 0.13 8.16% 0.18% 7.98% <0.01 *** 
9/18/2008             
9/19/2008   DELISTED     
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Table 18. Naked Short Selling around Credit Rating Downgrades and Large Price Drops 
 
Panel A: Naked Short Selling around Credit Rating Downgrades 
 
We analyze long-term issuer credit rating downgrades by S&P over the year 2008 for 17 financial firms: Bank of America Corporation, Barclays, Bear Stearns 
Companies Inc., Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank Group AG, Allianz SE, Goldman, Sachs Group Inc, Royal Bank ADS, HSBC Holdings 
PLC ADS, J. P. Morgan Chase & Co., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Mizuho Financial Group, Inc., Morgan Stanley, UBS AG, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae. We 
compute ONSR for each firm‘s common stock (when the primary exchange is not in the US, we use the corresponding ADR). In all, we identify 21 downgrades, 
and define day 0 as the day of the downgrade. We compute abnormal daily ONSR by subtracting the Mean ONSR from daily ONSR. Mean ONSR is computed 
over 100 trading days ending 20 days prior to the credit rating downgrade. We report results for various event windows. Cumulative Abnormal ONSR is the sum 
of daily ONSR for all days in the event window. The significance of the mean is computed making use of the historic estimate of the standard error (computed 
over the estimation period of 100 trading days ending 20 days prior to the credit rating downgrade), adjusted for date clustering. p-values are reported next to the 
estimates ―*‖, ―**‖, and ―***‖ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
 
Event 
Window 
N 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
ONSR 
p-value 
(-20,-1) 21 -0.36% 0.06 * 
(-10,-1) 21 -0.27% 0.05 ** 
(-5,-1) 21 -0.15% 0.11   
(0,0) 21 -0.02% -0.57   
(+1,+5) 21 0.32% <0.01 *** 
(+1,+10) 21 0.57% <0.01 *** 
(+1,+20) 21 0.67% <0.01 *** 
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Panel B: Naked Short Selling around Large Drops in Returns 
 
The sample includes all NYSE common stock of US-based firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) included in the CRSP and TAQ databases over the entire interval 
January 1, 2008 to July 20, 2008, with no large changes (>10%) in the number of shares outstanding during the same period. For each security, we compute daily 
returns over the entire period and estimate the mean and standard deviation of the daily stock price return. We standardize daily returns by subtracting the mean 
return and by dividing by the standard deviation of the security return. We identify days with large abnormal negative stock price returns as security-days for 
which the standardized return is less than -2. We obtain a sample of 83 security-days with extreme negative return and we refer to those as ‗event days‘. For each 
security-day in the interval between day -20 and day +20 (where day 0 is the ‗event day‘), we compute daily Abnormal ONSR, by subtracting Mean ONSR, 
estimated over a split interval containing the 50 trading days ending 21 trading days prior to the identified event date and the 50 trading days starting 21 trading 
days after the identified event date. We obtain Mean Abnormal ONSR by averaging Abnormal ONSR across securities. We then cumulate Mean Abnormal ONSR 
over various event windows. We compute Leverage as the ratio of Long Term Debt to Total Asset,  rank securities on Leverage and assign those with leverage 
below the sample median to a ‗low leverage‘ group and those with leverage above the sample median to a ‗high leverage‘ group. We test for significance using a 
Brown-Warner (1980, 1985) adjustment in the computation of standard errors, to account for the clustering of event dates. ―*‖, ―**‖, and ―***‖ indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
Event 
Window 
All Companies High Leverage Companies Low Leverage Companies 
N 
Mean Cumulative 
Abnormal ONSR 
p-value N 
Mean Cumulative 
Abnormal ONSR 
p-value N 
Mean Cumulative 
Abnormal ONSR 
p-value 
(-20,-1) 83 -1.90% <0.01 *** 41 -2.48% <0.01 *** 42 -1.32% <0.01 *** 
(-10,-1) 83 -1.25% <0.01 *** 41 -1.70% <0.01 *** 42 -0.81% <0.01 *** 
(-5,-1) 83 -0.79% <0.01 *** 41 -1.20% <0.01 *** 42 -0.39% 0.02 ** 
(0,0) 84 0.03% 0.60   42 0.01% 0.88   42 0.05% 0.53   
(+1,+5) 85 0.35% <0.01 *** 43 0.34% 0.04 ** 42 0.36% 0.03 ** 
(+1,+10) 85 0.79% <0.01 *** 43 0.95% <0.01 *** 42 0.63% <0.01 *** 
(+1,+20) 85 0.78% <0.01 *** 43 1.08% <0.01 *** 42 0.47% 0.06   
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Table 19. Attributes of Corporate Hedging Announcements 
 
This table describes the different attributes of hedging announcements. An event/announcement is 
categorized as Contaminated (uncontaminated) when there are other (no other) firm-specific news items 
between event days -1 and +1. An event is categorized as Market View when the firm making the 
hedging-related announcement explicitly claims that the change in hedging policy is a result of its 
expectations about future gold prices. Events are categorized as Bank Loans when the change in hedging 
policy is a consequence of a loan-related transaction. Events are categorized as Ex ante (Ex post) when 
the change in hedging policy is announced in advance of (subsequent to) its implementation. 
  
  
 
Hedging 
Increases   
Hedging 
Decreases   Total 
Panel A: Contaminated vs. Uncontaminated 
Contaminated 24   66   90 
Uncontaminated 14   49   63 
Total 38   115   153 
Panel B: Reason for Change in Hedging Policy  
Market View 24   88   112 
Bank Loans 6   10   16 
Others 8   17   25 
Panel C: Timing of the Change in Hedging Policy relative to Announcement 
Ex ante 14   52   66 
Ex post 24   63   87 
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Table 20. Descriptive Statistics of Firm and Event Characteristics 
 
This table presents summary statistics of firm and event characteristics. Firm Size is the log of the 
total assets in millions of US$. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt and total assets. Quick Ratio is 
the ratio of current assets and current liabilities. Tax Savings is the ratio of tax loss carry forwards 
and total assets. Information Asymmetry is the percentage error in analyst forecasts. Institutional 
Ownership is the ratio of total number of shares owned by institutions and total number of shares 
outstanding. Hedge Quantity Change is the change in the log of ounces of gold being hedged.  Hedge 
Proportion Change is the ratio of Hedge Quantity Change and the following year‘s annual production. 
 
  Mean Median Std N 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
Size 7.692 8.101 1.273 133 
Leverage 0.154 0.125 0.120 133 
Quick Ratio 3.073 1.805 5.554 150 
Tax Savings 0.052 0.037 0.066 133 
Information Asymmetry 0.123 0.125 0.070 115 
Institutional Ownership 0.317 0.237 0.269 142 
Panel B: Event Characteristics  
Hedge Quantity Change 13.541 13.542 1.183 116 
Hedge Proportion Change 0.667 0.164 1.614 116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 166 
 
Table 21. Effect of Corporate Hedging Announcements on Gold Returns 
 
Panel A reports the mean cumulative abnormal gold (spot) returns for all corporate announcements 
regarding a reduction in hedging. Day 0 represents the day a reduction in hedging was announced. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the mean-adjusted model. Panel B reports the mean cumulative 
abnormal gold (spot) returns for all corporate announcements regarding an increase in hedging. Day 0 
represents the day an increase in hedging was announced. CDA is the Brown and Warner test statistic 
that accounts for cross-sectional dependence of abnormal returns and Generalized Sign Z  is the non-
parametric test statistic. The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. 
 
Panel A: Gold Market Reactions to Corporate Announcements of  Decreases  in Hedging 
Days N Mean CAR         CDA Generalized Sign Z 
(0,0) 115 0.48%         5.780*** 3.564*** 
(-10,-1) 115 0.45%         1.700*          0.42 
(-5,-1) 115 0.28%         1.485          0.05 
(-1,+1) 115 0.63%         4.354***          3.009** 
(+1,+5) 115 0.58%         3.123**          0.605 
(+1,+10) 115 0.59%         2.250**          0.975 
 
Panel B: Gold Market Reactions to Corporate Announcements of  Increases  in Hedging 
Days N Mean CAR        CDA Generalized Sign Z 
(0,0) 38 -0.10%      -0.682      -0.527 
(-10,-1) 38 2.16%        4.724***        0.149 
(-5,-1) 38 0.80%        2.490**        0.149 
(-1,+1) 38 0.27%        1.098        0.825 
(+1,+5) 38 -0.32%       -0.991      -2.556** 
(+1,+10) 38 -1.41%       -3.084***      -1.542 
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Table 22. Gold Abnormal Returns and Event Characteristics 
 
This table reports the results of a cross-sectional regression conducted to analyze the relation between 
gold (spot) abnormal returns and different attributes of the hedging related announcement (event).  
The dependent variable is the event-day gold (spot) abnormal return. Big Five is a binary variable 
equal to 1 for the 5 largest companies in the sample. Hedge Quantity Change is the change in the log 
of ounces of gold being hedged.  Hedge Proportion Change is the ratio of Hedge Quantity Change 
and the following year‘s annual production. Market View is a binary variable equal to 1 when the 
firm making the hedging related announcement explicitly claims that the change in hedging policy is 
a result of its expectations about future gold prices. Ex post is a binary variable equal to 1 when an 
announcement is made after the gold is sold. Inc_Dec is a binary variable equal to 1 when the 
announcement is related to an increase in hedging. CAR_Pre_Gold is the 20-day historical CAR 
(between event days -20 and -1) in the gold market. The p-values are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and are presented in parentheses below the respective coefficients. The symbols *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. 
 
Variable   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
              
C   0.0021  0.0026  0.0025 
    ( 0.6131)  (0.4512)  ( 0.3176) 
         
Big Five   -0.0021  -0.0032  -0.0026 
    ( 0.3749)  (0.1991)  ( 0.2218) 
         
Market View   -0.0049  -0.0050  -0.0052 
    ( 0.0116)**  (0.0747)*  (0.0055)*** 
         
Hedge Quantity Change   -0.0001     
    (  0.9310)     
         
Hedge Proportion Change     -0.0005   
      (0.4266)   
         
CAR_Pre_Gold   -0.0187  -0.0189  -0.0323 
    ( 0.3823)  (0.3097)  ( 0.0501)* 
         
Inc_Dec   0.0014  0.0007  0.0019 
    (0.4388)  (0.8141)  (0.2327) 
         
Ex post   0.0007  0.0012  0.0005 
    (  0.7677)  (0.6077)  (  0.8094) 
         
Uncontaminated   -0.0035  -0.0023  -0.0038 
    ( 0.1723)  (0.6077)  ( 0.1064) 
         
Adjusted R-Squared   0.0511  0.0295  0.0806 
N   118  111  153 
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Table 23. Central Bank Announcements 
 
Panel A presents summary statistics of central bank announcements. Quantity is the log of the total 
ounces of gold sold. Panel B reports the mean abnormal gold (spot) returns for all central bank 
announcements regarding gold selling. Day 0 represents the day the gold sale was announced. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the mean-adjusted model. Day 0 represents the day a reduction 
in hedging was announced. CDA is the Brown and Warner test statistic that accounts for cross-
sectional dependence of abnormal returns and Generalized Sign Z is the non-parametric test statistic. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively, using a 2-tailed test.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Central Bank Announcements 
Country/Central Bank   Mean Quantity   Median Quantity   N 
Argentina   15.194   15.194   1 
Australia   15.491   15.491   1 
Belgium   15.304   15.684   4 
Canada   11.430   11.456   56 
European Central Bank   13.264   13.264   1 
France   16.770   16.770   2 
Germany   16.770   16.770   1 
IMF   16.453   16.453   1 
Russia   14.325   13.996   8 
Spain   13.712   13.706   3 
Sweden   12.676   12.676   2 
Swiss   17.019   17.544   3 
UK   13.781   13.592   20 
       
 
Panel B: Effect of Central Bank Announcements on Gold Returns 
Days N Mean CAR CDA 
Generalized Sign 
Z 
(0,0) 103 -0.12% -1.381 -1.253 
(-10,-1) 103 -0.08% -0.295 -1.45 
(-5,-1) 103 0.07% 0.346 -1.056 
(-1,+1) 103 -0.13% -0.853 -0.268 
(+1,+5) 103 0.10% 0.524 0.717 
(+1,+10) 103 0.25% 0.942 -0.662 
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Table 24. Effect of Hedging Announcements on Equity Returns 
Panels A and B report mean cumulative abnormal stock returns for all announcements of a decrease 
in hedging. Panel C and D report mean cumulative abnormal stock returns for all announcements of 
an increase in hedging. In Panels A and C, the abnormal returns are calculated using a two-factor 
model which includes commodity returns (gold, spot) along with the standard equity market returns. 
In Panels B and D, the abnormal returns are calculated using a five-factor model which adds the 
Fama French factors and the momentum factor to the aforementioned two-factor model.  CDA is the 
Brown and Warner test statistic that accounts for cross-sectional dependence of abnormal returns and 
Generalized Sign Z is the non-parametric test statistic value. The symbols *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test.   
 
Panel A: Equity Market Reactions to Corporate Announcements of  Decreases  in Hedging              
(Two-Factor Model) 
Days N Mean CAR               CDA 
Generalized Sign 
Z 
(0, 0) 115 1.46% 3.592*** 4.143*** 
(0,+1) 115 1.19%               2.067** 4.143*** 
(-10,-1) 114 0.12%               0.091         0.303 
(-5,-1) 115 0.84%               0.917         1.422 
(-1,+1) 115 0.72%               1.017 2.644*** 
(+1,+5) 115 -0.76%              -0.833         0.303 
(+1,+10) 115 0.32%               0.251         1.795* 
Panel B: Equity Market Reactions to Corporate Announcements of  Decreases  in Hedging            
(Five-Factor Model) 
Days N Mean CAR                CDA 
Generalized Sign 
Z 
(0, 0) 115 1.45%               3.622***         4.116*** 
(0,+1) 115 1.12%               1.966** 3.741*** 
(-10,-1) 114 -0.13%              -0.100         0.462 
(-5,-1) 115 0.70%               0.776         1.582 
(-1,+1) 115 0.65%               0.942         2.992** 
(+1,+5) 115 -0.63%              -0.699         0.649 
(+1,+10) 115 0.60%               0.470         2.141** 
Panel C:Equity Market Reactions to Corporate Announcements of  Increases  in Hedging               
(Two-Factor Model)  
Days N Mean CAR               CDA 
Generalized Sign 
Z 
(0, 0) 38 -2.05%              -3.045**        -2.293** 
(0,+1) 38 -1.51%              -1.583        -1.968** 
(-10,-1) 38 -0.37%              -0.173        -0.344 
(-5,-1) 38 -0.69%              -0.460        -0.019 
(-1,+1) 38 -2.17%              -1.860*        -1.643 
(+1,+5) 38 2.27%               1.510         0.955 
(+1,+10) 38 1.83%               0.861        -0.019 
Panel D:Equity Market Reactions to Corporate Announcements of  Increases  in Hedging               
(Five-Factor Model) 
Days N Mean CAR                CDA 
Generalized Sign 
Z 
(0, 0) 38 -2.08% -3.121***        -2.310** 
(0,+1) 38 -1.66%              -1.759*        -2.310** 
(-10,-1) 38 -0.21%              -0.100        -0.361 
(-5,-1) 38 -0.78%              -0.527        -0.361 
(-1,+1) 38 -2.41%              -2.087**        -1.661* 
(+1,+5) 38 1.89%               1.267         0.613 
(+1,+10) 38 1.52%               0.720         0.288 
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Table 25. Equity Abnormal Returns, and Event and Firm Characteristics (Two-Factor Model) 
 
This table reports the results of a cross-sectional regression conducted to analyze the relation between 
equity abnormal returns and different attributes of the hedging related announcement (event) and 
hedging related firm.  The dependent variable is the event-day equity abnormal return. 
CAR_Pre_Gold is the 20-day historical CAR (between event days -20 and -1) in the gold market. 
CAR_Pre_Firm is the 20-day historical CAR for the firm making the announcement. Hedge Quantity 
Change is the change in the log of ounces of gold being hedged.  Hedge Proportion Change is the 
ratio of Hedge Quantity Change and the following year‘s annual production. Market View is a dummy 
equal to 1 when the firm making the hedging related announcement explicitly claims that the change 
in hedging policy is a result of its expectations about future gold prices. Big Five is a binary variable 
equal to 1 for the 5 largest companies in the sample. Size is the log of total assets of the firm (in 
millions) making the announcement. Info_Asy is the percentage error in analysts‘ forecasts. Distress 
is the ratio of long-term debt to firm size. Tax Savings is the ratio of deferred taxes and firm size.  
Uncontaminated is a dummy variable equal to 1 for uncontaminated events. Inc_Dec is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when the announcement is related to an increase in hedging. The p-values are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and are presented in parentheses below the respective coefficients. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
using a 2-tailed test. 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
C   0.008   -0.047   0.041   0.016 
    (  0.5906)   ( 0.1007)   ( 0.0445)**   (0.7802)  
CAR_Pre_Gold   0.276   0.265   0.330   0.297 
    ( <0.01)***   ( <0.01)***   ( <0.01)***   (<0.01)***  
CAR_Pre_Firm   0.095   0.092   0.051   0.010 
    (   0.0114)**   ( 0.0143)**   ( 0.2775)   (0.8366 ) 
Hedge Quantity Change           -0.003   0.000 
            (  0.5580)   (0.9752)  
Hedge Proportion Change           0.000   0.000 
            (  0.9471)   (0.9839)  
Market View   -0.021   -0.024   -0.036   -0.020 
    (  0.0299)**   ( 0.0151)**   ( <0.01)***   (0.1202) 
Big Five   0.018       0.020    
    (  0.0499)**       ( 0.1214)    
Size       0.009       0.002 
        ( 0.0156)**       (0.6722)  
Info_Asy               0.004 
                (0.8062)  
Distress   -0.096   -0.090   -0.145   -0.206 
    ( <0.01)***   (  0.0113)**   ( <0.01)***   (<0.01)***  
Tax Savings   0.008   -0.002   -0.016   0.144 
    (   0.9089)   (  0.9770)   (  0.7161)   (0.1490)  
Uncontaminated   -0.014   -0.013   -0.017   0.013 
    ( 0.1080)   ( 0.1258)   ( 0.1455)   (0.2680)  
Inc_Dec   -0.001   0.001   -0.008   0.030 
    ( 0.9206)   ( 0.9479)   ( 0.5183)   (0.0406) 
         
Adjusted R-Squared   0.244   0.256   0.392   0.452 
N   132   132   92   67 
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Table 26. Equity Abnormal Returns, and Event and Firm Characteristics (Five-Factor Model) 
 
This table reports the results of a cross-sectional regression conducted to analyze the relation between 
equity abnormal returns and different attributes of the hedging related announcement (event) and 
hedging related firm.  The dependent variable is the event-day equity abnormal return. 
CAR_Pre_Gold is the 20-day historical CAR (between event days -20 and -1) in the gold market. 
CAR_Pre_Firm is the 20-day historical CAR for the firm making the announcement.  Hedge Quantity 
Change is the change in the log of ounces of gold being hedged.  Hedge Proportion Change is the 
ratio of Hedge Quantity Change and the following year‘s annual production. Market View is a dummy 
equal to 1 when the firm making the hedging related announcement explicitly claims that the change 
in hedging policy is a result of its expectations about future gold prices. Big Five is a binary variable 
equal to 1 for the 5 largest companies in the sample. Size is the log of total assets of the firm (in 
millions) making the announcement. Info_Asy is the percentage error in analysts‘ forecasts. Distress 
is the ratio of long-term debt to firm size. Tax Savings is the ratio of deferred taxes and firm size.  
Uncontaminated is a dummy variable equal to 1 for uncontaminated events. Inc_Dec is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when the announcement is related to an increase in hedging. The p-values are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and are presented in parentheses below the respective coefficients. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
using a 2-tailed test. 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 
C   0.009  -0.050   0.031   0.000 
    (0.466)  (0.085)   (0.599)   (0.9972) 
CAR_Pre_Gold   0.255  0.243   0.304   0.281 
    (<0.01)***  (<0.01)***   (<0.01)***   (<0.01)***  
CAR_Pre_Firm   0.091  0.086   0.021     -0.017 
    (0.017)**  (0.023)**   (0.646)   (0.7358) 
Hedge Quantity Change          0.000     0.001 
           (0.939)   (0.8207)  
Hedge Proportion Change          0.000     0.000 
           (0.999)   (0.9676) 
Market View   -0.024  -0.0264   -0.033   -0.020 
    (0.013)**  (<0.01)***   (<0.01)***   (0.1215) 
Big Five   0.020      0.017    
    (0.034)**      (0.169)    
Size      0.009       0.002 
       (0.01)***       (0.6698)  
Info_Asy              0.002 
                (0.8782) 
Distress   -0.092  -0.035   -0.115     -0.192 
    (0.011)**  (0.015)**   (<0.01)***   (<0.01)***  
Tax Savings   -0.001  -0.066   0.002     0.152 
    (0.989)  (0.884)   (0.974)     (0.1305)  
Uncontaminated   -0.013  -0.009   -0.015      0.012 
    (0.138)  (0.165)   (0.154)     (0.2873)  
Inc_Dec   -0.004  -0.002   -0.012     0.033 
    (0.723)  (0.873)   (0.286)   (0.0276)**  
         
Adjusted R-Squared   0.227   0.240   0.280   0.423 
N   132   132   92   67 
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Table 27. Industry Effects of Corporate Hedging Announcements 
Panels A and B report the mean cumulative abnormal stock returns of all companies in the gold 
mining industry (SIC=1041) (excluding announcing firms) for all corporate announcements regarding 
a decrease in hedging and Panels C and D report the same for increases in hedging. Day 0 represents 
the day of the hedging announcement. In Panels A and C, the abnormal returns are calculated using a 
two-factor model which includes commodity returns (gold, spot) along with the standard equity 
market returns. In Panels B and D, the abnormal returns are calculated using a five-factor model 
which adds the Fama French factors and the momentum factor to the aforementioned two-factor 
model. CDA is the Brown and Warner test statistic that accounts for cross-sectional dependence of 
abnormal returns and Generalized Sign Z is the non-parametric test statistic value. The symbols *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test.   
 
Panel A: Industry Reactions to Corporate Announcements of  Decreases  in Hedging  
(Two-Factor Model) 
Days N Mean CAR               CDA 
Generalized Sign 
Z 
(0, 0) 3949 0.53%  3.654*** 4.541*** 
(0,+1) 3949 0.55%               2.694** 4.797*** 
(-10,-1) 3947 0.52%               1.129         2.088** 
(-5,-1) 3949 1.01%               3.110** 4.908*** 
(-1,+1) 3949 0.96% 3.816*** 7.028*** 
(+1,+5) 3949 -0.04%              -0.116         0.464 
(+1,+10) 3949 0.33%               0.712 4.447*** 
Panel B: Industry Reactions to Corporate Announcements of  Decreases  in Hedging  
(Five-Factor Model) 
Days N Mean CAR               CDA 
Generalized Sign 
Z 
(0, 0) 3949 0.56% 3.958*** 4.536*** 
(0,+1) 3949 0.59% 2.958*** 3.994*** 
(-10,-1) 3947 0.65%               1.464 3.102*** 
(-5,-1) 3949 1.09% 3.471*** 6.273*** 
(-1,+1) 3949 0.97% 3.983*** 7.149*** 
(+1,+5) 3949 0.20%               0.630         1.956** 
(+1,+10) 3949 0.62%               1.385 5.460*** 
Panel C: Industry Reactions to Corporate Announcements of  Increases  in Hedging   
(Two-Factor Model) 
Days N Mean CAR                CDA 
Generalized Sign 
Z 
(0, 0) 1616 -0.63% -2.670** -3.678*** 
(0,+1) 1616 -0.53%               -1.581         -2.006** 
(-10,-1) 1616 -2.08% -2.804** -3.773*** 
(-5,-1) 1616 -0.98%               -1.868*         -1.009 
(-1,+1) 1616 -0.65%               -1.610         -2.405* 
(+1,+5) 1616 0.38%                0.717          1.832* 
(+1,+10) 1616 0.83%                1.123          2.779*** 
Panel D: Industry Reactions to Corporate Announcements of  Increases  in Hedging   
(Five-Factor Model) 
Days N Mean CAR CDA 
Generalized Sign 
Z 
(0, 0) 1616 -0.62%      -2.734***      -4.593*** 
(0,+1) 1616 -0.62%    -1.914**      -2.921*** 
(-10,-1) 1616 -1.67%    -2.329**       -3.044*** 
(-5,-1) 1616 -0.91%  -1.796*  -1.775* 
(-1,+1) 1616 -0.73% -1.861*      -3.021*** 
(+1,+5) 1616 0.09% 0.173 0.218 
(+1,+10) 1616 0.28% 0.393 0.866 
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Table 28. Industry Abnormal Returns, and Event and Firm Characteristics 
 
This table reports the results of a cross-sectional regression conducted to analyze the relation between 
abnormal stock returns and characteristics of all companies in the gold mining industry (SIC=1041) 
(excluding announcing firms), and different attributes of hedging announcements (event). 
CAR_Pre_Gold is the 20-day historical CAR (between event days -20 and -1) in the gold market. 
CAR_Pre_Industry is the 20-day historical CAR for the gold industry sample excluding the firm 
making the announcement.  Hedge Quantity Change is the change in the log of ounces of gold being 
hedged.  Hedge Proportion Change is the ratio of Hedge Quantity Change and the following year‘s 
annual production. Market View is a dummy equal to 1 when the firm making the hedging related 
announcement explicitly claims that the change in hedging policy is a result of its expectations about 
future gold prices. Big Five is a binary variable equal to 1 for the 5 largest companies in the sample. 
Size is the log of total assets of the firm (in millions) making the announcement. Info_Asy is the 
percentage error in analysts‘ forecasts. Distress is the ratio of long-term debt to firm size. 
Uncontaminated is a dummy variable equal to 1 for uncontaminated events. Inc_Dec is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when the announcement is related to an increase in hedging. The p-values are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and are presented in parentheses below the respective coefficients. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
using a 2-tailed test. 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 
 
C   0.001   -0.002 -0.010  0.012 
    (0.5580)   ( 0.4997) (0.3365)  (0.3281) 
CAR_Pre_Gold   0.079   0.080 0.063  0.092 
    ( <0.01)***   ( <0.01)*** (<0.01)***  (<0.01)*** 
CAR_Pre_Industry   0.021   0.021 0.001  -0.009 
    ( <0.01)***   ( <0.01)*** (0.9832)  (0.1566) 
Hedge Quantity 
Change         -0.001  -0.001 
          (0.4971)  (0.3231) 
Hedge Proportion 
Change         -0.001  -0.001 
          (0.3588)  (0.0687)* 
Market_View   -0.005   -0.005 0.000  -0.001 
    (0.0165)**   (  0.0116)** (0.9542)  (0.5131) 
Big Five   -0.000     -0.004   
    (0.8007)     (0.0372)**   
Size       0.001   0.001 
       (  0.2099)   (0.8418) 
Info_Asy           0.000 
            (0.8028) 
Distress   -0.016   -0.018 -0.005  -0.016 
    ( 0.0164)**   (< 0.01)*** (0.4739)  (0.0760)* 
Uncontaminated   -0.004   -0.004 -0.002  -0.001 
    ( 0.0399)**   ( 0.047)** (0.1793)  (0.7399) 
Inc_Dec   0.000   0.000 -0.004  -0.001 
    (0.9603)   ( 0.8485) (0.0505)*  (0.5904) 
Adjusted R-Squared   0.012   0.012 0.009  0.020 
N   5098   5098 4011  2484  
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Table 29. Implementation of Hedging Announcements 
 
This table presents summary statistics of changes in Total Committed Hedge (the theoretical 
maximum a producer might have to sell due to derivative positions) after announcements relating to 
hedging decreases. Quarterly Change is the change in Total Committed Hedge in one quarter after the 
announcement, expressed as a percentage of yearly production. Yearly Change is the change in Total 
Committed Hedge in one year after the announcement, expressed as a percentage of yearly 
production. 
 
Changes in Total Committed Hedge Mean Median Std N 
          
Quarterly Change -10.42% -7.46% 13.90% 34 
          
Yearly Change -36.52% -29.73% 41.49% 34 
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Appendix B: Figures 
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Figure 1. Order Revisions and Time from Submission 
The following graphs show the distribution of order cancellations (Panel A) and order modifications 
(Panel B) over time from order submission. 
Panel A: Order Cancellations 
 
 
Panel B: Order Modifications 
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Figure 2. Impulse Response Functions, Naked Short Selling 
Plots of accumulated impulse response functions depicting the impact of a one-standard deviation 
shock in ONSR. The VAR model used for estimation is Model 2 and the sample is the ‗overall 
market‘, as described in Table VI. The response variables in the four panels are, respectively, PE 
Volatility, Volatility, Spread and Order Imbalance, as defined in Table 9. The horizontal axis are time 
periods (days), following the initial shock (day 0). All variables are standardized and winsorized by 
security. Impulse response coefficients are estimated by security; mean values are depicted. 5% 
confidence intervals are computed using cross-sectional standard error estimates.  
 
 
Panel A: PE Volatility 
 
 
Panel B: Volatility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Spread 
 
 
Panel D: Order Imbalance 
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Figure 3.  Impulse Response Functions, Covered Short Selling 
Plots of accumulated impulse response functions depicting the impact of a one-standard deviation 
shock in OCSR. The VAR model used for estimation is Model 2 and the sample is the ‗overall 
market‘, as described in Table VI. The response variables in the four panels are, respectively, PE 
Volatility, Volatility, Spread and Order Imbalance, as defined in Table 9. The horizontal axis are time 
periods (days), following the initial shock (day 0). All variables are standardized and winsorized by 
security. Impulse response coefficients are estimated by security; mean values are depicted. 5% 
confidence intervals are computed using cross-sectional standard error estimates. 
 
Panel A: PE Volatility 
 
 
 
Panel B: Volatility 
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Figure 4. Naked Short Selling and Returns in 2008, Bear Sterns 
Plot of Outstanding Naked Short Ratio and Return Index related to Bear Sterns Companies Inc. common stock (ticker: BSC) against calendar date. The Return Index is set to 
1 on the 1st of January, 2008; )( ,


i
j
jBSCi RIndexReturn
1
1 .  jBSCR , is the observed total return for BSC on day j, from the CRSP database. 
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03/14-9:00 am:  BSC announced $30 
billion in funding provided by J.P. 
Morgan and backstopped by the 
government. 
03/16: JPM proporses to buy BSC  for
$2/share; BSC shareholders oppose.
03/22: JPM revises offer to $10/share; 
BSC shareholders approve
BSC added to the thershold list 
between 03/27 and 04/22
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Figure 5. Naked Short Selling and Returns in 2008, Lehman 
 
Plot of Outstanding Naked Short Ratio and Return Index related to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (ticker: LEH) over calendar time. The Return Index is set to 1 on the 1st 
of January, 2008; )1( 
1
,


i
j
jLEHi RIndexReturn .  jLEHR , is the observed total return for LEH on day j, from the CRSP database.    
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LEH Return Index ONSR (Right Axis)
9/9: Shares plunge 45% amid news that talks 
with Korea Developement Bank (previously 
rumored to be considering purchasing a 25% 
stake) have ended and reports that the 
investment bank was struggling to raise capital.
9/13-9/15: Over the weekend, 
talks with Bank of America and 
Barclays to buy Lehman fail. On 
9/15, Lehman files for bankruptcy9/11: Shares of Lehman drop 
another 42% as investors 
reject management's rescue 
plan
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Figure 6. Naked Short Selling and Returns in 2008, Merrill Lynch 
 
Plot of Outstanding Naked Short Ratio and Return Index related to Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (ticker: 
MER) over calendar time. The Return Index is set to 1 on the 1st of January, 2008;
)1( 
1
,


i
j
jMERi RIndexReturn .  jMERR , is the observed total return for MER on day j, from the 
CRSP database.   
 
 
 
Figure 7. Naked Short Selling and Returns in 2008, AIG 
 
Plot of Outstanding Naked Short Ratio and Return Index related to American International Group 
(ticker: AIG) over calendartime. The Return Index is set to 1 on the 1st of January, 2008;.  jAIGR , is 
the observed total return for AIG on day j, from the CRSP database. 
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